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improvements in the investment environment for other clean energy activities and 
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identify any impediments and, reflecting its public policy objectives, approaches that could 
deliver economy-wide outcomes.  
With the benefit of this report, the CEFC will investigate more fully the opportunities to 
invest in demand management and work collaboratively to support its wider 
implementation.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Overview 
This scoping study examines the potential for the Clean Energy Finance Corporation to 
help reduce customer electricity bills and foster clean energy investment in Australia by 
supporting electricity network businesses to implement Demand Management (DM). The 
report concludes that the benefits of network DM are likely to be significantly greater and 
realised more quickly if regulatory reform is complemented with a cooperative approach to 
performance targets, reporting and incentives. 
It has been recognised for over two decades that electricity DM has been under-utilised in 
Australia. In addition to reducing carbon emissions, DM can reduce business and 
household electricity bills through:  
 lower customer energy consumption (via improving end use energy efficiency)  
 lower wholesale energy prices and reduced need for peak electricity generation, and  
 deferred or avoided network capital expenditure (which has been the main driver of 
recent electricity bill increases).  
DM in the electricity sector can also directly and indirectly increase the uptake of clean 
energy initiatives, such as increased energy efficiency and renewable and low emission 
generation. 
According to the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), it is estimated that the 
‘economic cost savings of peak demand reduction in the National Electricity Market (NEM) 
is likely to be between $4.3 billion to $11.8 billion over the next ten years … which equates 
to between 3 per cent and 9 per cent of total forecast expenditure on the supply side’. 
These savings amount to ‘approximately $500 per consumer per annum (in South Australia 
and Queensland). In NSW, the savings per consumer is expected to be around $350 per 
annum … [and] in Victoria, around $120 per consumer per annum’.1  More recently, the 
Productivity Commission has estimated savings from DM could yield net benefits of 
between $900 and $1900 per household.2  
The AEMC and Productivity Commission’s estimates underpinned the December 2012 
Council of Australian Government (COAG) Standing Committee on Energy and Resources 
(SCER) reforms aimed at enhancing productivity and significantly reducing electricity bills.  
The proposed COAG/SCER electricity reforms are expected to reduce the barriers to cost-
effective DM, but these reforms are likely to take at least two years to come into effect, as 
the next Australian Energy Regulator (AER) five-year network regulatory pricing 
determinations do not take effect until 1 July 2015 for the ACT, NSW, Queensland and 
South Australia, and later in Victoria and Tasmania.3 
In the meantime, the CEFC could help accelerate the implementation of DM by offering 
finance to electricity network businesses provided that the following key conditions are met: 
                                               
1
 Australian Energy Market Commissions, 2012, Power of Choice Review – Giving consumers options in the 
way they use electricity (Final Report). 
2
 Productivity Commission, 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Framework, Final Report Vol. 2.  
3
 The current ACT/NSW regulatory control period ends on 30 June 2014. However the next ACT/NSW 
determination process has been deferred as a result of the AEMC’s November 2012 network regulation rule 
change. The period of 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 will be a transitional regulatory control period with a 
transitional determination made by the AER, followed by a substantive determination for the subsequent 
regulatory control period (1 July 2015 - 30 June 2019).  
  
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES JULY  2013 
INVESTING IN SAVINGS: FINANCE AND COOPERATIVE APPROACHES TO ELECTRICITY DM 
 
 9  
1. The Australian Energy Regulator using the current Better Regulation work-stream 
process to clarify that network businesses are able to retain a fair share of the 
avoided capital expenditure benefits delivered by DM. 
2. Government explicitly requesting (but not mandating) that NSPs adopt public DM 
targets to reduce demand, capital expenditure and customer energy bills; and that it 
requests that the network businesses regularly report progress against these 
targets. 
3. The CEFC engaging with the AER and network businesses to establish as soon as 
possible a framework to support financing of cost-effective DM. 
 
Demand management and current activities 
Electricity network investment has been the main driver of the rapid electricity bill increases 
seen in Australia over the past five years, particularly in New South Wales and Queensland. 
Electricity prices nationally have risen in real terms by 70 per cent between June 2007 and 
December 2012.4 Network charges now make up half of the average Australian electricity 
bill.5 These charges have been increased rapidly to recoup the more than $40 billion which 
is being invested in electricity distribution and transmission networks within the current 5-
year regulatory period.6 This level of investment exceeds and will be expended over a 
shorter time period than that of the National Broadband Network.7 
DM lowers or shifts the demand for a good or service (in this case electricity) as an 
alternative to providing additional supply. There is very little reliable data available on DM 
activity in Australia. However, the available evidence suggests that recent DM amounts to 
the equivalent of about one per cent of the generation capacity in the NEM, a fraction of the 
available cost-effective DM potential.  
Impediments to the higher uptake of DM include: 
 poorly designed regulation that rewards investment in growing network 
infrastructure but financially penalises utilities that undertake DM,  
 entrenched organisational and regulatory practices and values which favour 
infrastructure over DM solutions,  
 a lack of attention to DM on the part of network managers, shareholders, regulators 
and policy makers,  
 limited expertise and experience in Australia in large scale DM, and  
 a lack of relevant and reliable DM data and information. 
The relative neglect of DM also represents a risk to electricity customers and private, 
institutional and state government shareholders as technological change may make 
redundant some current network investments before they reach their full expected asset 
lifetimes. 
Reflecting these concerns and opportunities, COAG and SCER have initiated a program of 
reform. Much of this reform relates to how the AER regulates network businesses. 
However, even if implemented promptly these reforms will take time, as many are only 
intended to take effect in the AER’s next economic regulatory determinations (for the period 
2015-2020). 
                                               
4
 Productivity Commission 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra, p.2. 
5
 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2012, Electricity Prices (factsheet). 
6
 Langham et al., 2010, Building Our Savings: Reduced infrastructure costs from improving building energy 
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Internationally, there are many examples of demand management investments which 
significantly reduce the need for network investment and therefore lower customer 
electricity bills, while also increasing the reliability, productivity and profitability of the 
electricity network. These international precedents highlight the success of combining 
obligations (measurable performance against some target) and incentives to demand 
management activities. Similar conditions could be created in Australia. This study details 
how such a system of targets, reporting and incentives could operate in Australia.  
Investment opportunities for the CEFC  
Emerging clean, decentralised energy technologies and business models are likely to 
present investment opportunities for the CEFC in relation to the falling cost of solar PV and 
battery storage, the increasing penetration of advanced meters and time of use pricing, the 
rising take-up of electric vehicles and the expanding potential of smart energy management 
and energy efficient products. Peak focussed demand management is also likely to become 
more important as the proportion of the national electricity output supplied by variable 
output renewable energy generation, such as wind and solar, rises in response to the 
national 20% Renewable Energy Target. 
On the other hand, continued high levels of investment in electricity network infrastructure 
will increase ‘sunk costs’ which will then no longer be avoidable with DM. This will crowd 
out and diminish future business opportunities for clean energy technologies and add to the 
incremental cost of developing and deploying these technologies.  
The CEFC has the mandate and investment capacity to provide capital to accelerate the 
adoption of DM activities in the NEM. By doing so, the CEFC can contribute to lower 
consumer electricity bills, improvements in the investment environment for other clean 
energy activities and reduced carbon emissions. 
Creating a secure environment for DM investment 
For the CEFC to invest successfully in network DM, a number of external conditions would 
need to be met. These conditions relate to policy direction, regulatory certainty and NSP 
commitment to undertake DM. 
To provide financial support for network DM, the CEFC would need to be confident that it 
would be able to recover its investment, including returns to cover the CEFC’s cost of 
funds. While the risk profile of each investment is different, the CEFC would at least need to 
be confident of the network businesses’ commitment to DM and its capacity to ensure 
successful DM project implementation. The network businesses’ commitment and capacity 
would need to be supported by clear policy intent from the Commonwealth and/or the 
relevant state government, and regulatory certainty around the treatment and recovery of 
DM expenditure. Each of these conditions is outlined in more detail below. 
The current electricity market reform processes established by COAG/SCER have the 
potential to address both the policy and the regulatory conditions, but this potential must be 
converted into explicit policy and regulatory intent. 
Policy conditions – clear policy intent from federal and state governments 
A clear statement of policy intent is needed, indicating governments’ commitment to: 
 the long-term interests of consumers, including via the delivery of all cost-effective 
DM 
 establishing clear accountability and performance measures for DM by creating 
network DM targets and reporting in collaboration with the network businesses. 
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Governments could quickly signal their intent to prioritise cost-effective DM by asking 
Network businesses to set ‘collaborative targets for DM’ and to provide a plan of measures 
they could take to reduce customer bills. (Network businesses could reduce bills either 
directly by helping customers save energy, or indirectly by helping customers to reduce 
peak demand on the networks and cutting network expenditure.) Furthermore, network 
businesses could be asked to report what they have already achieved and how much they 
believe they can reduce costs to consumers, and by when. An initial report on these 
matters could be requested to be provided to government within a few months. 
Such a process is likely to lead to network businesses being more engaged in strategies to 
expand DM activity in the short term. Conversely, in the absence of clear policy leadership, 
the uptake of finance for DM by network businesses is likely to be low.  
Regulatory conditions – certainty around DM investments by network businesses 
The AER can facilitate the uptake of DM activities by clarifying its regulatory intent of no 
disadvantage for network businesses that engage in cost-effective DM activities. 
Specifically, the AER should make it clear that cost-effective DM expenditure undertaken in 
the current regulatory period can be offset against avoided supply side investment in the 
next regulatory period. This would provide an important reassurance for network 
businesses that wish to expand DM activity in the current regulatory period.  
There are a number of further dimensions to providing regulatory certainty, including: 
 Regulatory incentives to offset project risk: While some network businesses 
have been expanding DM activities in recent years, there remain both real and 
perceived project risks for network businesses in building up DM expertise and 
experience. The regulatory system should recognise this risk by offering financial 
incentives to network businesses. This would involve sharing with network 
businesses and their shareholders some of the potential customer benefits of DM 
that may otherwise not occur at all. 
 Opex/capex substitutability: As DM expenditure is usually operating expenditure, 
but avoidable costs are normally capital expenditure, the network businesses must 
be able to offset costs in the former against savings in the latter both within and 
between regulatory periods. 
 Removing incentive bias against DM: There are number of major biases in the 
current regulatory system which encourage network supply side expenditure and 
discourage DM. For example, as noted by the Productivity Commission, ‘all 
[network] capital spending – regardless of its efficiency – is rolled into the regulatory 
asset base (RAB) at the end of the five-year regulatory period’.8  Such provisions do 
not apply to DM, which is mainly operating expenditure. These biases need to be 
addressed. 
 Balanced regulatory risk: The risk created by regulation associated with DM must 
be no greater than the risk involved in supply side expenditure. 
Some of the above regulatory conditions can only be established if the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER) changes the provisions the electricity network regulatory determinations 
and associated schemes. Such changes would take up to two years to be fully 
implemented. 
                                               
8
 Productivity Commission 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra, p.220. 
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Stakeholder engagement and next steps 
Many stakeholders contacted in the preparation of this report, including regulators and 
some network businesses, have shown a strong level of interest in tapping into DM 
opportunities. There is a strong recognition among many NSP officers that DM needs to 
(and is likely to) play a major role in the future of the electricity supply industry. This 
recognition extends to interest in learning more about the potential for accessing finance to 
support DM. However, NSP officers are generally even more interested in the potential for 
facilitating network DM expenditure by clarifying and reforming the regulatory system. 
In this context, should the CEFC wish to develop further the opportunities for financing 
network DM, the appropriate next steps are: 
1. Engage in the current AER reform process to bring greater clarity to the treatment of 
DM expenditure in relation to offsetting future supply side capital expenditure. 
2. Inform policy makers of: the potential for network DM; the importance of setting 
clear policy directions relating to the adoption of all cost-effective DM; and the need 
for clear NSP targets and accountability. 
3. Seek support from policy makers to establish a reliable baseline of current and 
proposed network DM activity, and to articulate current activities and future 
opportunities for network DM investment. (Similar to reporting arrangements in the 
Energy Efficiency Opportunities program.) 
4. Engage with network businesses in relation to: the potential for DM, the AER reform 
process, and the role of financial support as a precursor and complement to 
regulatory reform. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
This scoping study examines the potential for the Clean Energy Finance Corporation 
(CEFC) to help reduce customer electricity bills and foster clean energy investment in 
Australia by supporting electricity network businesses to implement Demand Management 
(DM), whilst reducing emissions and facilitating a lower carbon economy.  
Demand management, which involves reducing or shifting consumption as an alternative to 
providing more supply, has significant potential to reduce carbon emissions from the 
electricity system and to provide cost savings to consumers and the wider economy. 
This report discusses CEFC investment in DM through loans to network businesses, 
including operational aspects of finance provision and recovery. The report also outlines 
complementary regulatory, policy and industry-level changes to maximise the consequent 
benefits for network businesses, the CEFC, consumers and the wider economy. These 
complementary measures were identified from a scan of DM support policies and incentive 
programs both nationally and internationally, and interviews with relevant key stakeholders 
in Australia including network businesses and regulators. 
This scoping study establishes a clear rationale for CEFC interest in network DM and 
develops a possible model for investment, which has been discussed with some key 
stakeholders. Further work is needed to test and operationalise the model with a wider 
range of stakeholders and to place it within the CEFC investment framework, and the wider 
energy regulatory and policy environment. This proposed further work is highlighted in 
Section 8. 
1.1 CEFC AND DEMAND MANAGEMENT 
The CEFC’s mission is to accelerate Australia’s transformation towards a competitive 
economy in a carbon constrained world. It pursues this mission by facilitating increased 
flows of finance into the clean energy sector.9 Clean energy technologies include: 
renewable energy, low emission generation and energy efficiency and demand 
management technologies.  
Consistent with its commercial approach, the CEFC seeks to understand the near-term 
opportunities for investment and to identify impediments to such investment; and, reflecting 
its public policy objectives, the CEFC is also interested to understand the investment 
opportunities that could deliver economy-wide outcomes.  
The CEFC is keen to understand more fully the opportunities to invest in demand 
management (DM) in the distribution/ transmission sector, and the constraints on that 
investment.  
The Garnaut Climate Change Review – Update 2011 observed that ‘when the network 
company can profit from investing less rather than more, then it will seek ways to foster 
distributed generation and to set economically efficient tariffs’.10  
The CEFC Expert Review11 directs the Corporation towards investment in the network 
company area through the provision of recommendation 2.8: 
                                               
9
 Clean Energy Finance Corporation Act 2012, s.3, & s.60. 
10
 Garnaut, R., 2011, Transforming the electricity sector (Update Paper Eight, Garnaut Climate Change Review 
– Update 2011), Commonwealth of Australia. 
11
 Clean Energy Finance Corporation, 2012, Report of the Expert Review Panel, Commonwealth of Australia. 
  
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES JULY  2013 
INVESTING IN SAVINGS: FINANCE AND COOPERATIVE APPROACHES TO ELECTRICITY DM 
 
 14  
The CEFC can finance capital expenditure that is directed towards the efficient 
use of energy and the application of demand management enabling 
technologies.12 
Further, the Expert Review Panel notes that not all demand management reduces 
energy consumption and carbon emissions. However, 
to the extent that [demand management] lowers future network upgrade costs 
and defers investment in new generation, it is a valuable tool in minimising the 
cost of moving to a cleaner energy future. Therefore the Panel recommends 
the CEFC consider enabling technologies associated with demand 
management within the ambit of the energy efficiency area.13 
Electricity distribution and transmission network  businesses, also known as or network 
service providers (NSPs), and the organisations that regulate them, impact on and are 
impacted by many if not all of CEFC’s investments – including renewable, low emissions 
and energy efficiency investments. 
The CEFC commissioned this scoping study to consider strategies to accelerate demand 
management within the electricity system, particularly by Network Service Providers.  CEFC 
hopes that this report will contribute to a clearer understanding of the working functions of 
the NSPs relating to DM, as well as CEFC’s opportunities for investment.   
1.2 WHAT IS DEMAND MANAGEMENT? 
‘Demand management’ (also known as demand side management14) refers to activities that 
lower or shift the demand for a good or service as an alternative to providing additional 
supply. Demand management is usually undertaken by organisations responsible for 
ensuring reliable and adequate supply of a good or service (such as energy, water or 
transport utilities) where moderating demand is more cost-effective than increasing supply. 
In the energy sector, demand management (DM) usually refers to actions by the utility to 
encourage ‘decentralised energy’ measures, which include: 1) end use energy efficiency 2) 
peak load management, and/or 3) distributed generation. 
Other terms are sometimes used to describe DM or facets of DM. For example demand 
side response (DSR) usually refers to short term load reduction by customers in response 
to high prices or incentives offered by utilities at times of very high demand. Demand side 
participation (DSP) on the other hand, focuses on the consumer as the central agent, acting 
on their own initiative either in response to signals from utilities or to price and other 
conditions in the market. Figure 1 shows the spectrum of all these activities. 
                                               
12





 Dunstan, C. et al. 2011, Think Small: The Australian Decentralised Energy Roadmap. CSIRO Intelligent Grid 
Research Program. Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney. 
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Figure 1: Differing perspectives on demand management 
 
Demand side participation is arguably a more appropriate term if customers or third party 
aggregators bid reduced demand directly into the competitive wholesale electricity market 
(as is currently proposed by the Australian Energy Market Commission) while demand 
management is a more accurate term for action by regulated monopoly electricity network 
businesses, where the emphasis is on the electricity utility managing demand proactively. 
The three types of ‘decentralised energy’ measures that can be promoted through demand 
management are described in Table 1. 
Table 1: Decentralised energy measures promoted by demand management 
Peak load 
management 
(LM or PLM) 
Actions that influence the timing of energy use. This occurs when 
customers are provided with information, technology and/or 
incentives to shed or interrupt their load at times of peak demand 
and shift it to times of lesser demand. The objective of peak load 
management is generally not to reduce emissions, but to limit 
unnecessary electricity price rises. This could enable greater 
implementation of other low emission DM options. 
Energy efficiency 
(EE) 
Both technologies and behaviours that deliver the required energy 
services to consumers using less energy input. Energy efficiency 
behaviours (sometimes called ‘energy conservation’) can be carried 
out by individuals or undertaken in an organisational context, and 
generally involve reducing unnecessary energy consumption. 
Examples include individuals turning lights off when not in a room, 
and organisations adjusting building management system settings to 
reduce total energy consumption while maintaining the desired level 
of occupant comfort. Energy efficiency technologies are appliances 
and equipment (‘hardware‘) that reduce electricity or fuel 




Generation technologies that are ‘embedded‘ within the electricity 
network, that supply electricity on-site or to the local area, and that 
may provide other services such as heating and cooling from the 
‘waste‘ heat associated with electricity generation, with a maximum 
size of 30MW. Technologies include solar PV panels, small wind 
turbines, gas or biomass micro turbines, fuel cells and cogeneration 
(combined heat and power), and solar or biomass heating. 
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Figure 2 illustrates different types of activities (or ‘measures’) in each of these categories 
and how they interact with peak demand. (See Appendix A for a more detailed list of 
measures.) 
Figure 2: Types of decentralised energy measures 
 
Source: ISF, Australian Decentralised Energy Roadmap, 2011. 
Decentralised energy measures are usually related to a particular end-use of electricity by a 
customer. Network service providers (NSPs) therefore cannot generally undertake DM 
measures themselves, but need to encourage customer buy in. In order to stimulate a 
measure to occur, an NSP (or other party) generally needs to use a specific ‘instrument’ to 
facilitate it. When a specific instrument is applied to stimulate a specific measure, this 
represents a specific demand management option that can be applied by an NSP, as 
shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Creating a demand management option* 
 
* ‘Option’ in this sense should not be confused with the more specific meaning of ‘option’ in finance language. 
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1.3 OPPORTUNITES FOR CEFC INVOLVEMENT 
Analysis suggests that the value of increasing demand management activities in the NEM 
could be significant; and much of this can be delivered at a cost below the long run 
marginal cost of new supply. In addition to the potential cost savings, described in Section 
2.4, DM is estimated to be able to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity 
sector by 73 megatonnes of carbon dioxide (Mt CO2) per annum, which translates to a 35% 
reduction in Australia’s C02 emissions from 2009 levels.
15 According to the CSIRO 
Intelligent Grid research collaboration cluster, as well as delivering benefits to consumers in 
the form of reduced bills, and to the environment in the form of emissions reduction, the 
wider application of demand management could also enhance the operational and financial 
performance of electricity network businesses.16 
The benefits of increasing the pace of adoption of demand management in the NEM are 
therefore clear. However as described in Section 2.5, this is not just a regulatory issue. 
Regulatory approaches that increase the incentive and obligation for electricity networks to 
investigate demand management are important, but their effectiveness is limited by the 
length of time that these approaches take to have an impact, and they do not necessarily 
address the learning and information barriers that also exist. 
The benefits from reducing peak demand are split among different actors within the 
electricity system, and so the incentives for individual actors to participate in demand 
management are diminished because they are unable to fully capture the benefits.17 
Information barriers also exist to the implementation of demand management. The costs 
associated with searching and learning about the new activities involved, combined with the 
fact that the benefits cannot be fully captured, further reduces incentives for wider 
applications of demand management. 
There are also significant future risks to electricity networks arising from failure to develop 
DM opportunities now and in the past. These risks include: 
 possible sudden cuts in capital expenditure in the next regulatory period 
 potential network overcapacity, limiting development of future lower cost 
decentralised energy (energy efficiency, demand management and distributed 
generation) 
 the potential for network assets to become stranded if decentralised energy reduces 
the need for network capacity. 
In order to overcome these issues, and given the knowledge of the wider benefits of 
increasing demand management, external support for NSPs to undertake DM is justified. 
Networks have long-term capital works programs that cannot be easily reoriented. Tapping 
the identified benefits of the increased demand management for electricity networks, 
electricity customers and the wider economy could be accelerated by bringing forward 
some of the value of these benefits to finance network DM now. If only one-third of current 
growth-related capital expenditure by the electricity networks was redirected (approximately 
$1 billion per annum) this could unlock savings of $2 to $3 billion per annum.18 
  
                                               
15
 NERA Consulting, 2012, Peak Energy Savings Scheme Design Options: A Report for the Energy Savings 
Initiative Secretariat, Prepared for the Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism.  
16




 Dunstan, C. et al. 2011, Think Small: The Australian Decentralised Energy Roadmap. CSIRO Intelligent Grid 
Research Program. Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney. 
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A collaborative approach of performance targets, reporting and incentives could accelerate 
the wider adoption of demand management. This would in turn reduce the potential for 
network over-investment in the short to medium term (2–3 years) and would improve the 
business case for DM for when the proposed COAG/SCER reforms are established. This 
approach recognises that while DM may be in the long term interests of NSPs, active 
engagement and material support from government can help remove barriers to DM and 
expedite its adoption.19 
Any incentives (in the form of financial assistance such as loans, or loan guarantees) would 
need to be contingent on electricity networks adopting specific and credible plans and 
targets for demand management. This would ensure best practice is transferred to the 
wider industry, and would enable cost reductions in demand management over time. 
The CEFC is well positioned to act as a conduit for the provision of this finance because: 
 encouraging demand management is relevant to CEFC’s wider goal of promoting a 
cleaner energy supply 
 the CEFC has the finance and monitoring capacity to ensure DM activities are 
implemented in a cost-effective manner 
 CEFC has the ability to act as ‘patient capital’ and obtain repayment of loans plus 
returns through regulatory revenue determinations. 
 
This report is set our as follows: 
 Chapter 2 presents the current state of play regarding networks and demand 
management. 
 Chapter 3 describes the key mechanisms that can enable greater uptake of 
demand management in the short and medium term. 
 Chapter 4 sets out the role that the CEFC can play in facilitating this greater uptake. 
 Chapter 5 demonstrates how CEFC involvement can integrate with existing 
economic regulation and the current reform processes. 
 Chapter 6 describes the benefits that successful uptake of DM can provide for 
consumers. 
 Chapter 7 presents conclusions of the report and outlines potential next steps. 
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2 NETWORKS AND DM: THE STATE OF PLAY 
Peak demand management is under-utilised by electricity network businesses in Australia. 
However, it is important to understand and characterise this activity, as it provides the 
knowledge base for electricity networks in Australian circumstances.  
The current usage of demand management within the Australian electricity system is low, 
equivalent to about 1% of the generation capacity in the National Electricity Market 
(NEM).20 The absence of a balanced investment environment for network business and the 
consequent failure to implement cost-effective DM has contributed to the recent rapid 
increase in electricity prices and bills in Australia. Section 2.1 outlines the recent trends in 
demand, prices and bills. Section 2.2 discusses network investment growth over recent 
years and its implications for electricity bill increases. Section 2.3 describes the current 
volume and value of network DM activities. Section 2.4 examines the potential uptake of 
demand management across a number of scenarios. Section 2.5 examines the barriers to 
uptake of demand management in light of the current experience, and potential for demand 
management within the NEM. 
2.1 RISING ELECTRICITY PRICES AND RISING BILLS 
Australia’s electricity prices have risen rapidly in recent years as shown in Figure 4 below. 
While absolute residential electricity prices are still lower than in some other countries, 
prices are currently rising at a faster rate than in most OECD countries.21 
Figure 4: Trends in residential electricity prices in Australia 
 
Source: ISF, NEM Report Card, 2011. 
                                               
20
 Futura Consulting, 2011, Power of choice – giving consumers options in the way they use electricity. 
21
 Ison, N., Usher, J., Cantley-Smith, R., Harris, S. and Dunstan, C. (2011). The NEM Report Card: How well 
does the National Electricity Market serve Australia? Prepared by the Institute for Sustainable Futures and the 
Monash University Faculty of Law for the Total Environment Centre. 
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Several factors have contributed to these price rises. The most significant of these is 
network investment as discussed in Section 2.2 below. Figure 5 shows that the network 
cost component of an average bill in NSW more than doubled over the last 5 years, 
increasing $654 from $505 in 2007/08 to $1,159 in 2012/13. 
The contribution of different cost components varies from state to state, as shown in Figure 
6. Network charges are the biggest component of prices in NSW and Queensland where 
network reliability standards have been strengthened and capital expenditure has increased 
dramatically in recent years. Network costs are lowest in the ACT, probably due mainly to 
the relatively compact and accessible nature of the urban form. The retail margin is 
particularly high in Victoria, where there is no regulation of retail electricity charges.22 The 
carbon price accounts for about 7% to 8% of the total price while the renewable energy 
target and other state-based ‘green schemes’ account for about 5%.23 
Figure 5: Components of a typical NSW annual electricity bill, 2007/08 and 2012/13 
 
Source: IPART, Review of regulated retail prices and charges for electricity 2013 to 2016, (2012).
24
 
                                               
22
 South Australia is in the process of removing retail price regulation. The ACT, NSW and Queensland maintain 
retail price regulation.  
23
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2010, Future Possible Retail Electricity Price Movements. 
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Figure 6: Components of electricity prices by state, 2011/12 
 
(*Vic = 2012 calendar year) 
Source: AEMC Future Possible Retail Electricity Price Movements, 2010; Treasury modeling. 
An estimated one-third of the current investment in the networks is to cater for growth, and 
in particular, growth in peak demand. Peak demand refers to the points of highest electricity 
demand during a single half-hour period within the electricity system. Peak demand events 
occur for less than forty hours per year (or less than 1% of the time) yet account for 
approximately 25% of the average residential bill.25 This is because the electricity network 
must be built to accommodate this peak, even if this level of utility only occurs in very small 
periods of time each year. 
Peak demand growth is projected to continue to outpace growth in energy consumption 
over the next decade, placing further upward pressure on electricity prices.26 As electricity 
demand becomes ‘peakier’ – ie as it is characterised by higher maximum demand relative 
to average demand, the efficiency of the network diminishes, and the investment that is 
made to augment the network becomes less and less efficient. 
2.2 RAPID INCREASE IN NETWORK INVESTMENT 
To date the response to increased peak demand has been largely a supply side response – 
with more network capacity built to carry greater levels of supply. Demand management 
solutions have had very little uptake in the Australian electricity system. Only 1% of peak 
demand in the national electricity market is currently met with demand side measures27 and 
this activity is concentrated in one state, Queensland.28  Further, annual expenditure on 
                                               
25
 Productivity Commission (2012) Electricity Network Regulation (Draft report), Melbourne. 
26
 Dunstan, C. et al. (2011) Think Small: The Australian Decentralised Energy Roadmap, CSIRO Intelligent Grid 
Research Program. Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney. 
27
 Wright, G., 2012, Demand management targets for networks in the National Electricity Market (discussion 
paper). Total Environment Centre, Sydney. 
28
 Dunstan, C., Giotto, N. & Ross, K., 2011, Report of the 2010 Survey of Electricity Network Demand 
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demand management (DM) currently represents less than one per cent of total annual 
expenditure on electricity supply, as discussed in Section 2.3.29  
The AER notes that network investment in the current regulatory cycle is ‘running at 
historically high levels’, with transmission and distribution networks spending $7 billion and 
$35 billion respectively on network infrastructure in the current five-year regulatory period.30 
This expenditure is larger than the cost of the National Broadband Network and occurs over 
a shorter period of time. The spread of this expenditure by state is shown in Figure 7. 
New South Wales and Queensland both show marked increases in capital expenditure in 
the period from 2009. Across Australia, network augmentation expenditure accounts for 
approximately $3.7 billion of the transmission and $10 to $16 billion of the distribution 
investment.31 Augmentation-related expenditure is therefore expected to account for 
between 35 and 50 per cent of all electricity network capital expenditure forecast to take 
place within the current five-year period. That said, not all of this will be related simply to 
growth in peak demand.32 
Figure 7: Electricity network capital expenditure (T&D) by jurisdiction, 2006–2015 
 
Source: E Langham et al. (ISF), Building Our Savings, 2010 (updated). 
2.3 CURRENT DM ACTIVITY BY NETWORK BUSINESSES 
Although there is currently no comprehensive national survey or database, it is clear that 
there is already a significant amount energy efficiency, peak load management and 
distributed generation deployed in Australia.33 There has also been some important recent 
progress by network businesses in relation to DM as illustrated in Appendix D.  However, it 
is also clear that few of the Australia’s decentralised energy resources are deployed as a 
result of network DM and there remains large untapped potential for cost-effective DM. 
                                               
29
 Dunstan, C. et al. 2011, Think Small: The Australian Decentralised Energy Roadmap. CSIRO Intelligent Grid 
Research Program. Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney. 
30
 Australian Energy Regulator, 2011, State of the Energy Market report (excludes WA and NT). 
31
 NERA Consulting, 2012, Peak Energy Savings Scheme Design Options: A Report for the Energy Savings 




 As discussed in Section 1.2, end use energy efficiency, peak load management and distributed generation 
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Demand and peak demand activities by networks 
Peak demand activities are of critical interest to electricity networks because the electricity 
network must be built to a size which can cater for peak demand.  While other actors may 
be interested in demand management activities that result in electricity use reductions – 
such as energy efficiency to provide resource efficiency and carbon emissions reductions – 
for electricity networks, DM is of potential interest if it addresses peak electricity demand 
times in areas at or approaching their network supply capacity. 
The latest available figures, from the 2011 Survey of Electricity Network Demand 
Management in Australia34, identify just over 350MW of demand reduction from network DM 
projects in Australia in 2010/11, as presented in Figure 8. This was a substantial increase 
on 2009/10 figures (126MW), but still small in an electricity system that has more than 
45,000 MW of generation capacity. 
Figure 8: Network peak demand reduction by project type (MW) 
 
Source: ISF, Report of the 2010 Survey of Electricity Network Demand Management in Australia, 2011. 
This survey found that across 19 of the 20 Australian network businesses there are 97 load 
management programs, spread over a range of initiatives as illustrated in Table 2.35 These 
data suggest that NSPs are expanding their DM activity. Appendix D provides examples of 
recent DM undertaken by NSPs in Australia.  
It is important to note that this survey of DM undertaken by NSPs over the preceding 
decade does not encompass all electricity sector DM.  For example, it excludes residential 
off peak water programs that have been established over many decades and probably 
amount to some thousands of megawatts of peak demand reduction. While these are an 
important part of DM practice in Australia, such programs were, typically, established 
several decades ago, not initiated by the NSPs and are not focussed on addressing 
network constraints or peaks.  
                                               
34
 Dunstan, C., Giotto, N. & Ross, K., 2011, Report of the 2010 Survey of Electricity Network Demand 
Management in Australia (SENDMA). Prepared for the Australian Alliance to Save Energy by the Institute for 
Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, Sydney. 
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Table 2: Number and types of peak load management projects in Australia 
Peak Load Management Project Type No. of Projects 
Power factor correction 23 
Direct load control. Including hot water, air conditioning and pool pumps 17 
Stand-by generators for peak demand supply, incl. cogeneration and diesel 16 
Tariff trials, including time of use 10 
Load shifting 8 
Commercial and residential energy efficiency projects 3 
Fuel Switching 1 
Mixed projects, where multiple elements are use in a particular location 8 
Other 11 
TOTAL 97 
Source: ISF, Australian Decentralised Energy Roadmap, 2011. 
The majority of reported network demand management projects are taking place in 
Queensland36, as shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10. This stems from Queensland electricity 
distributors, Energex and Ergon Energy developing comprehensive demand management 
programs as part of their current regulatory revenue determinations. Outside Queensland, 
much of the network DM activity appears to be focussed around trials and pilots.  
Figure 9: Peak demand reduction by state  Figure 10: DM expenditure by state 
  
Source: ISF, Report of the 2010 Survey of Electricity Network Demand Management in Australia, 2011. 
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Electricity distributors are not the only source of demand management within the electricity 
system.   In its 2011 Electricity Statement of Opportunities report, AEMO identified 142 MW 
of capacity that was ‘very likely’ to be available across the NEM through demand side 
participation over the 2011–12 summer. 
Another study highlights demand management activities instigated by electricity retailers 
and by state government policies and programs.37 These programs include the NSW 
Government’s Energy Efficiency Scheme (EES), the South Australian Government’s 
Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme (REES) and the Victorian Government’s Victorian 
Energy Efficiency Target (VEET). 
Energy efficiency policies and schemes can contribute to peak demand management even 
though many of the activities that they promote target savings across the whole day. For 
example energy efficiency activities in commercial refrigeration reduce energy used by this 
equipment across the whole day, including the times of peak demand. Significant 
reductions in peak demand can be achieved from energy efficiency activities. This has been 
demonstrated in the US where utility energy efficiency and peak demand management 
programs are reported to be delivering peak demand reduction equal to 4.4% of the US 
peak demand, as shown later in Figure 21. This means that the amount of US peak DM 
activity is comparable to total Australian peak demand in the NEM. 
The above mentioned schemes have a number of objectives around market development 
and capacity building for energy efficiency in addition to energy savings. Figure 11 shows 
the target and estimated energy savings achieved by these schemes and activities. In 
2010/11 about 350MW in peak demand savings was achieved across the NEM by these 
activities – about the same amount achieved in that year by the NSPs. 
Figure 11: Peak demand reduction from network, energy market and state-based DM 
 
Source: ISF, NEM Report Card, 2011. 
                                               
37
 Ison, N., Usher, J., Cantley-Smith, R., Harris, S. and Dunstan, C. (2011). The NEM Report Card: How well 
does the National Electricity Market serve Australia? Prepared for the Total Environment Centre by the 
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Use of regulatory incentives 
In Australia, regulatory incentives for network DM have often taken the form of direct 
funding allocation to the businesses.38 For example, in South Australia the electricity 
industry regulator, the Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA), 
provided $ 20.4 million for DM initiatives to be implemented by the sole electricity DNSP in 
the State, ETSA Utilities, over the five-year regulatory period beginning July 2005.39 
ETSA Utilities was required to submit to the regulator for approval a program for the 
implementation of DM initiatives and expenditure of the approved funding over the 
regulatory period. The approved funding was treated as operating expenditure, and did not 
impact on the regulator’s consideration of approved capital expenditure for network 
augmentation purposes in the regulatory period.40 
At the end of the five-year period, after 27 trials were completed, only $11.7million of the 
allocated budget of $20.4 million (in 2004 dollars) had been spent, so ETSA submitted a 
proposal for a further five trials focusing on the characteristics of the evolving ‘smarter grid’ 
technology to be funded to June 2012 by the $8.7 million. 
A summary of the annual cost expenditure in each ESCOSA-determined category is set out 
in Table 3 below, and shows that, in accordance with the trial outcomes, Direct Load 
Control (DLC) accounted for 63% of the total expenditure. This was followed by Power 
Factor Correction (PFC) at 6%, Standby Generation (SG) at 4% and Voluntary and 
Curtailable Load Control (VCLC) at 2%. Expenditure on other categories was insignificant. 
Data on the savings from the trials were not made available. 
Table 3: Summary DM expenditure by ESCOSA by category 
 
($'000) 
Life to Date 
(2010) cost  
2010 to 2012 
Budget 
Total 
DM Program 11,752 20 11,772 
Administration and Reporting 2,138 123 2,261 
Power Factor Correction 660 0 660 
Standby Generation 373 -54 319 
Direct Load Control (DLC) 6,931 -54 6,877 
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) 7 0 7 
Voluntary/Curtailable Control 268 0 268 
Interval Meters 0 0 - 
Aggregation 4 0 4 
DM Org within ETSA Utilities 1,370 5 1,375 
Other 0 - - 
Phase IV Trial 3,889 8,655 12,544 
DLC with AMI Trial 17 263 280 
Proof of Concept Trial 27 27 54 
Defined Area Trial 1,800 3,428 5,228 
Communications Trial 1,962 2,639 4,601 
Technology Integration Trial 83 2,298 2,381 
Total 15,641 8,655 24,296 
Source: ETSA, Annual Demand Management Compliance Report, 2011. 
                                               
38
 Crossley, D. 2010, International Best Practice in Using Energy Efficiency and Demand Management to 
Support Electricity Networks. Prepared for the Australian Alliance to Save Energy by Energy Futures 
Australia. 
39
 ETSA Utilities, 2011 Annual Demand Management Compliance Report. 
40
 Crossley, D. 2010, op cit. 
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A number of peak demand management trials have also been conducted by NSW 
electricity distributors. On average these trials have achieved between 5% and 35% 
reductions in peak demand, as shown in Figure 12. 
Figure 12: Summary of peak demand reduction results from DM trials in Australia 
 
Source: AEMC Power of Choice Review Final Report, 2012. 
Another example of a direct regulatory funding allocation to NSPs is the Demand 
Management Incentive Schemes (DMIS). To date, the take-up rate within the current 
regulatory period of this allocation by electricity networks has been low. The most recent 
AER report41 on DMIA expenditures for non-Victorian distribution NSPs (DNSPs) states that 
DNSPs claimed $2.2 million in DMIA expenditures in 2011–12, just over twice the amount 
in 2010–11, as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Annual aggregate DMIA expenditure by DNSPs 
DNSPs  2009-10  2010-11/2011  2011-12/2012  
Non-Victorian  $360,398 $1,005,751 $2,218,125 
Victorian  N/A $551,936 – 
Source: AER Demand management incentive scheme assessment report 2011-12 (Non-Victorian DNSPs). 
AER-approved DMIA expenditure from 2009–10 to 2011–12 accounts for approximately 14 
per cent of the total allowance available to the non-Victorian DNSPs in their current five-
year regulatory control periods, as shown in Table 5.  This low uptake of DM by NSPs even 
where money is allocated specifically for the purpose suggests that funding alone is not 
sufficient to drive rapid expansion of network DM. 
                                               
41
 Australian Energy Regulator, 2013, Demand management incentive scheme assessment report 2011-12 
(Non-Victorian DNSPs). 
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ActewAGL  $19,675 $19,675 $58,521 $473,890 11.0%  
Ausgrid  $661,335 $661,335 $715,950 $4,608,155 13.4%  
Endeavour Energy  $268,642 $268,642 $437,580 $2,756,884 13.7%  
Energex  N/A N/A $51,553 $5,515,602 1.0%  
Ergon Energy  $540,108 $540,108 $1,009,486 $4,197,669 19.4%  
Essential Energy  $728,365 $728,365 $1,311,084 $1,883,380 41.0%  
SA Power Networks  N/A N/A N/A $3,124,293 0.0%  
TOTAL  $2,218,125  $2,218,125  $3,584,274  $22,199,773  13.9%  
Source: AER Demand management incentive scheme assessment report 2011-12 (Non-Victorian DNSPs). 
2.4 POTENTIAL FOR DM 
Energy policy and market development in Australia have historically had a strong supply-
side focus, leaving significant scope for introducing cost-effective demand-side efficiencies 
such as: 
 end-use energy efficiency 
 better utilised energy infrastructure (capacity). 
Rising peak demand is one of the three primary drivers of this network investment, and 
peak demand growth is projected to continue to outstrip growth in energy consumption over 
the next 10 years, placing continued upward pressure on electricity prices. 
The NEM is also highly centralised with a number of large-scale electricity generators and a 
large transmissions and distribution network to support the delivery of electricity from these 
large generators. This is slowly changing as more and more smaller-scale renewable 
generators connect to the grid. It is also changing in the face of growing evidence that 
decentralised energy (energy efficiency, peak load management and distributed generation) 
built to local scales, has the potential to reduce the need for costly network infrastructure 
and increase the flexibility of the electricity network to support multiple small scale and 
intermittent generators and demand management options.  
As shown in Figure 13, around one-third of total approved network investment, or almost 
$15 billion, is growth related and most of this is driven by peak demand growth and is thus 
potentially avoidable if demand growth were to be reduced or eliminated through DM.  In 
practice, it would not be practical or cost-effective to avoid all of this $15 billion of capital 
expenditure through DM. However, it is also likely that DM could also assist in displacing or 
deferring a share of the non-growth related capital expenditure driven by factors such as 
reliability requirements and asset replacement.  So while it is clear that much more detailed 
and transparent analysis of the potential for DM to defer and avoid network infrastructure 
spending is urgently required, it is also clear that DM could trim a significant share of this 
$47 billion expenditure.  
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Figure 13: Potentially avoidable capital expenditure vs total network capex ($m 2010) 
  
Source: ISF, Australian Decentralised Energy Roadmap, 2011. 
If deployed strategically, DM presents a means of achieving substantial reductions in this 
component of network spending. Analysis in 2010 found that decentralised energy 
measures could reduce annual electricity system by almost $3 billion per annum by 2020 
compared to ‘business as usual’ system, as shown in Figure 14.  
These savings could be either be passed on to consumers as bill savings, or ‘recycled’ to 
maximise carbon emission abatement by investing in additional decentralised energy and 
gas-fired generation and retiring up to 7000MW of coal fired power stations at no extra cost 
to consumer.  (If this analysis were to be repeated today the achievable savings in 2020 
would still be significant but somewhat lower as some of the potentially avoided network 
costs have now been spent.) 
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Energy, Working Paper 4.3 (ver. 2). 
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The AEMC Power of Choice review reported an estimate ‘that economic cost savings of 
peak demand reduction in the National Electricity Market (NEM) is likely to be between $4.3 
billion to $11.8 billion over the next ten years … which equates to between 3 per cent and 9 
per cent of total forecast expenditure on the supply side’. These savings amount to 
‘approximately $500 per consumer per annum (in South Australia and Queensland). In 
NSW, the savings per consumer is expected to be around $350 per annum … [and] in 
Victoria, around $120 per consumer per annum’.44 
Another recent study, using a different methodology, has concluded: 
The Council of Australian Governments’ review (the ‘Parer Review’ in 2002) and the 
report of the Energy Reform Implementation Group in 2006 recommended that action 
should be taken to strengthen demand-side participation. 
Our analysis leads to the conclusion that if the Parer Review recommendation had 
been implemented and 3,000 MW of [Demand Response] had been available to 
reduce peak demand from what it is now, $15.8bn of expenditure on generation, 
transmission and distribution infrastructure could have been avoided.45 
The Productivity Commission estimated in the draft report of its Inquiry into Electricity 
Network Regulatory Frameworks that DM ‘could yield net benefits of between $1500-3400 
per household’.46 This estimate underpinned the December 2012 Council of Australian 
Government’s (COAG) Standing Committee on Energy and Resources (SCER) reforms 
and the Prime Minister’s proposed ‘plan to make sure that families pay $250 less per year 
for electricity’.47   In its Final Report, the Productivity Commission, noted,  
If a smart meter rollout is implemented efficiently and targeted at regions where 
capacity constraints are impending, then the relevant households could get a stream 
of benefits that add to around $900–$1900 per household in net present value 
terms. This stream of benefits is equivalent to an annual benefit of around $100-
$200 over the life of the meter.48 
These estimates focussed on the use of smart meters and time of use pricing.  If the 
benefits of non-price based energy efficiency DM programs were to be included then the 
total benefits would be expected to be significantly higher. 
It should be noted that these estimates have not been endorsed by the NSPs themselves, 
but they do serve to provide an indication of the potential scale of benefits that could be 
achieved through DM and more efficient development of electricity networks in Australia.  
Potential for Peak Load Management 
Demand side solutions are consistently lower cost for our electricity system when compared 
with supply side solutions (ie new generation – both fossil fuel and renewable – and new 
network infrastructure). Cost curve analysis in Figure 15 and Figure 16 shows demand 
management activities – particularly industrial, commercial and residential energy efficiency 
measures – are well below the cost per MWh of supply side solutions for meeting peak 
demand. 
 
                                               
44
 Australian Energy Market Commissions, 2012, Power of Choice Review – Giving consumers options in the 
way they use electricity (Final Report). 
45
 Mountain, B., 2012, Reducing Electricity Costs through Demand Response in the National Electricity Market. 
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 Productivity Commission, 2012, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks (Draft Report). 
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 Julia Gillard, 2012, Transcript of Interview with Paul Bongiorno, Rafael Epstein and Patricia Karvelas, Meet 
The Press, 2 Dec 2012.  
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 Productivity Commission, 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks (Final Report). 
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Figure 15: Peak power by source category ($m/MWp) 
 
Source: ISF, Evaluating the Costs and Potential of Decentralised Energy, CSIRO Intelligent Grid Research 
Program, 2010. 
 
Figure 16: Peak power by cost component ($m/MWp) 
 
Source: ISF, Evaluating the Costs and Potential of Decentralised Energy, CSIRO Intelligent Grid Research 
Program, 2010. 
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2.5 BARRIERS TO DM 
The previous sections have highlighted the current uptake of demand management within 
the electricity system and compared this with the benefits that a wider uptake of demand 
side solutions in the electricity system would offer. These benefits include significant 
reductions in the amount of investment required to deliver electricity in the NEM, and also 
the opportunity of increased flexibility in the electricity system as it decarbonises. 
This section looks at the barriers that are preventing the wider take-up of demand 
management. The electricity system is complex, and as this analysis of the barriers shows, 
the inertia and institutional forces within the system that are preventing the wider uptake of 
demand management are also complex and multi-layered. 
A survey of energy market participants and stakeholders highlights six types of institutional 
barriers to demand management activities as highlighted in Figure 17. These include: 
 information barriers 
 spilt incentives 
 payback gaps 
 externalities and price structures 
 regulatory barriers 
 cultural barriers. 
These barriers interact to create confusion which is itself a further barrier to demand 
management. 
Figure 17: Institutional barriers to demand management 
 
Source: ISF, Survey of Barriers to Demand Management, 2011. 
Not all barriers to electricity demand management are equally important. Figure 18 shows 
the ten barriers to demand management that stakeholders (including utilities as shown) 
rated in a survey as being the most significant. The barriers of most significance to NSPs 
include: 
 regulatory processes that do not consider DM investments on an equivalent basis to 
network augmentation 
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 cultural bias favouring supply side solutions and limited experience of and expertise 
in demand management within the networks 
 price structures which create a mismatch between cost of electricity and the time 
and location of use 
 split incentive barriers between energy users and networks in a disaggregated 
electricity system which mean that the benefits of demand management are hard to 
capture and that they accrue to DM proponents. 
The top ranked barrier – lack of coordination at state and national level – relates to a 
number of these specific barriers, but also to information barriers. Information barriers can 
also be considered as knowledge gaps, and these exist in both a tacit and codified form. 
Usually, when information barriers are referred to, this points to codified knowledge gaps. 
Codified knowledge gaps assume a tacit knowledge base built on experience and practice 
and the transmission of this knowledge both within the industry and to other key 
stakeholders. Issues of coordination speak more to a tacit knowledge gap that has not yet 
developed into an explicit information need. 
Figure 18: Top 10 barriers to demand management 
 
 
Source: ISF, Survey of Barriers to Demand Management, 2010. 
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Regulatory barriers 
Regulatory barriers are a major impediment to the implementation to network DM. In its 
2012 ‘Power of Choice’ directions paper, the AEMC found that the current arrangements 
could be discouraging distribution businesses from pursuing efficient DM projects.49 
Stakeholders – and the businesses themselves – generally agreed with this finding. 
According to the businesses, under the current arrangements there are insufficient financial 
rewards to motivate them to undertake DM. The result is a preference for network capital 
investment – which consumers pay for over the long term – and under-development of the 
potential of the demand side. 
The factors contributing to this preference for capital investment relate to the following 
characteristics of the businesses’ planning and investment decision-making framework: 
 the regulatory frameworks for assessing and approving operating expenditure 
(opex) and capital expenditure (capex) and the potential profit associated with DM 
projects 
 differing financial returns of opex and capex (the regulatory framework has a 
powerful influence on this) 
 the inability of businesses’ planning processes and procedures to generate network 
and DM solutions 
 the businesses’ approach to risk management and decision-making at all levels 
within the organisation 
 the ways in which network businesses recover their allowed costs through their tariff 
structures 
 the ways in which the businesses’ planning and investment frameworks support 
them in managing the risks and uncertainty associated with DM projects, especially 
given that the DM market is in the early stages of development and the technology 
is constantly evolving.50 
These factors are plotted in Figure 19 on the basis of their ability to be influenced by the 
regulatory framework and business. The incentives for and assessment of expenditure 
related to DM are both seen as highly influenced by the regulatory framework. 
There are also technology specific regulatory barriers. For example,  the ‘ring fencing’ 
limitations on NSPs supporting and investing in distributed generation limits their ability to 
use distributed generation strategically to benefit the network and customers. This issue 
has also been highlighted by the AEMC which states in recommendation 21 of its Power of 
Choice Review Final Report: 
The AER should give consideration to the benefits of allowing distribution 
businesses to own and operate distributed generation assets when developing the 
national ring fencing guidelines for these businesses.51 
 
 
                                               
49
 The AEMC referred in its report to DM as ‘Demand Side Participation’ or DSP. 
50
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Power of Choice Review – Giving consumers options in the 
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Figure 19: Institutional barriers to demand management 
 
Source: AEMC Power of Choice Review Final Report, 2012. 
 
It is also important to recognise that in there is a cultural dimension to the relatively slow 
uptake of DM in Australia.    In concluding its Inquiry into DM in 2002, the Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW found, 
It is the Tribunal’s strong view that there is significant untapped potential for efficient 
demand management. To a large extent, one of the major obstacles continues to be 
a culture which favours traditional 'build' engineering solutions and which pays little 
more than lip service to alternative options.52 
 
                                               
52
 Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW (2002), Inquiry into the Role of Demand Management 
and Other Options in the Provision of Energy Services. 
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3 UNLOCKING DM POTENTIAL 
There is a range of policy tools available to address the barriers to tapping the large 
potential for DM in Australia. Many of the most effective tools are highlighted in the ‘Policy 
Palette’ in Figure 20. 
Figure 20: Policy tools to address barriers to demand management53 
 
Source: ISF, Australian Decentralised Energy Roadmap, 2011. 
The key elements from the above palette in the context of network DM are regulatory 
reform, targets, information and incentives, and are discussed individually below. 
3.1 REDUCING REGULATORY BARRIERS TO DM 
To provide financial support for network DM, the CEFC would need to be confident that it 
would be able to recover its investment, including a return to cover the CEFC’s cost of 
funds. While the CEFC may choose to share risk with NSPs, it would as a minimum need to 
be confident that the NSP had the capacity and commitment to successfully implement a 
DM project, and that the regulatory system would not create barriers to the recovery of 
prudent DM expenditure. To provide the CEFC with the required level of confidence, the 
following NSP conditions are required. 
Box 1: Required NSP conditions 
 Demonstrated management commitment to successful implementation 
 Clear DM performance measures and savings targets 
 Effective risk management processes. 
                                               
53
 DE or ‘decentralised energy’ includes end use energy efficiency, peak load management, and distributed 
generation measures. 
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To facilitate the above NSP conditions, some or all of the following regulatory conditions are 
required. 
Box 2: Required Regulatory conditions 
 Efficient cost recovery: Where an NSP undertakes DM at a cost lower than the 
avoided cost of network supply or augmentation, the NSP must be able, via 
customer network charges, to recover, as a minimum, the full cost of the DM 
measure or program. (In addition, the NSP should be able to recover some share of 
the avoided supply costs, as discussed below.) NSPs should be explicitly 
encouraged to include specific DM operating expenditure in their regulatory 
proposals well in advance of the next regulatory determinations.   
 Inter-period offsets: NSPs must be able to capture and offset the value of future 
avoided costs (in the next regulatory period) against current DM expenditure (in the 
current regulatory period). This means that the regulator must clearly and explicitly 
take these actual and avoided costs into account at the five-yearly regulatory 
determination. 
 Opex/capex substitutability: As DM expenditure is usually operating expenditure 
but avoidable costs are normally capital expenditure, the NSP must be able to offset 
costs in the former against savings in the latter.  NSPs should be able to earn the 
equivalent of a return on investment for DM expenditure. 
 Removing incentive bias against DM: There are number of major biases in the 
current regulatory system which encourage network supply side expenditure and 
discourage DM. For example, as noted by the Productivity Commission, ‘all 
[network] capital spending – regardless of its efficiency – Is rolled into the regulatory 
asset base (RAB) at the end of the five-year regulatory period’.54  Such provisions 
do not apply to DM, which is mainly operating expenditure. These biases need to be 
addressed. 
 Balanced regulatory risk: The risk created by regulations associated with DM 
must be no greater than the risk involved in supply side expenditure. 
 Regulatory incentives to offset project risk: Given the actual and perceived 
project risks associated with building up DM expertise and experience in relatively 
unfamiliar areas, the regulatory system should offset this risk by offering financial 
incentives to NSPs.  This will involve sharing with NSPs and their shareholders 
some of the benefits of DM that would otherwise accrue to customers. Failure to do 
so will likely mean the benefits of DM accrue to no one.  In this context, the current 
DM Incentive Allowances may be counter-productive, as they create the semblance 
of an incentive, but are so relatively small that they have been largely neglected by 
the NSPs.  
Some of the above regulatory conditions can only be established if the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER) changes the provisions the electricity network regulatory determinations 
and associated schemes. This is likely to take up to two years to be achieved. Note that the 
first two of the above conditions are critical to the viability of providing finance for DM. The 
AER could create these conditions by simply clarifying the provisions of the existing 
determinations. 
                                               
54
 Productivity Commission 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra, p.220. 
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To facilitate the above regulatory conditions, the following government policy conditions are 
required (see Box 3). 
Box 3: Required government policy conditions 
 Commitment to the long term interests of consumers, including through the delivery of 
all cost-effective DM 
 Establishment of clear accountability and performance measures for DM, including for 
example, establishing network DM targets and reporting in collaboration with the NSPs 
 Primary focus on customer bills rather than price 
 Incentives to engage NSPs’ interest and offset start-up costs (to the extent that 
regulatory incentives are inadequate for this purpose).  
The current electricity market reform processes established by the Council of Australian 
Governments and the Ministerial Standing Committee on Energy and Resources have the 
potential to address both the regulatory and policy conditions, but this potential must be 
converted into explicit regulatory and policy intent. 
The first three policy conditions above could be established relatively quickly by a statement 
of policy intent by government. The fourth condition is contingent on the absence of 
effective regulatory incentives and may therefore be unnecessary. 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on those key elements not currently being addressed 
– specifically, targets, reporting and incentives. 
3.2 DM TARGETS: MANDATORY VS COLLABORATIVE 
The implementation of performance measures and targets is fundamental to the strategic 
management of any organisation or government policy. Electricity NSP managers routinely 
adopt performance indicators and targets and track progress in relation to many key 
aspects of their operations, such as cost, profitability, dividends, reliability, safety, power 
quality, customer satisfaction and price. It is understood that some of these performance 
targets apply, not just to how the organisation is judged, but also to the remuneration of 
senior executives – a powerful motivator for management priorities. However, to date DM 
targets have generally not been adopted by Australian NSPs (the Queensland DNSPs 
Energex and Ergon Energy being the main exceptions as discussed below). 
Some network managers and shareholders, policy makers, and regulators are concerned 
that DM can reduce NSP revenue, profit and dividends. However, this is only the case 
where network regulations are poorly designed and ‘couple’ kWh throughput to profit. 
Provided regulations are well designed, DM targets can help NSP achieve other objectives 
such as lowering costs, and enhancing profitability, dividends, reliability and customer 
satisfaction, while also lowering customer bills. The impact of DM on price is less definitive, 
as it depends on what is currently driving NSP costs and what types of DM are deployed.  
In order to stimulate the clean energy sector, state, territory and federal governments in 
Australia have imposed legislative targets on electricity retailers in relation to renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, greenhouse gas emissions and gas fired generations.55 
However, they have not to date imposed specific performance targets in relation to DM, 
                                               
55
 For example, the Large Renewable Energy Target, the Small Renewable Energy Scheme, the NSW and ACT 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme, the NSW Energy Savings Target, the Victorian Energy Efficiency 
Target, the South Australian Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme and the Queensland Gas Scheme. 
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even though such targets have been in place in numerous jurisdictions overseas for many 
years, as described in Appendix C. 
In principle, governments could establish through legislation or regulation a similar scheme 
for DM targets to apply to electricity retailers or networks in Australia. Indeed, the federal 
government has considered the possibility of a peak demand savings component in its 
proposed National Energy Savings Initiative.56 However, while there some clear advantages 
associated with a mandatory approach to DM targets, there are also three major 
weaknesses: 
1. A mandatory scheme would take an extended period of time, at least until 2015, to 
be negotiated between jurisdictions, and then to be legislated and implemented. 
2. In the wake of the controversy over rising electricity prices and the imposition of new 
cost obligations on electricity utilities in the form the carbon price and renewable 
energy schemes, governments are likely to be reluctant to impose an additional 
obligation on electricity suppliers that could lead to any increase electricity prices, 
even if this also leads to lower average electricity bills. 
3. As network capital expenditure is currently the major driver for higher electricity bills, 
and the major source of avoidable cost for DM, the greatest benefit is likely to derive 
from applying the target to networks rather than retailers.  However, as network 
capacity constraints are very time and location specific, nominating effective and 
efficient mandatory DM targets for NSPs would be problematic. Allocating equitable 
targets to NSPs with different peak demand and capital expenditure profiles is likely 
to be contentious. Measuring, reporting and verifying DM outcomes in very different 
organisational, climatic and economic circumstances across Australia without well-
established precedents and conventions is likely to be very challenging. 
The AEMC has also cautioned against mandatory targets: 
For networks, DSP outcomes should be measured on a project by project basis, given 
that the value of DSP will be specific to the location and demand characteristics. Higher 
level measures may be too volatile to be helpful.57 
An approach more likely to be effective is for government to engage cooperatively with 
NSPs in setting non-mandatory collaborative targets for DM. Collaborative targets would 
involve government setting an overall DM target and working with each NSP to identify how 
much DM they could contribute to achieving that target. The Canadian province of Ontario 
provides a successful example of this approach (see Appendix C.2 for more details). 
Such collaborative targets could be initiated by individual state or territory governments, the 
Australian Government or cooperatively by both levels of government and they would not 
require legislation or a change to the National Electricity Rules. 
The key objective of collaborative targets would be to encourage electricity network 
businesses to volunteer to set quantitative goals for helping their customers to reduce the 
growth in peak demand, energy consumption and energy bills. Given the voluntary 
dimension of collaborative targets, they would only be effective to the extent that the NSPs 
responded to government leadership. However, as collaborative targets would need to 
focus on DM options that are mutually beneficial for NSPs and customers, the NSPs would 
have good reason to respond positively. 
                                               
56
 NERA Consulting, 2012, Peak Energy Savings Scheme Design Options: A Report for the Energy Savings 
Initiative Secretariat, Prepared for the Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism. 
57
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Power of Choice Review - Giving consumers options in the way 
they use electricity (Final Report), p.224. 
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The setting and achievement of ambitious collaborative DM targets would require the 
removal of regulatory disincentives to DM by the AER (this is already in train as described 
above) and the provision of meaningful incentives (which are discussed below). 
Precedents 
There are numerous precedents for DM targets in Australia and overseas. Some of the 
most noteworthy are: 
 Ontario Electricity Conservation and Demand Management Program: Sets 
targets of peak demand reduction of 1330 MW and energy savings of 6000 GWh 
between 2011 and 2014.58 
 Queensland Energy Conservation and Demand Management Program: ($47 
million).59 
 US Energy Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS) and Efficiency Goals (EG): 
15 states and one power authority have implemented peak reduction targets within 
their EERS or EG, or award additional certificates for peak reductions. Targets are 
available for California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Texas and Vermont.60 
 UK Energy Efficiency Obligations: a white certificate scheme has been in place in 
the UK since 1994. Though not targeted specifically at peak demand, it is estimated 
that this has resulted in an 800 MWe reduction in peak demand.61 
A full list and details of reviewed state-based and international schemes incorporating peak 
demand are set out in Appendix C. 
Defining DM targets 
DM targets can be defined using a range of possible units. DM targets can relate either to 
inputs (such as the amount or proportion of funds to be devoted to demand management 
activities) or outcomes (such as the amount of end-use or system peak demand reduction 
to be achieved, or the number or value of augmentation projects to be deferred). Energy 
consultants Oakley Greenwood suggest that input targets should be considered as 
transitional or capacity building mechanisms. Two types of outcome-based targets they 
suggest are: 
 reducing, by a specified percentage, the forecast growth in network system peak 
demand 
 reducing, by a specified percentage, the capital that is forecast to be spent on 
augmentation projects driven by increased peak demand.62 
The two most obvious metrics for DM targets are energy (MWh per annum) and peak 
demand (MWp or MWp/year). Energy efficiency targets are typically denominated in MWh 
per annum, and this is appropriate where the objective is primarily carbon emission 
abatement. On the other hand, if the primary objective is reducing infrastructure costs, 
                                               
58
 Ontario Executive Council, cited in Dunstan, C. et al. 2011, op cit. 
59
 Queensland Government, 2009a, cited in Dunstan, C. et al. 2011, Think Small: The Australian Decentralised 
Energy Roadmap. CSIRO Intelligent Grid Research Program. Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of 
Technology Sydney. 
60
 Wright, G., 2012, Demand management targets for networks in the National Electricity Market, (Discussion 
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which are mainly driven by peak demand, then denominating the DM target in peak 
demand (MWp) is more appropriate. In practice, policy makers often pursue both cost and 
carbon objectives and consequently DM targets often combine both MWh and MWp 
components, as highlighted in Appendix C. 
However, there are other options for denominating DM targets. The Alternative Technology 
Association (ATA) and the Total Environment Centre (TEC) propose that targets could be 
based on such things as: 
 current peaks (either network wide, or weather-corrected peaks within each 
distributor’s service area) or forecast peak growth. 
 weather-corrected network load factor. 
 per capita reduction in peak demand.63 
 capital expenditure to meet peak demand growth as a proportion of network-wide 
peaks or peak growth.64 
The ATA and the TEC suggest that targets could be set annually or in line with five-yearly 
regulatory reviews. 
If the primary objective of the DM target is to maximise the value of savings to energy 
customers, then it is possible to denominate the target in dollars. Such value-based DM 
targets could focus on the value of deferred and avoided network capital expenditure, the 
value of customer bill savings, or a combination of the two. The avoided network capital 
expenditure could be quantified as the value of network infrastructure deferred or avoided. 
The customer bill savings could be characterised as the value of avoided retail bills, which 
would capture the value of avoided energy consumption and avoided peak demand across 
the whole value chain from generation and transmission to distribution and retail margin. 
While such value based targets could be challenging to enforce as mandatory targets since 
the value of network expenditure avoided varies from place to place and time to time, they 
could be ideally suited to collaborative targets as outlined earlier. 
Scale of DM targets 
The scale of the targets is a crucial decision for government. If the government is adopting 
collaborative targets, one option is not to set any target at all and simply ask the NSPs to 
nominate their own DM targets. This approach has two obvious risks. Firstly, it could lead to 
very modest targets as NSPs seek to minimise the chance of underperformance. Secondly, 
it could lead to very disparate targets across the NSPs as they apply different approaches 
to estimating achievable cost-effective DM potential. 
The alternative approach is for the government to set an indicative, overall benchmark DM 
target and then to engage with NSPs or invite NSPs to set individual DM targets for each 
NSP. 
The overall target should strike a balance between the low level of current network DM 
activity and the large potential for DM as described in Section 2.4 (which cites estimates of 
cost savings of peak demand reduction in the National Electricity Market (NEM) between 
$4.3 billion and $11.8 billion over the next ten years). Moreover, the Queensland and NSW 
Governments have already announced network capex reductions of about $1.5 billion65 and 
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 Wright, G., 2012, op cit. 
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 Alterative Technology Association, 2012, Submission on the Productivity Commission’s Review of Electricity 
Network Regulation. 
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 Steven Wardill, ‘Infrastructure and service cuts aimed at tackling skyrocketing household electricity bills in 
Queensland’, The Courier Mail, 8 December 2011. 
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$2 billion66 respectively. This compares to annual national network capital expenditure of 
about $9 billion per annum. Former Prime Minister Julia Gillard flagged the government’s 
‘plan to make sure that families pay $250 less per year for electricity’.67 This amounts to 
more than 10 per cent of the current typical household energy bill. 
Accordingly, while the setting of targets is clearly a matter for government and should be 
based on thorough analysis and consultation, a DM savings target in the order of $1 billion 
dollars per annum to be achieved within say, four years would be broadly consistent with 
the estimates for savings potential, described in section 2.4.   While a target at such a scale 
would likely fall short of the cost-effective potential for DM, it would still be large enough to 
deliver a significant reduction in customer bills and carbon emissions and a boost to 
industry development. Whatever the overall target, it would then need to be appropriately 
apportioned to the NSPs with regard to their local demand, investment and market 
conditions and capacity. 
Mandatory DM targets 
As described in the previous section, there are several reasons why collaborative targets 
are preferable, and mandatory DM targets are unlikely to be practical, particularly in the 
short term. However, if effective collaborative DM targets cannot be implemented in the 
short term, then it may be prudent to consider the mandatory option. It is beyond the scope 
of this study to consider mandatory DM targets in detail, however it is recognised that there 
are numerous precedents for mandatory DM targets overseas and that a mandatory DM 
target can be developed in a flexible, market friendly manner and need not necessarily be 
applied to, or be delivered by, NSPs. 
For example, Green Energy Trading also suggests a DM Certificate trading scheme, with 
certificates worth a specified $ per MWp value to reflect different locational investment 
values (see Table 6 below). Green Energy Trading suggests the scheme could be 
managed by the Clean Energy Regulator (CER).68 
Table 6: Example values for DM certificate-based target scheme 
Investor Location Peak Metric Investment 
Annual 
Value 
Generation NEM-wide Coincident region peak $400/kw $40/kw 
Transmission Regional Coincident region peak Region 1 = $100/kw $10/kw 
Locational  
(terminal station) 
Local peak T Location a =$500/kw 
T Location b = $50/kw 
$50/kw 
$5/kw 
Distribution Regional Coincident DNSP peak 
for region 
D Region 1 = $600/kw $60/kw 
Locational 
(zone sub) 
Local peak D Location a =$1000/kw 
D Location b = $200/kw 
$100/kww 
$20/kw 
Source: Green Energy Trading, Creating a Community Financial Dividend through Managing Peak Electricity 
Demand. 
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 Quoted in Michael West, ‘Time to switch off on bloated power industry’, Sydney Moring Herald,  7 November 
2012. 
67
 Julia Gillard, 2012, Transcript of Interview with Paul Bongiorno, Rafael Epstein and Patricia Karvelas, Meet 
The Press, 2 Dec 2012. 
68
 Green Energy Trading, 2012, Creating a Community Financial Dividend through Managing Peak Electricity 
Demand. Discussion Paper. 
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3.3 REPORTING DM PERFORMANCE 
An essential precondition for any form of target or goal is a means of measuring 
performance. At present, there is no comprehensive system for measuring and reporting of 
network DM. The only comprehensive assessment of electricity network DM to date was 
the 2011Survey of Electricity Network Demand Management in Australia (as presented in 
Section 2.3).69 
There has been some effort to improve reporting of NSPs’ DM activity. For example, under 
the new Distribution Network Planning and Expansion Framework Rule which commenced 
in January 2013, DNSPs are required through their Annual Planning Review to report: 
information on the Distribution Network Service Provider’s demand management 
activities, including a qualitative summary of: 
(1) non-network options that have been considered in the past year, including 
generation from embedded generating units; 
(2) actions taken to promote non-network proposals in the preceding year, including 
generation from embedded generating units; and 
(3) the Distribution Network Service Provider’s plans for demand management and 
generation from embedded generating units over the forward planning period.70 
However, a ‘qualitative summary’ is clearly insufficient for either meaningful DM targets or 
for financing contracts. 
In contrast to Australia, in the US there has been comprehensive quantitative reporting of 
DM costs and outcomes for over two decades as illustrated in Figure 21. 
Figure 21: US utility demand management (DM) actual peak load reductions 
 
Sources: US Energy Information Administration & AEMO. 
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 Dunstan, C., Giotto, N. & Ross, K., 2011, Report of the 2010 Survey of Electricity Network Demand 
Management in Australia (SENDMA). Prepared for the Australian Alliance to Save Energy by the Institute for 
Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, Sydney. 
70
 National Electricity Rules Chapter 5 Version 55 Network Connection, Planning And Expansion , p.589 
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Network DM reporting should become standardised and regular. Such information should 
be centrally collated and published annually to allow comparison between NSPs and to 
monitor trends over time. An illustration of the sort of information that should be reported in 
is included in Section 3.5. 
3.4 INCENTIVES FOR DM 
As noted above, in the absence of any obligation or penalty for non-compliance, 
collaborative targets for DM would require the offer of incentives to be effective. The Futura 
Report prepared for the AEMC Power of Choice Review stated that one of the ‘Market, 
Regulatory and Institutional arrangements’ needed to support DM is: 
adequately funded and designed incentive allowances that provide appropriate targets 
and rewards for encouraging distribution businesses to actively invest in both short and 
long term DSP opportunities and localised and broad based initiatives.71 
Possibilities for DM incentives include: 
1. a separate dedicated DM fund 
2. incentives in the existing regulatory system (e.g. AER’s DMEGCIS/DMIA) 
3. financing for DM. 
Each of these options is discussed below. It is important to note that while these incentives 
may be directed towards utilities or other intermediaries, they are only effective to the extent 
that they are ultimately directed to energy users in order to stimulate changes in in energy 
using behaviour. 
DM Fund 
During the stakeholder engagement process for the AEMC Power of Choice Review, and in 
the AER’s initial stakeholder workshop on DMEGCIS reform, it was discussed whether, if all 
disincentives to DM were addressed through regulatory reform which created a level 
playing field between DM projects and capital asset projects, NSPs undertaking DM should 
receive any extra reward/incentive.72 Given the variety of non-regulatory barriers discussed 
in Section 3.1 however, even if a regulatory level playing field was provided, further 
incentives would still be needed to overcome these barriers. 
The simplest and arguably most effective form of incentive would be to establish a fund to 
offer direct cash payments to NSPs and others for meeting specific DM performance 
outcomes. The establishment of a ‘Demand Management Fund’ was the primary 
recommendation of the 2002 NSW Inquiry into the Role of Demand Management and Other 
Options in the Provision of Energy Services, which led directly to the creation of the NSW 
Energy Savings Fund in 2005.73 
As noted by Crossley, a DE Fund ‘could be established to encourage investment in cost-
effective DM. Network businesses would be invited to bid for funding, but funding would 
also be open to other DM providers to make a more competitive pool of service providers’.74 
                                               
71
 Futura Consulting, 2011, Investigation of existing and plausible future demand side participation in the 
electricity market (Final Report for the Australian Energy Market Commission). 
72
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, DSP and Profit Incentives for Distribution Network Businesses 
(Staff Paper, Fourth Stakeholder Reference Group Meeting, Power of Choice Review). 
73
 The Energy Savings Fund was subsequently rolled into the Climate Change Fund, which in turn was later 
diverted to fund the blow out in expenditure under the NSW Solar Bonus Scheme. 
74
 Crossley, D. 2010, International Best Practice in Using Energy Efficiency and Demand Management to 
Support Electricity Networks. Prepared for Australian Alliance to Save Energy by Energy Futures Australia. 
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There are numerous examples of such funds overseas. In the US, over twenty states have 
instituted ‘public benefit funds’ or ‘system benefit funds’ to support energy efficiency and/or 
demand management. These are often in addition to DM programs undertaken by utilities.75 
As Crossley notes: 
In the United States, many states that adopted electricity industry restructuring also 
created public benefits funding mechanisms to help ensure the continued 
implementation of DM programs. Public benefits funding mechanisms for electricity DM 
typically involve the collection of a small per-kilowatt-hour public benefits charge (also 
often known as a ‘system benefits’ or ‘wires’ charge) as a part of the revenues of an 
electricity utility (typically an electricity distributor). These revenues are used to fund 
DM programs implemented either by utilities or by designated government or 
independent organisations. 
By the end of the 1990s, public benefits funding had emerged to be perhaps the most 
significant new policy supporting energy efficiency DM in the United States in a 
decade. Since that time, although the move toward electricity industry restructuring has 
largely stalled. 
The required funding level across these 18 states varies from 0.003 to 0.3 US cents 
per kilowatt-hour with a median value of between 0.11 and 0.12 3 US cents per 
kilowatt-hour. Combined annual expenditures are over US$900 million and annual 
incremental savings are nearly 2.8 million megawatt-hours. Cost-effectiveness 
estimates from nine of the most active states show the programs, in aggregate, to be 
very cost-effective with median benefit/cost ratio in the range of 2.1 to 2.5 and median 
cost of energy savings equal to 3 US cents per lifetime kilowatt-hour saved, public 
benefits funding for energy efficiency DM has continued unabated. Every state (18 in 
all) that initiated public benefits energy efficiency DM programs continues to operate 
those programs today.76 
In the UK, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets has established the Low Carbon 
Networks Fund as part of the electricity distribution price control arrangements. The Fund is 
providing up to £500m (about AU$773m) between 2010 and 2015 to support projects 
sponsored by the distribution NSPs ‘to try out new technology, operating and commercial 
arrangements’.77 
The main disadvantages of a DM fund in the current Australian context are the absence of 
likely funding sources and the time that it would likely take to establish it. Another more 
general disadvantage is that such funds are often vulnerable to ‘funding raids’ by 
governments seeking a quick solution to financial difficulties, as was the case of the NSW 
Energy Savings Fund which was ultimately diverted to help pay for the blowout in costs of 
the NSW Solar Bonus Scheme. 
Incentives in the regulatory system 
Incentives in the regulatory system can comprise one or both of the following components: 
 recovery of revenue foregone and DM program costs 
 direct incentives to encourage the use of demand-side resources for network 
support. 
                                               
75
 Pew Centre, 2010, cited in Dunstan, C. et al. 2011, op. cit. 
76
 Crossley, D. 2010, International Best Practice in Using Energy Efficiency and Demand Management to 
Support Electricity Networks. Prepared for Australian Alliance to Save Energy by Energy Futures Australia. 
77
 Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (UK), 2013, Low Carbon Networks Fund (webpage) 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/ElecDist/lcnf/Pages/lcnf.aspx  
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Revenue recovery  
There are currently two types of revenue recovery models operating in the US: 
1. Direct cost recovery: utilities can recover the costs of DM programs on a timely 
basis. 
2. Lost fixed-revenue recovery: utilities can cover any prudent costs that may not 
otherwise be recovered due to reduced sales from the DM program.78 
As Crossley notes, 
There are two views among policy makers and regulators about how foregone 
revenue and DM program costs should be treated. One view maintains that both 
foregone revenue and DM program costs are entirely the responsibility of the network 
business and should be fully taken into account when the business is evaluating the 
cost-effectiveness of DM versus network augmentation options. A second view 
maintains that the network business should be allowed to recover at least some of the 
foregone revenue and DM program costs and the value of this recovery should not be 
included in the cost benefit analysis of DM versus network augmentation options. 
In New South Wales, the introduction of revenue regulation [1999-2004] did not result 
in a major increase in the implementation of DM by electricity distributors. For the five 
year regulatory period to 2009, the regulator changed its method of regulating 
distributors from revenue regulation to price control but also allowed distributors to 
recover foregone revenue and DM project costs. To achieve this, the regulator 
introduced a D-factor into the weighted average price cap control formula that allowed 
distributors to recover: 
 non-tariff-based DM implementation costs, up to a maximum value equivalent to 
the expected avoided distribution costs;  
 tariff-based DM implementation costs; 
 revenue foregone as a result of non-tariff-based DM activities. 
These provisions are regarded as generous and have stimulated distributors in New 
South Wales to increase their implementation of DM measures to defer network 
augmentations.79 
The AEMC has also observed: 
Ausgrid states that the application of a ‘D-factor’ incentive resulted in a positive 
incentive for businesses to seek and implement demand management alternatives to 
network investments. Since its introduction, this has resulted in much more active and 
effective processes than has resulted in other NEM jurisdictions with identical 
regulatory obligations but no incentive arrangements. For example, in 2004/05 and 
2005/06, NSW DNSPs spent approximately $8.26 million on 26 DM projects under the 
D-factor scheme. NSW DNSPs have avoided $24.23 million of planned capital 
expenditure and operating expenditure over the 2004/05-2005/06 period as a result of 
approved demand management projects undertaken in conjunction with the D-factor 
mechanism.80 
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 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, DSP and Profit Incentives for Distribution Network Businesses 
(Staff Paper, Fourth Stakeholder Reference Group Meeting, Power of Choice Review). 
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 Crossley, D. 2010, International Best Practice in Using Energy Efficiency and Demand Management to 
Support Electricity Networks. Prepared for the Australian Alliance to Save Energy by Energy Futures 
Australia. 
80
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Demand Side Participation and Profit Incentives for Distribution 
Network Businesses (Power of Choice Review Directions Paper Supplementary Paper).  
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Direct incentives 
As discussed in Section 2.3, in Australia direct incentives in the regulatory system have 
usually taken the form of direct payments to NSPs. However, the main direct incentive 
model operating in the US is a system for performance incentives based on avoided 
costs: utilities can keep as before-tax profit a minor portion of the avoided cost that they 
would otherwise have incurred had they not implemented the DM program. Roughly half of 
the 50 states in the US have some form of performance incentive in place or pending81 – an 
example is shown on the following page in Box 4. 
The options for making changes to regulatory incentives for DM are discussed in further 
detail in Section 5.2.  
Financing for DM 
The third broad type of incentive that can be applied to encourage DM is financing. As 
finance needs to be repaid, it has the disadvantage of being a much less powerful 
motivator. However for the same reason, it also has the advantage of usually being a much 
lower cost option. 
In Australia, financing has the advantage of having an identifiable source of funds through 
the CEFC. Any reforms aimed at changing incentives within the regulatory system would 
take some time to implement. Financing for DM could be used as an incentive in the short-
term and is discussed in more detail in Section 4. 
Box 4: Example of performance incentives  
In Ontario, performance incentives accrue to networks for reaching 80% of their CDM 
target, up to a cap of 150%. The incentive is calculated in a stepped manner, with a 
higher $/kW rate for higher performance, as shown in Table 7 below.82 
Table 7: Performance-based DM incentives 
 
Source: Ontario Energy Board, Conservation and Demand Management Code. 
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 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, DSP and Profit Incentives for Distribution Network Businesses 
(Staff Paper, Fourth Stakeholder Reference Group Meeting, Power of Choice Review). 
82
 Ontario Energy Board, 2010, Conservation and Demand Management Code. 
  
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES JULY  2013 
INVESTING IN SAVINGS: FINANCE AND COOPERATIVE APPROACHES TO ELECTRICITY DM 
 
 48  
3.5 IMPLEMENTING COLLABORATIVE DM TARGETS  
There are many ways in which collaborative DM targets could be implemented. It should be 
emphasised that while a collaborative targets approach could potentially deliver significant  
savings for electricity consumers more quickly than relying in regulatory reform alone, it will 
only do so if it is consistent with and supported by the longer term reform program of 
government.   The following provides one possible approach which draws together the 
above themes of targets, reporting, regulatory reform and incentives.  
STEP 1: The CEFC announces its interest in and willingness to provide finance to support 
cost-effective network DM, in accordance with its Investment Mandate. 
STEP 2: The Federal Minister for Energy, either in their own right or through the Standing 
Committee on Energy and Resources, writes to the Australia Energy Regulator 
(AER) to request that they take all reasonable steps within their power that are 
consistent with the current National Electricity Rules to facilitate cost-effective 
network DM that is likely to deliver net customer bill reductions. Similar letters 
could be dispatched to the Western Australian Economic Regulatory Authority 
(ERA) and the Northern Territory Government. 
STEP 3: The Federal Minister for Energy, either in their own right or through the Standing 
Committee on Energy and Resources, announces an Indicative DM or Energy 
Savings Target, for example a 10 per cent reduction in customer energy bills 
below business as usual, or $1 billion per annum in customer energy bills, to be 
achieved within four years (as suggested in section 3.2). 
STEP 4: The Federal Minister for Energy, either in his own right or through the Standing 
Committee on Energy and Resources writes to the CEO of each distribution and 
transmission network service provider, requesting that they report on the 
following matters: 
1. Demand vs. Trend: How does coincident peak summer and winter 
demand (MWp) and annual energy consumption (GWh p.a.) in the past 
three years compare to the levels forecast in their respective current 
network pricing determination? 
2. DM performance: How much coincident peak summer and winter demand 
(MWp) and annual energy consumption (GWh p.a.) has been reduced 
across each NSP’s network system in the current year as a result of DM 
options that they the NSP has supported over the past three years? 
3. NSP cost savings: By how much have the NSP’s capital and operating 
expenditure been reduced as a consequence of points 1 and 2? 
4. Customer bill savings: By how much have customer energy bills been 
reduced in the current year as a result of points 1 and 2? 
5. NSP revenue impact: What has been the impact on NSP revenue of DM 
options undertaken over the past three years? 
6. DM plans and targets: What additional DM options does the NSP plan to 
undertake in next three years and how are these expected to impact on the 
above factors (peak demand, energy consumption, customer bills and NSP 
expenditure and revenue)? 
7. DM potential: What additional cost-effective DM options could the NSP 
undertake in the next three years if there were incentives in place to do so 
(including access to finance for DM) and what would the impact be on the 
above factors (peak demand, energy consumption, customer bills and NSP 
expenditure and revenue)? 
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These letters could also: 
 ask that these reports be provided within, say, four months; 
 offer a collaborative consultation process to refine the detailed reporting 
template and guidelines, within say, two months; 
 emphasise that this request is not a regulatory direction, but rather an 
invitation to collaborate with government in delivering savings to business 
and residential electricity customers; 
 advise that the AER (and its WA and NT counterparts) have been 
requested to provide all reasonable assistance within their power to 
facilitate cost-effective network DM; 
 indicate that should a lack of access to finance present a barrier, the CEFC 
is prepared to facilitate finance for network DM; 
 indicate that this reporting process is intended to become an annual event. 
 express an aspiration that this collaborative system can be effective in 
delivering benefits to customers, thus obviating the need to consider a 
more onerous or mandatory DM obligation.  
STEP 5: NSPs respond to the request for information and offer of support by reporting on 
current DM activities and plans and opportunities to increase DM activity. 
STEP 6: Government, regulators, CEFC and NSPs collaborate to develop network DM in 
Australia, including the use of CEFC finance where appropriate. 
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4 INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR CEFC 
4.1 LOANS FOR NETWORK BUSINESSES FOR DM 
Over-investment by networks in capital expenditure has ultimately been the result of NSPs 
responding to the rules and incentives created by government policy and regulators at the 
state, territory and Commonwealth levels. In order to encourage network businesses to 
change their practices quickly to support the interests of consumers, external support and 
incentives are not only required but justified. 
NSPs have long term capital works programs that cannot be easily or quickly reoriented. 
The availability of CEFC finance specifically targeted to DM investments which also reduce 
emissions is one area where the CEFC could play a unique role. 
CEFC financing for DM could provide a number of benefits, to both privately-owned and 
government-owned networks, as set out in Table 8. 
Table 8: Potential benefits of CEFC financing for DM 
1. Specifically targetting DM investments which also reduce carbon emissions.  
2. Potential to address existing capital constraints. 
3. Potential concessions on repayments, especially in regard to repayment timing in the 
current versus subsequent regulatory periods. 
4. Potential for upside and downside risk-sharing. 
5. Potential strategic support from CEFC in engaging with the AER over regulatory 
reform to ensure expenditure recovery. 
Given that networks are currently spending around $9 billion per annum on capital 
expenditure, these facilities need to be large to have a meaningful impact. For example, 
based on a plausible benefit to cost ratio of 3:1, the achievement of savings of $1 billion per 
annum (suggested above) would likely require DM expenditure to be quickly ramped up to 
the order of $300–400 million per annum in funding.83 
Loans would need to be contingent on electricity networks adopting specific and credible 
investment plans and targets for demand management, so that best practice could be 
transferred to the wider industry, enabling the creation of cost reductions in demand 
management over time. 
This financing could be wound back after 2016 as barriers to cost-effective DM are 
removed and more balanced regulatory structures are created for DM and network 
investment. This is particularly important in relation to the next round of electricity network 
economic regulatory decisions to be made by the Australian Energy Regulator for the five-
year periods commencing in each state (excluding WA) between 2014 and 2016. 
Financing should be contingent on network businesses adopting specific and credible plans 
and targets to reduce customers’ energy bills. It would also help the CEFC itself to be able 
to support investments that manifestly deliver short term benefits to energy consumers. 
Though the CEFC is an independent agency, this activity is consistent with the roles of the 
CEFC as proposed in the CEFC Expert Review Panel Report, its Act and Investment 
Mandate. 
                                               
83
 Dunstan, C. et al. 2011, Think Small: The Australian Decentralised Energy Roadmap. CSIRO Intelligent Grid 
Research Program. Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney. 
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The process could follow a process similar to that outlined below in Figure 22 (and in 
greater detail in  
Figure 27 in Appendix B). 
Figure 22: Suggested process for providing finance facilities NSPs 
 
Each of the above steps is described in more detail in Table 9. 
Table 9: Possible pathway for financing network DM 
Step Description 




CEFC outlines the conditions under which finance for 
network DM can be made available to NSPs consistent with 
its Investment Mandate and its Act. 
2. Networks Submit a 
DM and BAU Plan & 
Proposal 
 NSP proposals would be required to include: 
 proposed level of finance required. 
 performance targets: avoided network 
augmentation capex, customer bill savings and 
CO2 reductions. 
 proposed repayment schedule. 
 details of DM activity, NSP involvement and risk 
assessment. 
3. CEFC assesses and 
selects proposals 
Criteria assessment to include: 
 customer cost and carbon impact 
 additionality assessment 
 risk/reward assessment 
 strategic value in precedent setting, etc. 
 requirement for complementary regulatory reform.  
4. CEFC and selected 
NSPs sign 
agreement 
In accordance with standard CEFC investment practice. 
5. CEFC makes loans 
to networks 
Loans could be provided in 2013–14, with repayments to 
occur in the next regulatory period (post July 2015) when 
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Step Description 
networks reap the benefits of their investment in demand 
management. 
Loans can be ‘invested’ by networks in both investments in 
DM-related capital (such as generators, etc.) but also more 
broadly in operating expenditure for the wide variety of 
initiatives and programs that constitute normal demand 
management activities.  
6. Networks undertake 
DM activities using 
CEFC finance 
As per proposal and contract. 
7. Networks accrue 
savings and report 
on DM performance 
NSPs will generally see an increase in opex in Year 1, 
followed by a decrease in capex in following years. 
8. Networks repay 
CEFC loans from 
savings 
As per contractual terms, including any risk sharing. 
9. AER makes an 
incentive payment 
for DM performance 
In accordance with existing or reformed incentive structure 
as appropriate. 
10. Networks pay a 
share of the 
incentive to CEFC 
As per contractual terms, including any risk sharing. 
 
For the CEFC to be able to provide financial support for network DM it would need to 
recover its investment and a modest return to cover the CEFC’s cost of funds. While the 
CEFC would be prepared to share risk with networks businesses (see Section 4.2 below), it 
would need to have a strong level of confidence that the regulatory system would not create 
barriers to the recovery of prudent DM expenditure. This is discussed further in Section 5. 
4.2 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RISK SHARING 
The preceding section sets out how repayment of CEFC loans depends on an increase in 
CEFC-financed operating expenditure in one year being followed by a decrease in capital 
expenditure in the following years, providing a ‘surplus’ for the network to make repayments 
from. One of the benefits for networks of making CEFC finance available is the opportunity 
for provision of concessions (e.g. repayment deferral into the next regulatory period). 
The CEFC can also assist NSPs through risk sharing. Loans by the Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation to network businesses to finance DM activities can encourage a greater uptake 
of DM by helping to reduce the risk perceived by networks, since that risk could be shared 
with the CEFC. 
If the CEFC’s ‘investment’ only accrues principal repayment plus the minimal interest rate, 
then the CEFC is likely to underperform if some of the financed network DM activities do 
not meet their minimum targets for reduced peak demand (and therefore do not result in 
sufficient ‘savings’ to make repayments). This risk can be balanced and offset through a 
portfolio approach with associated sharing of benefits. One way for this to happen is for 
networks to share with the CEFC a proportion of any incentives received in the following 
regulatory period. 
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For this to provide effective ‘upside’ opportunity for the CEFC, there needs to be a 
mechanism to motivate networks to over-achieve, in order to ensure that potential 
incentives offer enough benefit to the CEFC to offset the risk of underperforming loans. 
One way to do this is to use DM targets with associated performance incentives for over-
achieving such targets, as shown earlier in Box 4 in Section 3.4. This constitutes another 
reason for the CEFC to engage in joint discussions with NSPs and the regulators (the AER, 
etc.). 
A detailed discussion of this is provided in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
4.3 CAPITALISING DM EXPENDITURE 
The current regulatory structure of linking prices to asset values, together with the use of 
price caps in NSW, Victoria and South Australia, creates a disincentive for demand 
management as outlined previously. This is because the structure is based on prices linked 
to asset values, together with the historical use of price caps. This has created two 
complementary drivers for Network Service Providers (NSPs): 
 to maximise the optimised asset base, in order to maximise the capacity to raise 
revenue, and 
 to maximise sales in order to maximise profits while also minimising prices to 
customers. 
These drivers are complementary, because the strongest justification for an increase in the 
asset base is increased demand. Both these drivers create disincentives to carry out 
demand management. 
Demand management can potentially lead to both reduced sales, and less growth in the 
asset base, as shown in Figure 23.  
Figure 23: Impact of DM on electricity business revenue 
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If DM expenditure was able to be ‘capitalised’, networks would receive returns on their DM 
expenditure, thus providing a more ‘level playing field’ between network expansion and 
demand management.  Capitalising the value of demand management into the regulated 
asset base for the next regulatory period could help reduce the longer-term regulatory 
disincentives to investing in cost-effective DM.  
Capitalising DM expenditure could also assist in facilitating finance for DM programs, 
whether provided by the CEFC or other sources. 
For this approach to work, the following would need to be in place84: 
 Expenditure on demand management would need to be treated as an equivalent 
substitute for network infrastructure capital expenditure to overcome network 
constraints. 
 Demand management projects would need to be valued as the net present benefit 
of deferral of the next-most expensive option, not their historical cost. 
 Demand management would need to be ‘capitalised’ at the value of the benefit of 
deferral of the full capacity of the network augmentation option, not just the 
proportion used, because the next-most expensive option would be to build the 
whole network option. 
 Valuation of network augmentation would need to be based only on that proportion 
of the network augmentation that is actually needed to supply demand on an annual 
basis. This is neutral to both options, because the alternative option can be sized to 
the capacity actually needed, namely demand management. 
 Returns should be performance-based, ie DM expenditure would only be considered 
an ‘asset’ to receive a return on, to the extent that it reduces peak demand and 
avoids/defers network augmentation. 
 The value of a demand management investment would need to be included in the 
asset base for the life of the project, regardless of when the network supply-side 
option was required, but subject to demand management delivering the intended 
demand reduction. 
                                               
84
 Tarlo, K., 2003, Capitalising Demand Management into the Asset Base: Preliminary Assessment. Prepared 
for Public Interest Advocacy Centre’s Utility Consumers’ Advocacy Program, by the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures, University of Technology, Sydney. 
 
Source: Energy Futures Australia, 2010, International best practice in using energy efficiency and demand 
management to support electricity networks. 
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This approach implies the NSP accruing all the immediate net benefit of DM relative to 
network augmentation.  This may be a desirable approach, at least for a period, in order to 
stimulate NSPs to embrace widespread cost-effective DM (that otherwise may not occur at 
all).  While this would deny customers a windfall associated with avoided network costs, 
customers would still benefit from avoided generation and retail costs on their bills, as well 
as enjoying any direct customer DM incentives and (uncosted) environmental benefits 
associated with DM programs.  
The United Kingdom’s Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) proposed in 2002 to 
allow distributors to retain the benefits of capital expenditure efficiency savings for a fixed 
period, rather than just up to the end of the regulatory period in which the investment 
occurred.85 
Capitalising DM-related expenditure (ie treating any DM opex as capex) was one of the 
options considered in the AEMC Power of Choice Review, through a potential new rule 
such as the one below: 
All expenditure relating to capital, either capital assets or expenditure which delays 
or defers the need for such capital asset must be treated the same in respect to 
power of the incentive and how such costs are treated at the regulatory resets.86 
On its own, capitalising the value of demand management investments would not remove 
all the disincentives to carrying out demand management as discussed in section 2.5. 
Overcoming these barriers requires positive incentives, such as the provision of financial 
assistance in the form of loans from the CEFC. Together, these proposals could provide 
effective motivation for networks to undertake a more optimal level of DM. 
While capitalising DM expenditure is possible and plausible, regulators may be 
uncomfortable with treating DM ‘opex’ as ‘capex’. In this case, it is also possible to create a 
‘level playing field’ by providing incentives for DM operating expenditure that act in a similar 
manner to returns on capital investment.  
 
4.4 ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR CEFC TO SUPPORT DM  
There are a number of benefits to DM by NSPs, such as avoiding or deferring specific 
network investment, that are unlikely to be easily captured through DM undertaken by other 
parties. However, the success of the CEFC in offering finance to NSPs depends on factors 
outside of the CEFC’s control, particularly in relation to establishing greater government 
policy certainty and accountability and in relation to treatment of DM expenditure and 
savings by the AER and other regulators. If both of these conditions are not met then the 
capacity of the CEFC to offer finance to NSPs for network DM is likely to be very limited. 
In these circumstances, alternative options that the CEFC may wish to consider include: 
1. Offering finance to electricity retailers to develop DM options to customers as a 
strategy to attract and retain customers. 
2. Offering finance to electricity retailers to develop DM options for customers as an 
alternative to retailers using generation capacity or financial hedges to manage 
exposure to high peak prices in the wholesale market. However, in the short term, 
such offerings may be more attractive to the smaller retailers as it is understood that 
                                               
85
 Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (UK), 2003, Electricity Distribution Price Control Review: Initial 
Consultation. 
86
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, DSP and Profit Incentives for Distribution Network Businesses 
(Staff Paper, Fourth Stakeholder Reference Group Meeting, Power of Choice Review). 
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most of the large electricity retailers also have large generation portfolios which are 
likely to benefit from high wholesale price spikes associated with high electricity 
demand. 
3. Offering finance to third party aggregators to develop products and attract end users 
to participate in demand side bidding into the wholesale electricity market, which 
has been proposed by the AEMC and is currently planned to begin in 2015. 
However, there still remains some uncertainty over how this function will be 
designed and how it will operate. 
It is beyond the scope of this report to consider these options. 
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5 INTEGRATION WITH REGULATORY REFORM 
There remains some uncertainty over the extent to which the proposed process of 
collaborative targets, reporting and incentives fits with the existing regulatory processes and 
current reform options. The following two sections set out firstly, how the process could 
integrate into the existing economic regulatory regime for the energy market, and secondly, 
how it could complement potential outcomes from the regulatory reform processes currently 
in train. 
5.1 EXISTING ECONOMIC REGULATORY REGIME 
The treatment of demand management projects in the current regulatory regime depends 
on whether the particular demand management project is included in the distributor’s 
regulatory proposal for a regulatory control period. 
If the NSP proposes a DM option in its regulatory proposal (as capital or operating 
expenditure, as did Queensland DNSPs Energex and Ergon in the current regulatory 
period) the business is able to recover the costs of implementing the DM option itself, but 
not any capital expenditures that might be avoided (e.g. network augmentation 
expenditure). (Note that this is an area nominated for potential reform by the AEMC Power 
of Choice Review – see Section 5.2). 
If, however, the DM option was not included in the regulatory proposal, but was identified 
during the regulatory control period, then the direct costs of the option are not recoverable, 
but any savings from successful deferral or avoidance of capital expenditure are retained by 
the NSP until the next regulatory control period. Any deferred or avoided opex can be 
retained for a period of five years under the efficiency benefits sharing scheme (EBSS). 
As most NSPs have not included substantial DM activity in their current regulatory 
proposals, any NSPs contemplating DM options (for example through access to CEFC 
finance) in these last two years of the regulatory control period would only be able to retain 
any savings from deferred or avoided capital expenditure that were achieved within the very 
short period before the end of the regulatory control period. Unless reforms are made to the 
treatment of DM activity for the next regulatory control period, the NSP will not be able to 
retain any capital expenditure savings in this next period. This is because it is expected that 
while DM costs might be incurred in this regulatory period, the deferred capital expenditure 
would occur in subsequent regulatory periods. 
Therefore the way in which such projects are treated in the next regulatory period is crucial 
to the ability of the CEFC to recover investments. 
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, providing the required ‘certainty of recovery of DM 
operating expenditure under an ongoing DM agreement would require a change to the 
Rules’.87 Note however that the need for a rule change remains open to debate. The 
following sections discuss the reform opportunities in the lead up to the next regulatory 
control periods. 
Upcoming regulatory control periods 
There is an opportunity to influence how DM is treated in the next regulatory control period, 
and making use of this opportunity is crucial to CEFC being able to recover finance for any 
investments in network DM. 
                                               
87
 Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC), 2012, Incentives for network driven DSP. Prepared for Energy Networks 
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Table 10: Key dates for upcoming AER regulatory control periods by jurisdiction 
 Network Regulatory Proposal 
due 
Regulatory control period 
begins 
NSW & ACT 31 May 2014 1 July 2015* 
Qld & SA 31 Oct 2014 1 Dec 2015* 
Vic 30 April 2015 1 June 2016* 
Tas 31 Jan 2016 1 July 2017 
* Note: NSW/ACT Regulatory control period commencement has been delayed by 12 months to 1 July 2015 
(with 1 year transitional regulatory control period); Qld/SA and Vic regulatory control periods delayed by 5 
months. 
Source: AER five-year project calendar 2013-2017: Regulatory determinations. 
Reporting of demand management activities 
There are a number of sources which report on demand management activities carried out 
by network service providers. Some of these are individual reports by the DNSPs are 
required by regulation and others are aggregate reports by regulators, market operators 
and third parties. 
Annual DMIA reporting to AER by NSPs 
As part of their Regulatory Information Notice (RIN) responses to the AER, DNSPs are 
required to provide reports on their use of their DMIA allowance. The AER uses these DMIA 
reports to assess the expenditure against the DMIA criteria and approve the claims by the 
DNSPs. 
As set out in paragraph 1.5 of schedule 1 of RIN, the annual report must: 
a. Provide an explanation of each demand management project or program for which 
approval is sought 
b. Explain, for each demand management project or program identified in the response 
to paragraph 1.5(a), how it complies with the DMIA criteria detailed at section 3.1.3 
of the DMIS, with particular reference to: 
i. the nature and scope of each demand management project or program, 
ii. the aims and expectations of each demand management project or program, 
iii. the process by which each demand management project or program was 
selected, including the business case for the project and consideration of any 
alternatives, 
iv. how each demand management project or program was/is to be 
implemented, 
v. the implementation costs of the project or program, and 
vi. any identifiable benefits that have arisen from the project or program, 
including any off peak or peak demand reductions. 
c. Provide an overview of developments in relation to projects or programs completed 
in previous years, and any results to date. 
d. State whether the costs associated with each demand management project or 
program identified in the response to paragraph 1.5(a) are: 
i. are not recoverable under any other jurisdictional incentive scheme, 
ii. are not recoverable under any other Commonwealth or State government 
scheme, and 
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iii. are not included in the forecast capital or operating expenditure approved in 
the AER’s distribution determination for the current regulatory control period 
under which the scheme applies or under any other incentive scheme in that 
determination. 
e. The total amount of the DMIA spent in the previous regulatory year, and how this 
amount has been calculated.88 
The two most relevant parts of the above are reporting on the implementation costs of each 
project and ‘any identifiable benefits that have arisen from the project or program, including 
any off peak or peak demand reductions’.89 Analysis of the most recent reports by DNSPs 
shows that reporting in relation to this latter requirement varies greatly across DNSPs, 
partly because of the various life cycle stages of the projects being reported. Only two 
NSPs, for a total of three projects, report kW or kVA peak load reductions and no NSP 
included information such as deferred/avoided capex. A summary of reporting is shown in 
Table 11. 
Table 11: Reporting by DNSPs of identifiable benefits of projects under DMIA 
DNSP Reporting 
ActewAGL90 For the one project reported on, ActewAGL states: ‘Since this project is 
under developing stage, no identifiable benefits have been achieved. 
The project has not yet entered the implementation phase.’ 
Ausgrid91 For every project described, Ausgrid states: ‘At this stage there are no 
material peak demand reductions achieved from this program’ (even on 
previously approved projects). 
Endeavour92 For one project, Endeavour provides a table detailing the average and 
peak kVA reduction from the project. For other projects, Endeavour 
indicated that results would be determined following the end of the 
projects. 
Ergon Energy93 Ergon provides high-level indication of benefits from each project, such 
as ‘Retain and Network Benefit Potential’. For some projects where 
data is available, Ergon provides % energy savings, and/or a kw or kva 
figure of maximum demand reduction recorded to date. 
Essential94 For the one project reported on, Essential states: ‘the technology 
benefits have been proven in the field installations, however actual 
business benefits will accrue when the technology is field proven and 
deployed as an enabler for peak reduction and reactive power support 
applications to avoid or defer network augmentation.’ 
There does not appear to be any other required reporting on demand management, such 
as DM activities carried out using sources of funding other than DMIA. 
                                               
88





 ActewAGL, 2013, Demand Management Incentive Scheme Power Factor Correction Project 2011-12. 
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 Ausgrid, 2012, Demand Management Innovation Allowance Submission 2011-2012 Report to the AER. 
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 Endeavour Energy, 2012, Demand Management Innovation Allowance 2011-2012 Report: Submission to 
AER. 
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 Ergon Energy, 2012, op cit. 
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 Essential Energy, 2012, Regulatory Information Notice (RIN) Supporting Information for Demand 
Management Innovation Allowance (DMIA) 2011-2012. 
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New reporting requirements for NSPs under Network Expansion Framework 
When information about the need for, and nature of, network investment is not provided in a 
timely and accurate way, it is more difficult for demand-side alternatives to be developed. 
DM service providers need sufficient time to consider the identified need, determine if DM 
can address the identified need, and determine the costs and benefits of participation. 
In an effort to address this, the AEMC recently made a rule establishing a national 
framework for electricity distribution network planning and expansion, including new 
demand side obligations for distribution businesses.95 This new rule requires the distribution 
businesses to have greater regard to DM potential, and to publish more information to help 
potential DM providers to identify DM opportunities and understand their value and 
operating requirements. Businesses will also be required to engage more with DM service 
providers. 
The final rule consists of an annual planning and reporting process, and a distribution 
project assessment process. Three of key components of the final rule are as follows: 
1. Distribution annual planning review 
The new rules replace current arrangements with a comprehensive and clearly 
defined annual planning process. All distribution businesses are required to 
conduct an annual planning review covering a forward planning period of five 
years. The planning review must include all distribution assets and activities 
undertaken by distribution businesses that would be expected to have a material 
impact on their networks. A comprehensive planning review will support the 
businesses in making efficient planning decisions. 
2. Distribution annual planning report (DAPR) 
All distribution businesses must publish an annual planning report. The report will 
set out the outcomes of the annual planning review and will include information on: 
forecasts, including capacity and load forecasts; and system limitations. Public 
reporting on distribution business planning processes and activities will allow 
network users to make better informed and more efficient investment decisions. 
3. Demand side engagement obligations 
The new rules introduce several demand side engagement obligations on 
distribution businesses, including a requirement to develop and document a 
demand side engagement strategy, and an obligation to engage with non-network 
providers and consider non-network options in accordance with this strategy. 
These requirements will encourage better engagement between distribution 
businesses and non-network providers, and provide greater transparency on how 
DNSPs assess and consider non-network options.96 
These new arrangements commenced on 1 January 2013. The AEMC notes that the 
impact of the Rules will depend on the extent to which demand side participants find the 
information useful. There is a definite possibility that the provided information may not be 
comprehensive enough to allow demand-side participants to understand the nature of the 
network problems that needs to be addressed. Further, demand-side participants may not 
be provided with sufficient time to propose legitimate alternatives. Both of these situations 
would reduce the utility of the new requirements.97 
                                               
95
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Rule Determination: National Electricity Amendment 
(Distribution Network Planning and Expansion Framework) Rule 2012.  
96
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Distribution network planning and expansion framework 
(Information Sheet). 
97
 Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2012, Incentives for network driven DSP. Prepared for Energy Networks 
Association. 
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In addition to the above changes, the new Rule requires the AER to develop a Regulatory 
Investment Test for Distribution (RIT-D), which will replace the current regulatory test. This 
work by the AER is discussed in Section 5.2. 
Non-NSP reporting of DM 
Reporting on DM by parties other than NSPs is limited. The main instances are the AEMO 
National Electricity Forecasting and Statement of Opportunities Reports, the AER State of 
the Energy Market reports, and research reports by independent third parties. 
 AEMO National Electricity Forecasting Reports and Statement of 
Opportunities Reports 
The AEMO National Electricity Forecasting Reports present the results of a survey 
by the AEMO of demand response aggregators, network service providers (NSP), 
retailers and other market customers. Respondents are asked for confidential DM 
megawatt values that can be regarded as ‘committed’ or ‘non-committed’. These 
values are then aggregated to create regional totals. In 2011, 207 MW of DM 
occurred, out of a maximum available of 243 MW. Forecasts for the coming summer 
are also reported, with approximately 303 MW reported as an ‘even chance’ for 
2012–13 summer.98 
The most recent AEMO Statement of Opportunities Report (2012) does not contain 
anything specific on demand management in the wholesale market. 
 AER State of the Energy Market Reports 
The annual AER State of the Energy Market reports have a section on demand 
management. This section of the most recent report (2012) describes changes in 
the electricity market relating to demand management (such as the AEMC Power of 
Choice Review, DEMGCIS rule changes and roll out of smart meters through the 
Victorian Government initiative and Ausgrid’s Smart Grid, Smart Cities project. No 
reporting of actual demand management activities is included.99 
However in an earlier section on demand side participation, the report summarises 
the information published by AEMO: 
AEMO in 2012 identified 218 MW of capacity that was ‘very likely’ to be 
available across the NEM through demand side participation over the 2012−13 
summer (up from 142 MW in 2011−12). It forecast annual growth in demand 
side participation of 3.2 per cent (for New South Wales) to 5.4 per cent (for 
Victoria and South Australia). 
 Independent research reports 
From time to time, research reports are published on demand management activity. 
Examples include the Report of the 2010 Survey of Electricity Network Demand 
Management in Australia100 (some of the findings of which are presented in Section 
2.1) and Power of choice – giving consumers options in the way they use electricity: 
Investigation of existing and plausible future demand side participation in the 
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 Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), 2012, National Electricity Forecasting Report. 
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 Dunstan, C., Giotto, N. & Ross, K., 2011, Report of the 2010 Survey of Electricity Network Demand 
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electricity market.101 These types of reports are not institutionalised, and are 
therefore not comparable or consistent over time. 
The current reporting practices for network DM will need to be improved in order to 
enhance understanding of DM practice in Australia and to allow for reliable network DM 
targets and/or financing for DM. Suggestions for reporting were discussed in Section 3.3. 
Demand management incentive schemes 
In 2008/2009 the AER developed two jurisdictional demand management incentives 
schemes (VIC, QLD/SA and NSW/ACT) to apply in the 2009–2014 regulatory control 
period. The DMIS provided upfront funding allowances to Distribution Network Service 
Providers (DNSP) to conduct research and investigation into innovative techniques for 
managing demand so that, in the future, demand management projects may be increasingly 
identified as viable alternatives to expensive network augmentation. They involved two 
components: the AER’s demand management innovation allowance (DMIA), providing 
payments for demand management related activities (as shown in Table 12); and the 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART)’s D-factor scheme (for NSW). 




Approved annual DMIA 
allowance 
ActewAGL (ACT)  2009-14 $100,000 
Ausgrid (NSW)  2009-14 $1,000,000 
Endeavour Energy (NSW)  2009-14 $600,000 
Essential Energy (NSW)  2009-14 $600,000 
Energex (Qld)  2010–15 $1,000,000 
Ergon Energy (Qld)  2010–15 $1,000,000 
SA Power Networks (SA)  2010–15 $600,000 
CitiPower (Vic)  2011–15 $200,000 
Jemena Electricity Networks (Vic)  2011–15 $200,000 
Powercor (Vic)  2011–15 $600,000 
SP AusNet (Vic)  2011–15 $600,000 
United Energy (Vic)  2011–15 $400,000 
Aurora Energy (TAS)  2012–16 $400,000 
Source: AER Decision 2010–11 and 2011 DMIS assessment. 
The AEMC recognises that the current DMIS is not a ‘true’ incentive scheme which allows 
extra rewards, but an innovation allowance plus potentially an allowance for foregone 
revenue associated with certain DM projects102 which is essentially a costs pass-through 
scheme. 
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 Futura Consulting, 2011, Power of choice – giving consumers options in the way they use electricity: 
Investigation of existing and plausible future demand side participation in the electricity market (Final Report 
for the Australian Energy Market Commission). 
102
 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, DSP and Profit Incentives for Distribution Network Businesses 
(AEMC Staff Paper for Session 1, Fourth Stakeholder Reference Group Meeting).  
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During the preliminary work conducted by AER last year in approving the DMEGCIS for 
NSW businesses, submissions from stakeholders on the 2008 demand management 
incentive scheme applying in the ACT and NSW noted that: 
 The scheme failed to create sufficient incentives for long-term structural change. 
 The lack of funding provided under the DMIA reduced its effectiveness. 
 Demand side actions and technologies should be incentivised based on the actual 
reduction in electricity demand (particularly peak demand) it brings.103 
These comments echo submissions to the Productivity Commission consultation, which 
criticised DMIS because of its low uptake. As described in Section 2.1, it is currently 
estimated that only about 15% of the Demand Management Innovation Allowance has been 
spent to date.104 
A staff paper for the AEMC Power of Choice Review noted that: 
the Demand Management Incentive Scheme may not be the answer [to achieving 
an efficient level of DM]. If the underlying profit motivation towards DSP projects is 
not there, the increase in the size of the DMIA may need to be substantial to offset 
the underlying disincentive.105 
In 2011, acting on a rule change request by the then Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE), 
the AEMC began the process of amending the DMIS to include embedded generation, with 
provisions of the ‘Inclusion of Embedded Generation Research into Demand Management 
Incentive Scheme’ final rule and final rule determination commencing on 22 December 
2011.106 
In 2012, as part of the Regulatory Determination for 2014–2019 for NSW and ACT, the 
AER proposed amendments to its demand management and embedded generation 
connection incentive scheme (DMEGCIS) to apply to network businesses. The main 
changes are a name change, broadening of scope to include embedded generation and 
removal of the D-factor scheme. The proposed DMEGCIS to apply to the NSW DNSPs in 
the next regulatory control period would therefore function in the same manner as the DMIS 
in this regulatory period107: 
 Demand management innovation allowance provided as annual ex-ante allowance; 
 DNSP able to recover revenue foregone that is directly attributable to approved non-
tariff demand management projects. (Although this would not apply under a revenue 
cap, as there would be no foregone revenue.) 
The AER delayed its final decision on the proposed DMEGCISs to allow the AEMC to 
finalise the Power of Choice Review so that recommendations for the DMEGCIS could be 
taken on board. 
In March 2013, the AER released a DMEGCIS Information Paper, proposing that the 
previous reform process from 2012 be closed off, and that the current scheme be 
maintained for the current regulatory period, and for a one-year transition period in the 
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 Australian Energy Regulator, 2013, Information Paper: Demand Management and Embedded Generation 
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 Australian Energy Regulator, 2013, Demand management incentive scheme assessment report 2011-12 
(Non-Victorian DNSPs). 
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(Staff Paper, Fourth Stakeholder Reference Group Meeting, Power of Choice Review). 
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 Australian Energy Mark Commission, 2011, Rule Determination: National Electricity Amendment (Inclusion of 
Embedded Generation Research into Demand Management Incentive Scheme) Rule 2011. 
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 Australian Energy Regulator, 2012, Explanatory Statement: Proposed Demand Management and Embedded 
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following regulatory period (for NSW and ACT). The AER would then begin work on a new 
scheme for the remainder of the following regulatory period. This work would begin as an 
informal consultation under the AER’s Better Regulation Review, followed by a formal 
reform process once the AEMC process is completed. The proposed changes to the 
DMEGCIS are discussed in more detail below. 
5.2 REGULATORY REFORM 
Interacting with current reform processes is crucial to ensuring that the current and 
proposed regulatory arrangements are conducive to the proposed approach of financing 
and collaborative targets for network DM. This includes facilitating avoidance of 
unnecessary infrastructure investment, supporting demand management to reduce 
customer bills, and ensuring recovery of any funds provided by the CEFC in the following 
regulatory period. 
A number of reforms to the energy market are currently in progress, including: 
 Power of Choice Review by the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) 
(recently completed) 
 Electricity Market Reform by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
through the Standing Council on Energy and Resources (SCER) 
 Better Regulation Review: Power of Choice workstream on demand management 
by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) 
The proposed approach of CEFC investment in demand management and associated 
collaborative targets complements the recommendations made by the AEMC Power of 
Choice Review, and the reforms recently agreed to by COAG. 
AEMC ‘Power of Choice’ package 
The AEMC Power of Choice Review, conducted from March 2011 to November 2012, 
looked at potential changes to the National Electricity Market to help consumers better 
manage their energy consumption, as well as ways to encourage electricity companies to 
better facilitate consumer choice and to invest more efficiently. It was the third stage in a 
review of DM, which it referred to as demand side participation (DSP). 
Stage 2 of the review focused explicitly on barriers in the National Electricity Rules for use 
of DSP, while Stage 3 had a broad focus, covering all electricity market frameworks 
(including electricity market arrangements and transactions that impact on the electricity 
supply chain, the Rules, other national and jurisdictional rules and regulations, and market 
behaviours) for facilitating investment in, and use of, DSP in the NEM. 
The Power of Choice Review proposed a number of recommendations to the Standing 
Council on Energy and Resources (SCER) on required changes to the National Electricity 
Rules (NER) and broader market reforms. Two reforms proposed by the AEMC are of 
particular relevance to reducing perverse incentives to invest in additional infrastructure 
(sometimes referred to as ‘decoupling’). The reforms are to: 
 provide networks with an allowance for revenue foregone as a result of undertaking 
DM activities instead of traditional capex projects, and 
 develop a set of pricing principles to guide network tariff structures.108 
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In addition, the AEMC recommended changes to the application of the current demand 
management and embedded generation connection incentive scheme to provide an 
appropriate return for DM projects which deliver a net cost saving to consumers (including 
creating separate provisions for an innovation allowance), and a minor change to the 
National Electricity Rules (NER) that clarifies that AER can have regard to non-network 
market benefits when assessing efficiency of expenditure. These changes should result in a 
better equalising of capex and opex. 
SCER has released a response to the recommendations, and is currently in the process of 
drafting a number of rule change requests (see below). Once the AEMC receives these rule 
changes requests, it will implement its normal consultation and deliberation process to 
amend the NER. 
While reforming the NER and related requirements is crucial, it also takes time. Indeed, the 
Power of Choice Review recommendations may create Australia’s most effective and 
comprehensive framework for avoiding costly and unnecessary electricity supply 
investment, just as Australia’s biggest ever program of electricity supply investment is 
winding down. 
There is therefore scope for a complementary, more collaborative approach for 
engagement with the industry in the meantime. Collaborative DM targets, reporting and 
incentives have the potential to enhance significantly the customer benefits of the DM 
reforms, and could do so in the current regulatory period up to and including 2015. 
Moreover, the proposals discussed in this report would support the first recommendation of 
the Power of Choice Review Final Report, which states that: 
A comprehensive communication/education strategy is developed to support 
implementation of the reforms recommended in this review, and to more broadly 
improve consumer understanding of energy use and relationship to costs.109 
Such a communication/education strategy would be much more effective if it were to 
engage the NSPs directly and if it were to be informed by a clear statement of what the 
NSPs (and government) are doing, are planning to do and could do for customers in the 
area of DM. Any such strategy that does not start from a position of what the electricity 
supply industry (and government) can do to reduce bills and otherwise help consumers will 
struggle to communicate effectively. 
COAG and SCER energy market reform 
The Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG) Standing Council on Energy and 
Resources (SCER) is responsible for pursuing priority issues of national significance in the 
energy and resources sectors and for progressing key reform elements of the former 
Ministerial Council on Energy and the Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources. 
SCER established an Energy Market Reform Working Group (EMRWG) to identify, 
consider and respond to priorities for energy market development, particularly focusing on 
some of SCER's Priority Issues of National Significance.110 
The Energy Market Reform has a number of elements of relevance to demand 
management, discussed below. 
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General Energy Market Reform workstream 
In December 2012, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) endorsed a package of 
national energy market reforms developed collaboratively by SCER to respond to the 
current challenges of rising electricity prices. The main element of the reform package 
relevant to demand side participation is around actions to reduce electricity peaks, 
specifically: 
Agreement to provide for greater demand-side participation to make it easier for 
consumers to reduce demand, particularly at peak periods, to minimise the need for 
new investment in energy infrastructure – drawing on the AEMC’s Power of Choice 
Review.111 
SCER has stated that it will report to COAG specifically on the full set of Power of Choice 
Review recommendations in June 2013 (see below for further discussion). 
In addition, the package includes elements around rule changes to limit over-investment in 
networks, including: 
Commitment in-principle to a new national framework of best-practice reliability 
standards which give added weight to the interests of consumers and in-principle 
agreement to transfer reliability setting to the Australian Energy Regulator; 
Early implementation of new rules that will ensure investment by network businesses 
is more efficient; and 
A public consultation process to improve the Limited Merits Review Regime to 
minimise the risk of ‘cherry-picking’ by network businesses while also ensuring review 
arrangements provide an effective back-stop for business.112 
As part of this, in January 2013, SCER asked the Australian Energy Market Operator 
(AEMO) to begin work to develop a new option for demand side resources to participate in 
the wholesale market for electricity, and to develop a new category of market participants 
for non-energy service provision.113 
All of these reforms are important as they pave the way for a halt to real electricity price 
increases for many years to come. However, this power bill relief may come too late to 
avoid a critical loss in support and momentum for the Clean Energy Future package. 
Collaborative DM targets would complement the energy market reform process by 
identifying and delivering demonstrable savings to consumers in the short to medium term 
(in the current regulatory period) while reducing the risk of over-investment in network 
infrastructure, and building capacity for greater savings and more efficient investment in the 
next regulatory period, once the currently proposed regulatory reforms have been enacted. 
The suggested approach of using the targets (where electricity network businesses 
volunteer to redirect a share of their capital expenditure into reducing peak demand growth 
and into assisting their customers to reduce energy consumption and energy bills) is 
particularly complementary to the reforms agreed to by SCER/COAG. Indeed, this 
approach could comprise a key element of recommendation 5.1.5 on ‘balanced incentives 
for distribution businesses to implement efficient demand side options and to pursue 
innovative demand side solutions’.114 
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Reform to demand forecasting 
As part of the above package of reforms, SCER agreed to task the AEMC with investigating 
the implications of differences between actual and forecast demand within the operation of 
the network regulatory frameworks by May 2013, and to task the Australian Energy Market 
Operator (AEMO) to develop demand forecasts which could be used by the AER to inform 
its future regulatory determination processes.115 
In February 2013, SCER issued terms of reference for a review of demand forecasting to 
the AEMC. The terms of reference note that recent observations in demand suggest that 
there may be a sustained slowing of growth in peak demand and a decline in average 
demand. Given that changes in demand, particularly peak demand, have implications for 
the cost of providing network services to consumers, SCER has asked the AEMC to 
investigate the implications of differences between actual and forecast demand within the 
operation of the existing incentive-based network regulatory frameworks. 
SCER also asked the AEMC to provide advice on: 
 the merits of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) considering differences 
between actual and forecast demand when undertaking network determinations for 
transmission and distribution network service providers; and 
 whether any changes to the current NER are needed to ensure the benefits of any 
sustained reductions in demand flow through to consumers, including but not limited 
to the AER’s ability to consider previously approved capital expenditure and 
improvements to NER around annual network tariff setting. 
The AEMC was asked to provide the advice by 31 March 2013, but details have not yet 
been published.116 
 
Response to AEMC Power of Choice Review recommendations 
As part of SCER’s report to COAG in November 2012, SCER committed to providing to 
COAG in June 2013 a report on the full set of Power of Choice Review recommendations. 
In March, SCER released a response to the Power of Choice Review recommendations.117 
In relation to the two main recommendations on distribution network incentives from 
Chapter 7, recommendations, both of which involved submitting a rule change proposal to 
the AEMC based on draft specifications in the Power of Choice Review Final Report, SCER 
agreed ‘in principle’. SCER must now develop and submit these rule change requests. 
No indication of timeframes has yet been given for this. Once requests are received by the 
AEMC and decisions are made, the AER will be tasked with operationalising the rule 
change. The section below discusses the corresponding AER reform process. 
The other relevant decisions by SCER relate to flexible (ie. time of use) pricing, including 
rollout of smart metres in defined situations (ie new connections, refurbishments and 
replacements) and time of use tariffs for residential and small business consumers. In both 
cases, the AEMC recommended that SCER submit a rule change request requiring these in 
certain situations. In both cases, SCER decided that it should be left up to each jurisdiction 
(ie. state) to decide if and when smart meters or time-of-use pricing should be required. 
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 Standing Council on Energy Reform, 2012, Electricity: Putting Consumers First.  
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 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2013, Market Review (Open): Differences between actual and 
forecast demand in network regulation (webpage), http://www.aemc.gov.au/market-reviews/open/differences-
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117
 Standing Council on Energy Reform, 2013, SCER Response to the Power of Choice Review. 
  
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES JULY  2013 
INVESTING IN SAVINGS: FINANCE AND COOPERATIVE APPROACHES TO ELECTRICITY DM 
 
 68  
Time-of-use pricing - and associated time-of-use meters - are a potentially important 
element of promoting DM. If the implementation of these is to be left up to jurisdictions, and 
via jurisdictions, and therefore utilities themselves, to make the call on, then incentives in 
the form of CEFC finance may able to  facilitate this. For example, CEFC finance could help 
expedite time-of-use pricing where it makes sense by facilitating the rollout of time-of-use 
meters which are essential in time-of-use pricing. 
AER ‘Better Regulation Review’ 
In response to the changes to the National Energy Rules announced by the Australian 
Energy Market Commission at the end of November 2012 following the AEMC Power of 
Choice Review, and the further forthcoming rule change requests by SCER, the AER has 
started a process for reform under their Better Regulation Review. The AER described the 
Review as ‘a program of work that will deliver improved regulation focused upon the long 
term interests of consumers’. 
The AER describes the purpose of the Power of Choice workstream as ‘Ensuring network 
companies are innovating and exploring demand management solutions’.118 The 
workstream will explore how best to adapt AER regulatory processes to make a positive 
contribution to increasing demand management. Specifically, the workstream has three 
components: 
1. Network incentives, including the Demand Management and Embedded Generation 
Connection Incentive Scheme (DMEGCIS) – arising from the AEMC Power of 
Choice Review. 
2. Regulatory investment test for distribution (RIT-D) – arising from the Expansion 
Network framework rule determination. 
3. Efficient and flexible network pricing – arising from the AEMC Power of Choice 
Review. 
The latter two of these components are dependent on rule changes by the AEMC not yet in 
progress, so the initial focus of the workstream will be on contributing to the AEMC rule 
change processes. 
In addition, a separate stream of the Better Regulation Review, ‘Expenditure Incentives’ is 
reviewing existing incentives for efficient capex. Part of the review is to move towards 
neutrality between capex and opex incentives. 
The two relevant streams of the Better Regulation Review are shown in Figure 24. 
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 Australian Energy Regulator, 2012, Better Regulation Reform Program (webpage), 
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Figure 24: AER Better Regulation Review workstreams 
 
Source: AER website. 
Each component and its relevance to the proposed package of targets, reporting and 
incentives is discussed below. 
Demand Management and Embedded Generation Connection Incentive Scheme 
(DMEGCIS) 
One of the AEMC Power of Choice Review recommendations was for the National Energy 
Rules (NER) to be amended to reform the application of the current DM and Embedded 
Generation Connection Incentive Scheme (DMEGCIS) so that it: 
a) provides an appropriate return for DM projects that deliver a net cost saving to 
consumers; and 
b) better aligns network incentives with the objective of achieving efficient demand 
management.119 
The AEMC proposed to SCER that this recommendation be implemented through a rule 
change which adds more principles and criteria for the application of the demand 
management incentive scheme. The rule change would also include an objective to clarify 
the purpose of the incentive scheme – that is, to correctly incentivise the network 
businesses to develop and pursue DM options as an efficient alternative to capital 
investment. 
In March 2013 AER initiated informal consultations, through the publication of an Issues 
Paper on DMEGCIS120, to allow it to participate in the upcoming AEMC Rule Change 
process. AER will then initiate a formal consultation on applying a demand management 
incentive scheme to ACT/NSW Distribution Network Service Providers (DNSPs) as part of 
the next distribution determination process. 
The Issues Paper sets out the AER’s proposed approach to consulting on the form of any 
new demand management and embedded generation connection incentive scheme 
(DMEGCIS), and to applying a demand management incentive scheme to ACT/NSW 
DNSPs during their next regulatory control periods. Their proposal is to maintain the 
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 Australian Energy Market Commissions, 2012, Power of Choice Review – Giving consumers options in the 
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existing DMIS/DMEGCIS for the first year of the new regulatory period (the transitional 
regulatory period, 1 July 2014 – 30 June 2015), and then to introduce a new DMEGCIS 
during the determination for the subsequent regulatory determination period (1 July 2015 – 
30 June 2019). 
As guidance for coming up with a new scheme, the AER will use the draft specifications in 
the AEMC’s Power of Choice Review Final Report and any draft rule change proposals that 
may be under consideration. The specifications which could be adopted include such 
elements as: 
 permitting the network businesses to retain a share of the non-network related 
market benefits arising from the DM option 
 allowance for foregone profit for any DM-approved activities 
 allowance for performance indicators and reporting guidelines developed by the 
AER. 
Further, the AER is allowed to maintain the Demand Management Innovation Allowance. 
As discussed in Section 5.1, and as acknowledged by AER, this is quite limited in scope 
(currently providing around $1 million or less for most networks, as shown earlier in Table 
12). The AER is currently considering the benefits of maintaining an ‘innovation’ allowance 
if better DM incentives are provided. 
In the Issues Paper, the AER proposed the following timeframe for ACT/NSW DNSPs: 
Transitional regulatory control period: 
 ACT/NSW DNSPs submit transitional regulatory proposal by 31 January 2014, 
 AER makes transitional regulatory determination by 30 April 2014. 
Subsequent regulatory control period: 
 Stage 2 of the Framework & Approach paper published in January 2014, 
including information on any demand management incentive scheme (Stage 1 
was published March 2013), 
 ACT/NSW DNSPs submit regulatory proposal in May 2014, 
 AER makes draft determination due in November 2014, 
 AER makes final determination due in April 2015. 
It is clear from the above timeframes that the next year is crucial for inputting into reform of 
DMEGCIS, to ensure that it is effective in encouraging DNSPs to adopt a more efficient 
level of DM in the next regulatory period.121 However, as the new DMEGCIS will not take 
effect until 2015, initiatives to encourage DM activity by DNSPs in the intervening years 
remain crucial. 
In addition to the formal Incentive Scheme, the AEMC Power of Choice Review also 
recommended that the AER be allowed to consider broader upstream and downstream 
market benefits (ie additional to any network expenditure savings – for a distribution NSP, 
this implies a share of the cost reductions at the transmission and generation levels) 
resulting from DM activities by NSPs. As part of refining incentives, the AER may explore 
whether the presence of these broader market benefits presents a case for allowing 
DNSPs, at the regulatory proposal stage, to retain capital expenditure savings resulting 
from DM options, something they are presently unable to do. 
                                               
121
 Note ISF has been commissioned by TEC using funding by National Electricity Consumer Advocacy Panel to 
advise on options for reform of the DEMGCIS. 
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One way of allowing DNSPs to be able to do this would be to create an incentive scheme 
that provides NSPs with a (financial) share of the broader benefits created by a DM 
initiative – similar to the way the Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme (STPIS) 
permits distributors to retain a share of the customer benefits from reliability improvement. 
Doing so would mean that the incentives for the network business were better aligned with 
the interests of all NEM players.122 
Given that DM expenditure is generally operating expenditure, and most of the savings 
derive from avoided or deferred capital expenditure, the ability of NSPs to capture the value 
of avoided capex in the next regulatory period would provide NSPs with the ability to 
recover the costs of these DM options. From the CEFC’s perspective, this would provide 
the key source of savings for NSPs to repay finance from the CEFC. 
Regulatory investment test for distribution (RIT-D) 
Electricity distribution companies undertake numerous investment projects each year to 
augment parts of their networks. The AEMC’s Final Rule Determination, ‘Expansion 
Network framework’, requires the AER to develop and publish a new Regulatory Investment 
Test for Distribution (RIT-D) to replace the current regulatory test for distribution projects. 
The RIT-D is designed to take place before significant distribution network investment 
decisions are made and will apply to all projects over $5 million.123 
The AER aims to develop the RIT-D in a way that ensures RIT-D proponents duly assess 
all credible options (including both network and non-network options) before choosing the 
most cost-effective option available to meet consumer demand. Application guidelines will 
be developed by the AER to guide RIT-D proponents in applying the RIT-D, and will include 
a specific methodology for valuing classes of benefits. The aim is to enhance transparency 
and consistency in investment decision-making. 
The effectiveness of the RIT-D in facilitating DM will depend on how the guidelines are 
written, including whether and how ‘benefits’ are assessed. In any case, if NSPs do not face 
balanced incentives for undertaking DM then the effectiveness of the RIT-D in encouraging 
efficient uptake of DM will be limited. Furthermore, the RIT-D will only apply to projects over 
$5m and evidence to date shows that there are (and are likely to continue to be) many 
projects that fall under this threshold. 
An issues paper was released by the AER in January 2013, followed by public submissions 
in February 2013. The final RIT-D and its application guidelines will be released by 31 
August 2013. 
Distribution network pricing rules 
The AEMC has proposed changes to pricing principles to ensure prices are cost reflective. 
This includes requiring more consultation to give retailers and consumers more control in 
developing pricing tariffs (particularly the structure/nature of tariffs). 
As discussed above, SCER’s decision regarding specific recommendations regarding 
flexible (ie. time-of-use) pricing was to leave control over pricing models to jurisdictional 
governments. They have however, agreed ‘in principle’ to changes to the pricing principles 
and have agreed to submit a rule change proposal to the AEMC. From the AER’s point of 
view, the reforms to efficient pricing in the Rules should result in more detailed pricing 
reviews. The AER will likely also have an expanded role to advise on pricing principles and 
set out detailed guidelines on how the consultation with retailers and consumers will need 
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to occur. The AER plans to participate in the AEMC consultation following submission of the 
rule change request. 
These more cost reflective tariffs could play out in different ways. For example, as some 
networks have invested heavily in network infrastructure, there may be a temptation to shift 
charges from volume related components into fixed charge components.  This would likely 
reduce consumers’ capacity to reduce bills through energy savings and therefore reduce 
their level of interest DM programs. While shifting to higher fixed charges may help secure 
NSP revenues in the short term, it would also have equity impacts on vulnerable consumers 
and could in the drive customers to disconnect from the grid thus eroding NSP revenues in 
the longer term. 
On the other hand, flexible pricing may encourage DM by promoting more peak focussed 
cost-reflective Time of Use (TOU) tariffs. 
Expenditure Incentives Review 
In addition to the work being undertaken under the Power of Choice workstream, the AER 
is also developing expenditure incentive guidelines, as required by the revised National 
Electricity Rules.124 
These guidelines will set out how the AER will improve incentives for electricity network 
businesses to ensure efficient capital expenditure, so customers only fund the investment 
necessary to provide a safe and reliable network. As part of this, the AER is also reviewing 
the incentives for efficient operating expenditure. In particular, it is considering revisions to 
the current efficiency benefit sharing scheme that applies to the approach network 
businesses take to expenditure assessments. 
The review aims to address the following issues with the current capex incentives: 
 The imbalance between capex and opex incentives 
 The incentive for efficient capex declines over the regulatory control period, 
encouraging overspending in later years 
 That NSPs can choose to ignore the incentive of obtaining revenue savings, 
knowing that any capex spend will ultimately be rolled into the Regulated Asset 
Base, with the majority of future/ongoing costs being passed onto consumers. 
An issues paper was released in March 2013, with stakeholder consultations expected to 
finish by late May 2013. Guidelines are expected to be finalised by November 2013.125 
The issues paper addresses both ‘ex ante’ measures put in place at the beginning of a 
regulatory control period to properly incentivise efficient capex, and ‘ex post’ measures to 
apply at the end of a regulatory control period, to correct for inefficient capex spending. The 
AER has expressed its preference for ex ante measures to remain the principal method for 
incentivising, but is proposing to consider ex post measures where a significant capex 
overspend has occurred and where the ex post assessment has uncovered clear cases of 
inefficiency or imprudent behaviour by the NSP. 
The AER’s proposal for the primary capex ex ante measure is a continuous, asymmetric 
Capital Expenditure Sharing Scheme (CESS). The continuous nature of the scheme would 
ensure constant incentives in each year of the regulatory control period, and the 
asymmetric nature (e.g. greater penalty than reward) would provide stronger protection for 
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consumers. The reward for underspending by NSPs would be 20–30%, while the penalty 
would be greater than 30%.126 
The combination of a Capital Expenditure Sharing Scheme with a change to allow NSPs to 
retain capital expenditure savings resulting from DM options (broader upstream and 
downstream market benefits), would enable NSPs to retain savings for a period of five 
years regardless of how late in the regulatory determination period the DM activity 
occurred. This would strengthen the ability of NSPs to recover costs of DM activities, and 
enable them to use this as a source to repay CEFC finance. 
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6 BENEFITS FOR CONSUMERS 
6.1 IMPACTS ON PRICES AND BILLS 
The principal benefits for consumers of increasing the amount of demand management in 
electricity systems are a reduction in the amount of investment in building and maintaining 
electricity networks, and increased efficiency of the existing network. The cost of network 
investment is recovered from electricity customers at a regulated rate that is determined by 
the Australian Energy Regulator. This is then passed through the electricity retailers and 
then customers as a component of their electricity tariff. Network costs have increased so 
much in recent years that they now make up an average of over 50% of the regulated 
electricity tariff (see Section 2.2). 
Network costs are predominately fixed capital costs that must be recovered from the 
available customer base over the long term. This means that in the short term we can have 
the perverse situation of diminishing total electricity demand leading to higher electricity 
prices, because the cost of the network is being recovered from a smaller volume of 
electricity consumption. However, provided the DM activity is cost-effective – that is, 
provided the cost of DM is lower than the incremental cost of supply, increasing DM will 
lower overall energy bills. However the benefits of DM will not be evenly spread – DM 
program participants will benefit more than non-participants. It is therefore crucial that DM 
programs are designed with equity impacts in mind. It is also crucial that DM programs are 
focused on times and places of capacity constraint in order to maximise the cost savings for 
consumers. 
6.2 SPREADING OF COSTS OF PEAK DEMAND 
This also raises significant equity issues with electricity bills as all electricity customers 
must pay for the increased network through network charges, even though individual 
customers will have different contributions to peak demand. Low-income households tend 
to pay a higher proportion of their income in electricity bills than do high-income 
households. 
From the mid-1990s to 2010 electricity bills represented less than two per cent of average 
weekly household earnings. This share has since been rising and is projected to grow to 
2.5 per cent by 2015, as shown in Figure 25. For some households however, electricity bills 
can represent a much greater proportion of weekly income. IPART estimates that 12 per 
cent of NSW households will face bills that are greater than six per cent of their disposable 
income.127 Consequently, the adverse impacts of recent electricity bill and price rises have 
fallen disproportionally on vulnerable consumers. This is a further reason to ensure there is 
an equity dimension in DM programs design.  While cost-effective DM can reduce average 
electricity for all customers, it is important to consider the equity impacts of specific DM 
programs to ensure these benefits are equitably shared. 
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 Figure 25: Average annual electricity bill vs. average weekly earnings 
 
Source: Simshauser & Downer, cited in Power of Choice Review Directions Paper, 2012, Australian Energy 
Market Commission. 
6.3 POTENTIAL COSTS SAVINGS 
Electricity networks are long-lived assets with high capital intensity. They require a rate of 
return that can attract the capital necessary for their operation. So while prices and bills can 
rise rapidly when capital expenditure surges, as it has done recently, reducing prices and 
bills will take typically take an extended period, (unless assets are written off or the 
regulator reduces the rate of return). 
Increasing the amount of cost-effective demand management in the electricity system, by 
placing a DM target on the electricity networks and offering financial incentives, will reduce 
peak demand and network costs. However, there are likely to be short-term costs to the 
networks to meet these targets. These short-term costs will be outweighed by downward 
pressure on both electricity generation and network costs over the longer term.128 
In the recent AEMC Power of Choice Review into demand side participation, Frontier 
Economics (consultants to the review) established that the economic cost savings of peak 
demand reduction in the period 2013/14 to 2022/23 will be between $4.3 billion and 
$11.8 billion.129 This equates to between 3% and 9% of the forecast expenditure on the 
supply side of the NEM, with the majority accruing to electricity networks.130 The upper and 
lower ranges of these figures and their composition are shown in Figure 26. The main 
contributing factors underlying the two scenarios are demand-based pricing (efficient pricing 
and demand response) and energy efficiency. 
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Figure 26: Absolute total benefit of demand reduction in the NEM 2013/14 to 2022/23 
 
Source: Power of Choice Review (Final Report), 2012, AEMC. 
 
6.4 FLOW THROUGH TO CUSTOMERS 
Assuming these cost savings are passed through to customers, the proportion of network 
charges in electricity tariffs should fall as the need for network augmentation to meet peak 
demand falls. The extent of the savings to customers will be different across jurisdictions of 
the NEM, with regions with strong peak demand growth expected to benefit the most. For 
the AEMC review, Frontier Economics forecast savings of approximately $500 per 
customer per annum in South Australia and Queensland, $350 in New South Wales and 
$120 in Victoria.131 
Increased peak demand management will also have implications for the price of electricity 
generation. If peak demand decreases and electricity consumption in peak times is shifted 
to other times this has the impact of flattening the demand curve.132 The price of electricity 
generation is determined in half-hour blocks on a bidding process. Fewer periods of peak 
demand, and therefore fewer half-hour periods of very high electricity generation prices in 
the wholesale electricity market (prices can go as high as $12,500 per MWh) will lead to an 
overall reduction in the average wholesale price of electricity. This also flows through to 
customers in the form of a reduced electricity generation component in their electricity tariff. 
Peak demand targets would not by themselves ensure reductions in network investment, 
only that peak energy savings are achieved. Network augmentation may not be avoided 
despite these savings for a number of reasons, as outlined by NERA Consulting: 
 there might be insufficient peak demand savings in locations where network 
augmentations are required; or 
 the network business is not confident that planned non-network approaches will in 
practice avoid anticipated growth in peak demand and so undertakes the network 
augmentation so as to not breach system security requirements.133 
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It is therefore important that any DM incentives and targets are carefully designed to 
recognise the differing circumstances for NSPs.  Some networks have major investment 
programs relating to replacing aging assets or implementation of government directed 
reliability standards (such as in Queensland and NSW). 
These issues further highlight the need for reform to address barriers to demand 
management investment and to ensure that cost-effective peak demand savings and 
associated network augmentation deferrals are achieved. 
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7 STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
7.1 INITIAL ENGAGEMENT 
As part of this scoping study, preliminary consultations were undertaken with a range of key 
stakeholders, including: senior representatives of distribution NSPs in Queensland, NSW, 
Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia; the Energy Networks Association; the 
Australian Energy Regulator; the Australian Energy Market Commission; and the Federal 
Department of Resources Energy and Tourism. 
In each case the stakeholders were given commitments that none of their comments would 
be directly quoted or attributed. In most cases, the stakeholders noted that the comments 
offered were on an informal basis and did not necessarily represent the official position of 
their organisation. Moreover, most stakeholders indicated that to elicit an official response 
from their organisation would involve a process and timeframe which would be outside the 
scope of this project.  
The consultations found an unprecedented level of interest on the part of regulators, and 
the federal government policy department, in tapping DM opportunities. 
The response from NSPs has been mixed. There is a strong recognition among some 
NSPs that DM needs to, and is likely to, play a major role in the future of the electricity 
supply industry. This recognition extends to an interest in learning more about the potential 
for accessing finance to support DM. However, there is a greater interest in the potential for 
clarification and reform of the regulatory system in order to facilitate network DM 
expenditure. 
It has emerged that AER is a key agent in the further development of the potential for 
financing for DM. If the AER provides clarification that cost-effective DM expenditure 
undertaken in the current regulatory period can be offset against avoided supply side 
investment in the next regulatory period without reform to the regulations, then there is 
significant potential for interest on the part of NSPs in accessing finance to expand DM 
activity in the current regulatory period.  
On the other hand, if the AER indicates that the question of offsetting DM expenditure 
against future capital expenditure can only be addressed in the context of the current 
regulatory reform process, there are two sub-options. Firstly, this question could be 
resolved in the next few months through the reform consultation process around. Secondly, 
the issue could be resolved over a longer period in the lead-up to the next regulatory period 
which comes into effect from July 2015 (in NSW, ACT, Queensland and South Australia). In 
this last case, there would be little opportunity for the CEFC to offer finance for networks for 
DM in the current regulatory period.  
The second key agent is the federal and state governments through the Standing 
Committee on Energy and Resources (SCER) which has a role of clarifying the policy intent 
in relation to network DM. If governments make the delivery of cost-effective DM a priority, 
for example by engaging with the NSPs to set collaborative targets for DM, then the NSPs 
are much more likely to expand DM activity in the short term. In the absence of policy 
leadership, the uptake of finance for DM by NSPs is likely to be low. 
The third agent that is crucial to the success of finance for DM is the NSPs themselves. 
Based on preliminary consultations, there is a growing interest in the potential for network 
DM activity, both as a risk management strategy and as a business development 
opportunity. The NSPs, like the AER, seem to expect DM to play a much greater role in the 
next five-year regulatory periods However, at this stage it is difficult to discern a clear view 
of the level of NSP interest in finance for DM in the current regulatory period.  
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Clarifying either regulatory and/or policy intent as described above is likely to have a 
significant impact on the potential appetite of NSPs for financing network DM. 
 
7.2 FURTHER ACTIONS FOR STAKEHOLDER 
ENGAGEMENT 
In the context of the above findings, the key next steps in developing the opportunities for 
network DM finance are: 
1. Engage in the current AER reform process to seek clarification of the treatment of 
DM expenditure in relation to offsetting network augmentation capital expenditure. 
2. Inform policy makers of the potential for network DM and the importance of setting 
clear policy directions relating to the adoption of all cost-effective DM, and of the 
need for clear NSP targets and accountability. 
3. Engage with NSPs in relation to the potential for DM, the AER reform process and 
potential for financial support as a precursor and complement to regulatory reform. 
This broader engagement would include stakeholders additional to those already consulted 
for this scoping study in electricity networks and regulatory institutions and include state 
and Commonwealth Government energy policy makers, the demand management industry 
and their advocates and consumer representatives. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
This scoping study was commissioned by the CEFC to investigate options to accelerate 
demand management investment within the Australian electricity system, and in particular, 
the option of CEFC investment in demand management activities by network service 
providers. The role of the CEFC is to facilitate financial flows into the clean energy sector, 
and thereby accelerate the adoption of electricity sources with lower carbon intensity. 
This report of the scoping study establishes a rationale for CEFC interest in DM and 
develops a possible model for investment, which has been tested with some key 
stakeholders. Further work is needed to test and operationalise the model with a wider 
range of stakeholders and better place it within the CEFC investment framework, and the 
wider energy regulatory and policy environment. This is highlighted in the ‘Stakeholder 
engagement and next steps’ section at the end of these conclusions. 
Key Findings 
DM is under-utilised in Australia 
Demand management, has significant potential to reduce carbon emissions from the 
electricity system and provide cost savings to consumers and the wider economy.  This 
report highlights the extent of the under-utilisation of demand management in Australia. 
While network DM has expanded in recent years, it still only provides the equivalent of a 
small fraction of the generation capacity in the NEM. The majority of current DM projects 
were in load management initiatives such as power factor correction, direct load control and 
stand-by generators. The use of energy efficiency and distributed generation projects for 
network DM appears to be minimal. 
DM offers significant opportunities for costs savings on electricity bills 
Electricity bills are now of major political and public interest after dramatic real price 
increases in the past five years of about 70% across the country. Electricity network 
charges are the main driver of electricity bill increases; these charges now make up half of 
an average Australian electricity bill.134 The massive increase in electricity infrastructure 
investment is in turn driving the increases in network charges; more than $40 billion is being 
invested on electricity distribution and transmission networks within the current five-year 
regulatory period.135 This level of investment exceeds that of the National Broadband 
Network (NBN) and will be expended over a shorter time period and warrants a greater 
level of scrutiny.136 
The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) projects that demand management 
activities targeted at peak demand reduction could generate savings to the economy of 
$4.3 billion to $11.8 billion over the next ten years. This equates to between three and nine 
per cent of total forecast expenditure on the supply side, and is likely to produce savings to 
consumers ranging between ‘approximately $500 per consumer per annum (in South 
Australia and Queensland). In NSW, the savings per consumer is expected to be around 
$350 per annum … [and] in Victoria, around $120 per consumer per annum.’137 
                                               
134
 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2012, Electricity Prices (factsheet) 
http://www.ret.gov.au/Department/Documents/clean-energy-future/electricity-prices-factsheet.pdf. 
135
 Langham et al., 2010, Building Our Savings: Reduced infrastructure costs from improving building energy 




 Australian Energy Market Commission, 2012, Power of Choice Review - Giving consumers options in the 
way they use electricity (Final Report), p.8. 
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Excessive electricity network investment impacts clean energy investments 
Significant levels of network spending are likely to crowd out and diminish business 
opportunities for clean energy by creating sunk costs that can then no longer be avoided by 
DM measures. More broadly, the continued investment represents a risk to electricity 
customers, state governments, and private and institutional shareholders. The risk is that 
these new investments may not remain viable for their full term of their expected economic 
lifetimes. 
Other emerging technological and business model opportunities, including the falling cost of 
solar PV and battery storage, the increasing penetration of advanced meters and time of 
use pricing, the rising take-up of electric vehicles and the expanding potential of smart 
energy management applications, will likely present investment opportunities for the CEFC. 
These investments will also be negatively impacted by continuing sunk costs of investment 
in electricity supply and in particular network infrastructure, adding to the incremental cost 
of developing and deploying clean energy technologies. 
Financial incentives can help remove barriers to NSPs taking up DM 
Analysis presented in Section 2 shows that there are a number of interrelated barriers that 
prevent NSPs from wider adoption of DM. These barriers include: information barriers; spilt 
incentives; payback gaps; externalities and price structures; regulatory barriers; and 
cultural/ practice inertia. While NSPs generally have well-established access finance for 
network investment, this access has seldom been used to support DM activities.  Evidence 
from Australia and overseas indicates that, where it is supported by clear policy intent and 
well-designed regulation, finance incentives can be a powerful tool to overcome these 
barriers to DM.   
Performance targets are an effective tool to increase DM activities 
Section 3 and the Appendix C demonstrate from available international evidence the ability 
of demand management targets and incentives to increase DM activities. These 
international precedents highlight the success of combining obligations (performance 
against some measured target) and incentives to encourage the widespread adoption of 
demand management activities. Section 4 takes these precedents further and highlights 
how such a system of ‘collaboratively’ derived targets for DM could be used in Australia. 
Stakeholders contacted as part of the preparation of this report showed an high level of 
interest on the part of regulators and federal government policy departments in tapping DM 
opportunities. The response from NSPs has been more mixed. 
Creating a secure environment for DM investment 
If the CEFC were to invest successfully in DM, a number of external conditions would need 
to be met. These conditions relate to policy direction, regulatory certainty and NSP 
commitment to undertake DM. To provide financial support for network DM, the CEFC 
would need to be confident that it would be able to recover its investment, including returns 
to cover the CEFC’s cost of funds.  
Policy conditions – clear policy intent from federal and state governments 
If governments make the delivery of cost-effective DM a priority, through for example, 
engaging with the NSPs to set collaborative targets for DM, then the NSPs are likely to be 
more engaged in strategies to expand DM activity in the short term. In the absence of policy 
leadership, the uptake of finance for DM by NSPs is likely to be low. 
The current electricity market reform processes established by the Council of Australian 
Governments and the Ministerial Standing Committee on Energy and Resources have the 
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potential to address both the policy and regulatory conditions, but this potential must be 
converted into explicit regulatory and policy intent. 
A clear statement of policy intent is needed, indicating governments’ commitments to: 
 the long term interests of consumers, including via the delivery of all cost-effective DM 
 the establishment of clear accountability and performance measures for DM, 
including for example, establishing network DM targets and reporting in collaboration 
with the NSPs 
 a primary focus on customer bills rather than price 
 incentives to engage NSPs’ interest and offset start-up costs (to the extent that 
regulatory incentives are inadequate for this purpose). 
A statement of policy intent by government could establish the first three policy conditions 
above relatively quickly. The fourth condition is contingent on the absence of effective 
regulatory incentives and may therefore be unnecessary. 
Regulatory conditions – certainty around DM investments by NSPs 
The research has highlighted that investment activities in supply and demand side options 
are treated differently by NSPs, and greater certainty around the recovery of costs and 
revenue on DM activities is necessary. 
The Australian Energy Regulator (AER) can facilitate the uptake of DM activities by 
clarifying regulatory principle of no disadvantage for NSPs who engage in cost-effective DM 
activities.  Such a clarification is necessary as at present NSPs have no guarantee that they 
will be able to capture savings in network capital expenditure in the subsequent regulatory 
period that flows from DM expenditure in the current regulatory period. This distortion 
applies even if the DM expenditure involves much lower costs than capital investment.  
If the AER makes it clear that cost-effective DM expenditure undertaken in the current 
regulatory period can be offset against avoided supply side investment in the next 
regulatory period, this will provide a significant signal to NSPs to expand DM activity in the 
current regulatory period. Such a clarification would be consistent with the principles of the 
NEM which hold that all technologies should be treated equally.  
However, if the AER considers that the question of offsetting DM expenditure can only be 
addressed in the context of the current regulatory reform process, there are two sub-
options. Firstly, this question could be resolved in the next few months through the 
forthcoming reform consultation process around. Alternatively, if the AER does not provide 
such clarification, there will be little opportunity for the CEFC to offer finance for networks 
for DM in the lead-up to the next regulatory periods, beginning from July 2015.  
There are a number of further dimensions to providing regulatory certainty, including: 
 Efficient cost recovery: Where an NSP undertakes DM at a cost lower than the 
avoided cost of network supply or augmentation, the NSP must be able, via 
customer network charges, to recover as a minimum the full cost of the DM 
measure or program. In addition, in order to incentivise action, the NSP should be 
able to recover some share of the avoided supply costs where these are higher than 
the cost of DM 
 Inter-period offsets: NSPs must be able to capture and offset the value of future 
avoided costs against current DM expenditure. This means that the regulator must 
clearly and explicitly take account of these actual and avoided costs at the five-year 
regulatory determinations 
  
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES JULY  2013 
INVESTING IN SAVINGS: FINANCE AND COOPERATIVE APPROACHES TO ELECTRICITY DM 
 
 83  
 Regulatory incentives to offset project risk: While some network businesses have 
been expanding DM activities in recent years, there remain both real and perceived 
project risks for network businesses in building up DM expertise and experience. 
The regulatory system should recognise this risk by offering financial incentives to 
network businesses. This would involve sharing with network businesses and their 
shareholders some of the potential customer benefits of DM that may otherwise not 
occur at all 
 Opex/capex substitutability: As DM expenditure is usually operating expenditure but 
avoidable costs are usually capital expenditure, the NSP must be able to offset 
costs in the former against savings in the latter 
 Removing incentive bias against DM: There are number of major biases in the 
current regulatory system which encourage network supply side expenditure and 
discourage DM. For example, as noted by the Productivity Commission, ‘all 
[network] capital spending – regardless of its efficiency - is rolled into the regulatory 
asset base (RAB) at the end of the five-year regulatory period’.138  Such provisions 
do not apply to DM, which is mainly operating expenditure. These biases need to be 
addressed 
 Balanced regulatory risk: The risk created by regulations associated with DM must 
be no greater than the risk involved in supply side expenditure. 
Some of the above regulatory conditions can only be established if the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER) changes the provisions the electricity network regulatory determinations 
and associated schemes. This is likely to take up to two years to be achieved. The first of 
these two conditions is critical to the viability of providing finance for DM and these 
conditions could potentially be achieved by the AER simply clarifying the interpretation of 
provisions of the existing regulatory determinations. 
NSP conditions – management-level commitment to cost-effective DM 
This report shows there is a strong recognition among some NSPs that DM needs to, and is 
likely to, play a major role in the future of the electricity supply industry. This recognition 
extends to interest in learning more about the potential for accessing finance to support 
DM. NSPs can respond to both the policy and regulatory intent discussed above by: 
 management demonstrating a commitment to successful implementation of DM 
projects 
 establishing clear DM performance measures and savings targets 
 developing effective risk management processes. 
Alternative strategies to develop the DM market 
There are a number of benefits to DM by NSPs, such as avoiding or deferring specific 
network investment, that are unlikely to be easily captured through DM undertaken by other 
parties. However, the success of the CEFC in offering finance to NSPs depends on factors 
outside of the CEFC’s control, particularly in relation to establishing greater government 
policy certainty and accountability and in relation to treatment of DM expenditure and 
savings by the AER and other regulators. If both of these conditions are not met then the 
capacity of the CEFC to offer finance to NSPs for network DM is likely to be very limited. 
  
                                               
138
 Productivity Commission 2013, Electricity Network Regulatory Frameworks, Report No. 62, Canberra, p.220 
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In these circumstances, ‘second best’ options that the CEFC may wish to consider include: 
1. Offering finance to electricity retailers to develop DM options to customers as a 
strategy to attract and retain customers. 
2. Offering finance to electricity retailers to develop DM options for customers as an 
alternative to retailers using generation capacity or financial hedges to manage 
exposure to high peak prices in the wholesale market. However, in the short term, 
such offerings may be more attractive to the smaller retailers as it is understood that 
most of the large electricity retailers also have large generation portfolios which are 
likely to benefit from high wholesale price spikes associated with high electricity 
demand. 
3. Offering finance to third party aggregators to develop products and attract end users 
to participate in demand side bidding into the wholesale electricity market, which 
has been proposed by the AEMC and is currently planned to begin in 2015. 
However, there still remains some uncertainty over how this function will be 
designed and how it will operate. 
Stakeholder engagement and next steps 
In the context of the above findings, the key next steps in engagement for developing the 
opportunities for network DM finance are as follows: 
1. Engage in the current AER reform process to seek clarification of the treatment of 
DM expenditure in relation to offsetting future supply side capital expenditure. 
2. Inform policy makers of the potential for network DM and the importance of setting 
clear policy direction relating to the adoption of all cost-effective DM and the need 
for clear NSP targets and accountability. 
3. Engage with NSPs in relation to the potential for DM, the AER reform process and 
potential for financial support as a precursor and complement to regulatory reform. 
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A. DEMAND MANAGEMENT MEASURES 
Table 13 lists a range of DM measures that could potentially be applied by NSPs. This list is 
not intended to be exhaustive but simply illustrate the range of measures available. 
Table 13: Indicative DM measures  
Measure Notes 
RESIDENTIAL 
Switch to gas cooking Switch from electric to gas cooking 
Elimination of 2nd 
fridges 
Removal and disposal of second fridges 
Lighting efficiency 
upgrades (res) 
Replacement of inefficient lighting with LED or high-efficiency 
halogen lighting 
Changing pool pump 
motor type 
Upgrade to high efficiency pump 
Switch timing of pool 
pump operation 
Switch to off peak tariffs for pool pump operations 
Energy Efficient Air-
Conditioners (res) 
Promoting installation of new air-conditioner as close as possible to 6 
star efficiency for large units in living areas either at end-of-life or as 
an early replacement 
External window shading Install vertical external shutters/shadings to east and west windows 
Home insulation – roof 
Either upgrade (e.g. from R2 to R4) or install if none present and 
include reflective foil 
Reduce heat losses from 
hot water system 
Insulation of tank, pipes, reduce water temperature setting 
EV – vehicle to 
grid/vehicle to house 
Use of EV batteries for energy storage and network support (using 
battery resource) 
Load management for EV 
charging 
Minimising load of electric vehicles on network at peak periods (no 
charging during peak periods) 
Energy efficient 
consumer electronics 
Purchase of energy efficient models instead of average 
Behaviour change – 
billing info 
Improved customer billing information, including basic feedback, peer 
comparison and targeted energy saving tips  
Residential Load Shifting 
Includes assessments of instruments such as time-of-use tariffs, 
critical peak pricing to encourage shifting of demand outside of peak 
times 
Direct Load Control 
(DLC) – A/C 
Direct Load Control of residential air conditioners  
Residential HW 
Conversion 
Convert electric hot water units to electric boosted solar, gas boosted 
solar or heat pump 
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Measure Notes 
COMMERCIAL 
Variable speed drives/ 
efficient motors 
Installation of VSD / efficient motors for commercial air handling 
Energy efficient 
commercial lighting 
(interior & exterior) 
Replacement existing inefficient lighting with more efficient 
technology 
High efficiency heating 
ventilation and air 
conditioning (HVAC) 
Upgrade to higher efficiency AC including high-efficiency chillers, at 
End of life of existing systems. 
Energy Efficient Air 
Handling (e.g. VAV 
systems) 
Installation of efficient air handling systems 
Power Factor Correction 
(com) 
Install equipment (capacitors/inductors) to correct power factor 
Chilled water storage 
(incl. district) 
Off-peak chilling of HVAC water and use in peak times to level 
cooling load. May be at individual building or district level. 
Battery storage 
Batteries which charge at off-peak and used at peak. Switch circuit to 
discharge during peak 
Solar PV PV on commercial roof space (optimal siting only) 
Standby generation 
(com) 




(BMS) controls (HVAC) 
Inspection of A/C, optimisation of the change of the filters, cleaning of 
condensing and evaporating coils, fine tuning of controls, optimal 
scheduling. Applies to buildings with BMS. 
HVAC temperature set 
points 
Increase temperature deadband range to reduce energy intensity of 
commercial HVAC 
Trigeneration Trigeneration in areas of high cooling loads and mains gas supply 
Install and commission 
BMS controls for lighting 
Applies to buildings without BMS installed already. 
Upgrade of electronic 
equipment 
Upgrades of computers, monitors and servers to energy efficient 
units 
Delamping 
Redesign/re-evaluate lighting requirements to achieve minimum 
power densities 
Install and commission 
BMS controls for HVAC 
BMS to schedule HVAC level and zones and to enable dispatching of 
load reductions. Includes set HVAC to use outside air when cooler 
than inside (economy cycle) where equipped. 
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Install premium efficient pumps compared to average efficiency 
currently installed 
Load shifting of water 
pumping 
Installing water storage tanks to allow for storing of pumped stock 
and irrigation water 
Install efficient fans 
Upgrade fans (and potentially driving motors) to high efficiency units 
and matching unit specification to required performance 
Lighting efficiency 
Replacement of high intensity discharge (HID) (often metal halide) 
high bay lighting with T5 high-output fluorescents 
Optimise air 
compressors 
Automatic shutdown of conveyors and compressed air , air dryers 
and local conveyors and local compressed air supply when not 
required for production. Improvement in process control 
Refrigeration upgrade 
Upgrade to high-efficiency refrigeration equipment, including efficient 
compressors, optimised floating head pressure and equipment size 
optimization 
Standby generation Incentives to turn on/share standby generators during peaks 
Demand side response Interruptible load from industrial sector, largely process-related 
DLC refrigeration Switch-based load control of cooling and refrigeration 
Power factor correction 




Installation of programmable logic controls on conveyer systems, 
higher efficiency drives, couplings, gear/speed reducers, regenerative 
braking. 
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B. PROPOSED DM, REFORM AND FINANCE PROCESS 
The following diagram sets out the proposed process for the CEFC to provide financing facilities for DM and to recover investments from NSPs (as described in 
Section 4.1) and shows the interaction of this process with the existing regulatory process and current reforms. 
Figure 27: Interaction of financing with targets, regulation and reform processes 
 
  INVESTING IN SAVINGS: FINANCE AND COOPERATIVE APPROACHES TO ELECTRICITY DM  90  
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES JULY  2013 
C.  PRECEDENTS FOR DM TARGETS 
This section provides a brief introduction to various precedents for DM targets in Australia and internationally. It includes only those examples 
that have a specific ‘peak demand’ focus. Table 14 provides a summary, followed by more detailed information on each scheme. 
Table 14: Summary of precedents 
Region Target  Legislated? Funding Penalties/Rewards 
Australian state-based schemes  
Qld 144 MW + 103 MW No, but policy direction from Government Initial $47 million provided 
by Qld Government. 
Subsequent program cost 
recovery sought and 
approved via AER. 
If performance targets not met, 




Conservation and Demand 
Management (CDM) targets rising to 




Overall targets issued by Minister, Individual 
Targets set by Energy Board, following 
advice from Power Authority (advice based 
on direct consultation with Utilities) 
Costs recovered via 
regulatory structure 
Performance incentives accrue 
once 80% of CDM target reached. 
(They do not accrue for 
performance exceeding 150%.) 
California, 
US 
Ranging from 455-534 MW each year 
between 2012 to 2020 
Public Utilities Commission sets demand 
targets for private utilities. Public utilities 
develop their own goals. 
Costs recovered via 
regulatory structure 
Incentives rise as performance 
relative to targets rise 
Colorado, 
US 
5% of 2006 peak demand by 2018 Legislation provides minimum targets but 
authorised Public Utility Commission to 
revise goals and establish interim targets 
Tariff riders on customer 
bills 




15% of 2007 peak electric demand by 
2015 (2011 = 52MW, 2015 = 392 MW) 
Targets set in legislation Still to be determined, but 
may include cost-
recovery, volumetric 
charge to customers 
Unknown 
Florida, US Summer: 3,024 MW  
Winter: 1,937 MW  
(cumulative from 2010-2019) 
Public Service Commission sets goals Unknown None at this stage. 
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Region Target  Legislated? Funding Penalties/Rewards 
Illinois, US 0.1% reduction in peak demand each 
year for 10 years (EY 2009-2019) 
Legislation sets overall annual targets Cost-recovery tariffs Non-compliance with plans requires 
utilities to make contribution to the 
Energy Efficiency Trust Fund 
Maine, US 100 MW reduction in peak load 
electricity consumption by 2020 





From 2007 level, 5% reduction in per 
capita peak demand by 2011, 10% by 
2013, and 15% by 2015 
Targets set in legislation Cost-recovery rates with 




Annual 1% peak reduction, cumulative 
reduction of 9% by 2020, increasing by 
1% each year thereafter 
Cumulative target set in legislation, annual 
targets set by Public Service Commission 
TBD  Unknown 
Ohio, US 1% reduction in peak demand in 2009, 
0.75% reduction in peak demand each 
year through 2018 
Targets set in legislation Unknown Failure to comply with requirements 
will result in forfeiture to be paid to 
the Advanced Energy Fund 
Pennsylva
nia, US 
No current targets. Previous targets 
were savings of 4.5% by May 31, 
2013, measured against actual peak 
demand from June 2007–May 2008 
Targets set in legislation Reconcilable adjustment 
clause to rates 
Failure to achieve targets is 
punishable by fines. 
Rhode 
Island, US 
Summer: Range from 18,512 kW in 
2011 to 32,759 kW in 2014; Winter 
range from 17,197kW in 2011 to 
30,432 kW in 2014 
Public Utilities Commission sets targets Volumetric rate surcharge Unknown 
Texas, US 30% of electric demand growth in 
2013 
0.4% of each company’s peak demand 
Individual targets set in legislation Included in customer 
tariffs, as monthly or 
volumetric basis 
Performance bonus for exceeding 
goal within cost imit. 
Vermont, 
US 
Summer peak savings: 60,800 kW 
(three-year goal for 2012-2014). No 
winter peak target. 
Public Service Board set targets following 
submissions by Utilities and workshop with a 
number of stakeholders including Utilities. 
Volumetric charge on 
customer bills 
Positive performance awards for 
meeting stretch QPIs, and forfeiture 
of portions of performance award 
for failing to meet other minimum 
QPIs. 
Other countries that have implemented DM targets or similar initiatives that may impact on peak demand include: Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Thailand and the United Kingdom*.  
(*see Total Environment Centre, 2012, Demand management targets for networks in the National Electricity Market [Discussion Paper].) 
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C.1 QUEENSLAND ENERGY CONSERVATION AND 
DEMAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM  
Legislation 
Targets are included in the Queensland Energy Management Plan (QEMP), which outlines 28 
initiatives to manage electricity consumption and peak demand in a cost-effective way. 
The initiatives will be further developed and implemented through the Queensland Energy 
Management Centre, which will include a dedicated government policy and regulatory team 




By 2020, successful implementation of the QEMP will help avoid the equivalent of 1000 MW, 
saving more than $3.5 billion in avoided network and generation costs.
140
   Part of this will be 
drawn from the Peak Demand Targets for Energex and Ergon Energy: 
 Energex target: 144 MW by 2014/15 (Figure 28) 
 Ergon Energy target: 150MW by 2016/17 (Figure 29) 
Figure 28: Energex Demand Management Targets to 2014/15 
 
Source: Energex, 2010, Peak Demand Management, Planning for the Future 
 
Figure 29: Ergon Energy Demand Management Targets to 2016/17 
 
Source: Ergon Energy, 2012, Demand Management Outcomes Report 2011-12. 
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 Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation (DEEDI), Queensland Government, 
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Funding 
In 2009/10, the Queensland Government allocated $47 million for demonstration projects. In 2010, 
Energex and Ergon sought and were allocated ~$220 million for demand management programs 
from the Australian Energy Regulator. 
 Energex: $27m OEC Funding 2009–2012 + $170m AER funding 2010–2015
141
 
 Ergon Energy: 2011–12 expenditure of the demand management program was $22.6 




Energex’s performance in DM programs is exceeding its targets in its key Commercial/Industrial 
and Residential DM Initiatives
142
 as shown below Table 15. 
 
Table 15 Energex DM Performance Targets Vs Actuals (MVA Cumulative) 
 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Residential Target - 8 12.5 
Residential Actual - 15.4 23.4 
Commercial & Industrial Target 16  26 42 
Commercial & Industrial Actual - 26.1  42.6 
Source: Energex,  Network Management Plan 2012/13 to 2016/17. 
 
Ergon’s demand management activities delivered 36MW of reductions during 2011–12, exceeding 
the 25MW target set in the 2011–12 Demand Management Plan. With 17MW of peak demand 
reductions in the previous financial year, the reductions delivered to date equate to 51% of the 
regulatory control period target of 103MW. Ergon Energy has now implemented demand 
management activities in seven network constraint locations, with the effect of deferring $428 
million of proposed network augmentations, and generating savings of $78 million.
143
 Table 16 
shows the distribution of these deferrals and resultant savings.  
Table 16 Ergon DM Performance, deferral and savings 
 
Source: Ergon Energy, 2012, Demand Management Outcomes Report 2011-12. 
  
                                               
141
 Energex, 2010, Peak Demand Management, Planning for the Future 
http://pdf.aigroup.asn.au/environment/Peak_Demand_Briefing_Terry_McConnell.pdf. 
142 Energex, Network Management Plan 2012/13 to 2016/17. 
143
 Ergon Energy, 2012, Demand Management Outcomes Report 2011-12 
http://www.ergon.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/137183/DMP-Outcomes-2011-12.pdf. 
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C.2 ONTARIO ELECTRICITY CONSERVATION AND 
DEMAND MANAGEMENT 
The following information is a summary of the material provided on the Ontario Energy Board’s 




In September 2009, the Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009 was amended to allow the 
Minister of Energy and Infrastructure to issue a directive requiring the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) 
to specify, as a condition of licence, conservation and demand management targets for electricity 
distributors. Specifically, section 27.2 of the Ontario Energy Board Act was amended to include the 
following: 
Directives re conservation and demand management targets 
 27.2 (1) The Minister may issue, and the Board shall implement, directives that have been 
approved by the Lieutenant Governor in Council that require the Board to take steps specified in 
the directive to establish conservation and demand management targets to be met by 
distributors and other licensees. 2009, c. 12, Sched. D, s. 7. 
Directives, specified targets 
  (2) To promote conservation and demand management, a directive may require the Board 
to specify, as a condition of a licence, the conservation targets associated with those specified 
in the directive, and the targets shall be apportioned by the Board between distributors and 
other licensees in accordance with the directive. 2009, c. 12, Sched. D, s. 7. 
Targets 
The Minister issued such a directive in March 2010. The Directive set out overall peak demand and 
energy savings targets, for the OEB to allocate amongst the respective distributors, as a condition 
of a licence. 
Current peak demand target: 
 1,330 MW of provincial peak demand persisting at the end of the four year period, beginning 
January 1, 2011 and ending December 31, 2014. 
Energy savings target: 
 Cumulative 6,000 GWh p.a. 2010 to 2014 
Individual targets 
The OEB is responsible for determining the allocation of the total CDM targets to each licensed 
electricity distributor, having regard to information from the Ontario Power Authority (OPA), 
developed in consultation with distributors. 
In June 2010 the OPA provided advice to the OEB on target allocation amongst electricity 
distributors.
145
 In developing its advice, the OPA sought input from all Local Distribution Companies 
(LDCs) via a written consultation process, utilising a consultation paper entitled, ‘The 
Establishment of LDC Conservation Targets under the Green Energy Act – Target setting and 
allocation methodology advice from the OPA’. 
The overall recommendations of the OPA in regards to the targets were: 
 Individual target setting methodology: The OPA recommends that peak demand savings 
targets be allocated based on each LDC’s relative contribution to system peak demand. 
Specifically, the OPA recommends using a peak demand target allocation factor which is 
based on each LDC’s average contribution to the top 10 system peak hours, over the most 
recent two years of available data. 
The recommended allocation methodology is: 
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Individual LDC Peak Demand Savings Target (MW) = Dem% x LDC Provincial 
Aggregate Peak Demand Savings Target of 1330 MW, Where: 
Dem% = (Dem%Yr1 + Dem%Yr2) ÷ 2 
Dem%Yr1 = (Sum of LDC demand at top 10 system peak hours in Year 1) ÷ (Sum of 
demand of all LDCs that have CDM Targets at top 10 system peak hours in Year 1) 
Dem%Yr2 = (Sum of LDC demand at top 10 system peak hours in Year 2) ÷ (Sum of 
demand of all LDCs that have CDM Targets at top 10 system peak hours in Year 2) 
 Individual targets: Individual recommendations were made by the OPA for 79 Local 
Distribution Companies based on the methodologies above. 
Individual targets were issued by the OEB (initially in November 2010 and revised in March 2011) 
for 81 distributors, with peak demand targets ranging from less than 1 MW to over 280 MW and 
energy savings targets ranging from less than 1 GWh to over 1,300 GWh. In many cases, the 
targets issued by the OEB were slightly different to those recommended by the OPA, though 





Overall in 2011, distributors reported spending a total of $94,129,770 on CDM programs across 
Ontario, as per the following table: 
 
The reported amounts in this report include only the spending incurred directly by distributors and 
do not include any spending amounts for programs centrally funded by the OPA. (Centrally funded 
programs are those where the OPA works directly with either retailers such as appliance exchange 
or retirement, contractors such as HVAC incentives, and/or aggregators such as in the Demand 
Response 3 program.) 
 
Penalties/Rewards 
Distributors begin to accrue a performance incentive once they reach 80% of their CDM target. 
Performance incentives do not accrue for performance that exceeds 150% of each CDM Target.
146
 
The incentive is calculated in a stepped manner, with a higher $/kW rate for higher performance. 
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Specific criteria are in place regarding performance criteria: 
 A distributor may only claim a performance incentive in relation to its contribution to the CDM 
Programs. In order for a distributor to claim 100% attribution of benefits, the distributor shall 
demonstrate that its role was central to the CDM Programs. 
 If a distributor’s role does not meet the test for centrality… the distributor shall then submit a 
proposal for an attribution of benefits to the Board for approval and the Board will determine 
whether the proposal is acceptable. 
 If more than one distributor applies for an attribution of benefits for the same CDM program, 
the total applied for between the distributors cannot exceed 100%. 
 Performance incentive payments shall be made on the basis of a distributor’s achieved 
verified results in meeting its CDM Targets. A distributor must provide verified results for both 
electricity savings (kWh) and peak demand savings (kW) at the time of its application to the 
Board for a performance incentive. The verification must have been completed by an 
independent third party selected from the OPA's third party vendor of records list. 
 A distributor's performance incentive shall be calculated across the distributor's entire 




The first annual report on the CDM targets was for the 2011 year. 2011 Peak Demand Net Savings 
(kW) were: 
 
The majority of distributors reported having achieved at least 10% of their net peak demand (kW) 
target from their 2011 results, with 4 distributors achieving over 60%, another 4 over 30% and 7 
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2011 results were achieved through the use of the province-wide CDM programs made available 
by the OPA. While three Board-Approved CDM Program applications were received by the Board 
over the course of 2010 and 2011, ultimately no Board-Approved programs proceeded in 2011. 
Upon review of the first two or the three received applications, the Board determined that additional 
evidence was required relating to the evaluation plans. For the third application, the Board found 
duplication with certain OPA-Contracted Province-Wide CDM Programs, but approved some 
funding for two programs over a 15-month period. In all three applications, the applicants ultimately 
decided not to proceed. 
Factors behind differential performance are not identifiable from currently available information. 
Overall, distributors were mainly optimistic in their comments about the 2011 results and 
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C.3 US STATE-BASED SCHEMES 
The information on the following US state-based schemes, except where otherwise noted, 
is a summary of information from the following two web resources: 
 American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE), 2012, State Energy 
Efficiency Policy Database (website). http://aceee.org/sector/state-policy/ 
 N.C. Solar Center (no date) DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables 
and Efficiency (webpage). N.C. State University with support from the Interstate 
Renewable Energy Council, Inc. http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/index.cfm 
The schemes are generally designated as Energy Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS). 




The California Legislature emphasized the importance of energy efficiency and established broad 
goals with the enactment of Assembly Bill 2021 of 2006. The bill calls for a 10% reduction in 
forecasted electricity consumption within 10 years. 
The bill also requires the California Energy Commission (CEC), the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) and other interested parties to develop a statewide estimate of all cost-
effective electricity and natural gas savings and to develop efficiency savings and demand 
reduction targets for the next 10 years. This study must be updated every three years. 
Public utilities in California are not regulated by the CPUC. Still, Assembly Bill 2021 requires them 
to pursue energy efficiency as well. The law required them by June 1, 2007 to identify all cost-
effective energy efficiency and demand reduction possibilities, and to establish energy reduction 
goals for the next 10 years. Public utilities are required to update these studies every three years 
and to submit them to the CEC. 
Targets 
Having already developed interim efficiency goals for each of the utilities from 2004 through 2013, 
the CPUC developed new goals in 2008 for years 2012 through 2020. The goals consist of 
separate electricity savings and demand reduction requirements for each of the three investor-
owned electrical utilities and energy savings requirements for the state's three gas utilities. 
Electric Peak Demand Reduction varies by utility, as shown in the following table: 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
PG&E 251 MW 236 MW 228 MW 241 MW 257 MW 258 MW 270 MW 270 MW 269 MW 
SCE 239 MW 240 MW 189 MW 193 MW 213 MW 215 MW 222 MW 222 MW 223 MW 
SDGE 31 MW 41 MW 38 MW 38 MW 40 MW 40 MW 41 MW 42 MW 42 MW 
Total 521 MW 517 MW 455 MW 472 MW 510 MW 514 MW 533 MW 533 MW 534 MW 
The required energy savings will be primarily met through incentive programs for utility customers, 
but utilities can also count the energy savings resulting from these policies, including state building 




Annual Peak Savings from Efficiency Programs and Standards: California 
                                               
147
 http://energy.gov/savings/energy-efficiency-resource-standard; http://aceee.org/sector/state-
policy/california; http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=CA62R&re=1&ee=1.  
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A House Bill required the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to establish energy savings 
goals for gas and electric utilities (thereby creating an EERS) and to give investor-owned utilities a 
financial incentive for implementing cost-effective efficiency programs. 
Targets 
The EERS statute does not directly set a fixed schedule of statewide percentages of energy 
savings to be achieved by particular years, nor does it require the acquisition of all cost-effective 
energy efficiency resources. Instead the law provided minimum energy and demand savings 
targets but also authorized CPUC to revise the goals and establish interim savings targets as it 
deems appropriate. It set an overall multi-year statewide goal for investor-owned utilities of at least 
five percent of the utility's peak demand and retail energy sales in the base year (2006) to be met 
by the end of 2018. 
Current peak demand targets: 
 5% of 2006 peak demand by 2018. 
 
Funding 
The utilities recover the program costs of the plans approved by the PUC by using tariff riders, 
which adjust customer bills. The PUC has created incentives to reward utilities that create 
efficiency programs for electricity and/or natural gas. 
 
Penalties/Rewards 
The 2009/10 Demand Side Management (DSM) Plan, approved in 2008, includes a three-part 
incentive package that included a $2 million ‘disincentive offset’ for each year that Public Service 
Colorado implement an approved DSM plan, a performance incentive and cost recovery via a rider 
on a prospective basis. (A similar three-part package was approved for Black Hills.) In each case 
the performance incentives are available for achieving efficiency targets - utilities achieving 
efficiency targets can earn a percentage of the net economic benefits generated by those savings. 
The total incentive (including the disincentive offset) is capped at 20% of PSCo’s annual DSM 
expenditures. 
The ‘Disincentive offset’ is a payment of $2 million after taxes (approximately 3.2. million gross) for 
each year that 80% of the annual energy savings goal for an approved DSM plan is achieved. This 
amount is recovered over the 12 month period following the year in which the DSM plan is 
implemented. The PUC specifically notes that this ‘disincentive offset’ should not be considered 
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lost margin recovery, but is an annual bonus for meeting approved DSM goals. The $2 million 
disincentive offset can be adjusted downward in future years if the 80% target is not met although it 
was reported that the 80% target is so easily achieved as to make the payment almost automatic 







Almost all utilities have had peak demand programs in place before deregulation. In the 2007 base 
year, most utilities had some level of peak demand reduction in operation during the summer 
timeframe and 2007 actual consumption data reflect the utilities’ peak demand as reduced by the 
programs (restricted demand). 
 
Legislation 
In July 2009 the Delaware legislature enacted legislation creating energy savings targets for 
Delaware’s investor-owned, municipal, and cooperative electric utilities, as well the state’s natural 
gas distribution companies. Utilities are permitted to determine the best way to achieve the energy 
savings targets and to develop and fund programs towards this end. 
The legislation required the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control 
(DNREC) to develop regulations implementing the standard by July 29, 2010 (one year after the 
enactment); however, as of this writing final regulations have not been promulgated. 
Applicable Sectors: 
 Municipal Utility, Investor-Owned Utility, Rural Electric Cooperative, Natural Gas Distribution 
Utility. 
Targets 
The law requires affected electric utilities to establish programs which save the equivalent of 15% 
of 2007 electricity consumption and peak electric demand by 2015. The standard also includes an 
interim reduction target of 2% of electricity consumption and peak demand by 2011. 
Current peak demand target: 
 Peak demand savings equivalent to 15% of 2007 peak electric demand by 2015  
(2011 = 52MW, 2015 = 392 MW). 
Based on actual 2007 electric peak (restricted demand), the affected energy providers would have 
the following savings targets: 
 2007  








Delmarva Power & Light Company 1892 38 284 
Delaware Electric Cooperative 345 7 52 
Delaware Municipal Electric Corporation 376 8 56 
Total 2,613 52 392 
 
Funding 
Based on the recommendations of the EERS Workgroup, the DNREC may establish an energy 
efficiency charge to fund these programs on customer bills. Any charge must be levied on a per 
kilowatt-hour (kWh) or per therm basis and may not vary by customer class. In addition, the chosen 
rate may not result in an average charge greater than $0.58 per month per residential electric 
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customer, or $0.41 per month per residential natural gas customer. Utilities collect and remit any 
energy efficiency charges to the Delaware Energy Office for deposit into the Sustainable Energy 
Trust Fund (SETF), with a separate account for each utility. The funds will be used to support 
activities in the following areas and proportions: 
 75% to further the goal and activities of the Sustainable Energy Utility (SEU), including 
energy conservation, energy efficiency, renewable energy and energy financing. 
 20% to fund the Weatherization Assistance Program 






Energy efficiency is defined by statute as, ―a decrease in consumption of electric energy or 
natural gas or a decrease in consumption of electric energy or natural gas on a per unit of 
production basis or equivalent energy efficiency measures that do not cause a reduction in the 
quality or level of service provided to the energy customer achieved through measures or programs 
that target consumer behaviour, or replace or improve the performance of equipment, processes, 
or devices. Since the efficiency reduction in energy use sometimes takes place during peak energy 
use hours, the efficiency may contribute to reducing peak demand during those times. The Center 
for Energy and Environmental Policy reviewed various sources of information, including a 2009 
report from the Energy Information Administration and provided the following data on demand 
reduction resulting from utility-administered energy efficiency programs. 
 
Assuming achievement of the 2011 and 2015 energy efficiency goals and a range of 0.12 to 0.37 
megawatts of demand reduction per gigawatt-hour, the spillover effect from efficiency to peak 
demand savings could range from 28 megawatts to 87 megawatts in 2011 and 213 megawatts to 
658 megawatts in 201520. The EERS peak demand reduction goals are 52 megawatts and 392 
megawatts in 2011 and 2015, respectively; Delaware’s concentrated efforts on energy efficiency 
programs could achieve between half to more than the full targeted peak demand savings without 
any further expenditures on demand reduction program. 
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Florida150 
Legislation 
In 1980, Florida enacted the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (FEECA), creating 
Florida Statutes Section 366.80-366.85 and Section 403.519. Section 366.82(6) requires the 
Florida Public Service Commission to review the conservation goals of each utility subject to 
FEECA at least every five years. Most recently, goals were established on December 30, 2009 with 
the passage of Order No. PSC-09-0855-FOF-EG. Each utility had 90 days from the date of 
issuance of the Order to file a demand-side management plan to meet the goals set by the PSC. 
Each utility must report out on efficiency goal status to the Florida legislature annually. 
Applicable Sectors: 
 Utility, Investor-Owned Utility, Rural Electric Cooperative, All Utilities with >2,000 GWh 
annual sales. 
Utilities whose annual sales amount to less than 2,000 GWh as of July 1, 1993 are not subject to 
FEECA. This leaves all five Florida investor-owned utilities (Florida Power & Light Company, 
Progress Energy Florida Inc., Tampa Electric Company, Gulf Power Company, Florida Public 
Utilities Company) and two municipal utilities (Orlando Utilities Commission and Jacksonville 
Electric Authority) under the authority of the law. 
 
Targets 
The Florida PSC approved annual goals for each utility for summer peak reduction, winter peak 
reduction, and overall annual sales reductions. 
Current peak demand targets: 
 Summer: 3,024 MW cumulative reduction from 2010-2019 
 Winter: 1,937 MW cumulative reduction from 2010-2019. 
Individual targets 
Goals for individual utilities for each specific year can be found in the PSC order. The goals set by 
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Illinois151 
Context 
Prior to legislation passed in 2007, there was limited funding and associated activity for utility-
sector energy efficiency programs. Illinois had little involvement with utility energy efficiency 
programs, other than a small annual funding requirement (~ $3 million/year) created in the Illinois 
restructuring legislation (HB262) in 1997 to support some small programs administered by the state 
Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (DCEO). 
Legislation 
Legislation passed in 2007 (Illinois Power Agency Act, or IPAA) set energy efficiency and demand 
response program requirements for utilities. A state policy requires electric utilities to use cost-
effective energy efficiency and demand-response measures to reduce direct and indirect costs to 
consumers. This can be accomplished by avoiding or delaying the need for new generation, 
transmission, and distribution infrastructure. Because Illinois is still technically a ‘restructured’ 
state—with distribution utilities purchasing power in competitive wholesale markets—it is not clear 
how energy efficiency would be factored into resource planning decisions. 
Applicable Sectors: Investor-Owned Utility, Retail Supplier, Illinois DCEO. (The electricity reduction 
goals apply to utilities that had 100,000 or more customers on December 31, 2005.) 
Targets 
The legislation set an energy efficiency resource standard (EERS) savings goal that sets 
incremental annual electric and natural gas savings targets based on previous year’s consumption, 
beginning on June 1 of that year. The electric savings requirement began at 0.2% in 2008 and 
ramps up to a requirement of 2% annual savings in 2015 and thereafter. 
Current peak demand targets: 
 0.1% reduction in peak demand each year for 10 years (EY 2009-2019). 
Funding 
SB1592 authorizes utilities to recover the costs for providing energy efficiency programs and 
directs utilities to design and implement cost-recovery tariffs. Energy efficiency measures must 
satisfy the Total Resource Cost (TRC) Test. In addition, in 2008 through 2011, annual per kilowatt-
hour charges are limited based on the previous year's rates. Beginning in 2012, the estimated 
average net increase due to the cost of efficiency measures to 2.015% of the amount paid per kWh 
by customers in EY 2007 or the incremental amount per kWh paid for the measures in 2011, 
whichever is greater. (DSIRE) 
If the rate impact cap is reached, the energy savings goals will be relaxed to the maximum savings 
that can be achieved within the rate impact cap. If, after 2 years, an electric utility fails to meet the 
efficiency standard it must make a contribution to the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance 
Program and transfer the program to the Illinois Power Authority. 
Funds from the tariffs cover both utility- and state-administered programs. Individual electric utilities 
are required to administer 75% of the total funds for energy efficiency. The Illinois Department of 
Commerce and Economic Opportunity (DCEO) administers 25% of the funds, which are used to 
target government facilities, low-income households, and market transformation-oriented 




Illinois does not have a mechanism in place for utility shareholder incentives for energy efficiency. 
SB1592 does not address the issue. 
However there are penalties for non-compliance by utilities. Utilities that fail to submit an energy 
reduction plan will result in a fine of $100,000 for each day until the plan is filed. This penalty is 
deposited in the Energy Efficiency Trust Fund and may not be recovered by rate payers. Plans are 
due on September 1 every three years. If an electric utility fails to comply with its plan after 2 years, 
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it must make a contribution to the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). Large 
utilities (those with more than 2,000,000 customers on December 31, 2005) must contribute 
$665,000, and medium utilities (those with between 100,000 and 2,000,000 customers) must 
contribute $335,000. Utilities that fail to meet their plans again after the third year must make 
another contribution to the fund ($665,000 for large utilities and $335,000 for medium utilities). 
After three years of non-compliance, the Illinois Power Agency (IPA) shall assume control over 
energy efficiency incentive programs. 
 
Results 
Illinois reported an efficiency budget of $165.5 million for 2009/2010 (Program years are summer to 
summer, not calendar years). Illinois electric utilities reported efficiency program savings of 




In June 2009, Maine enacted the Act Regarding Maine's Energy Future, which established the 
Efficiency Maine Trust. As a part of this Act, the Trust is responsible for creating a plan to reach the 
energy efficiency targets. 
In pursuance of these goals, the Trust must develop triennial plans describing a three-year plan, 
programs, and implementation strategies for reaching these goals, as well as other energy 
efficiency and renewable energy goals. The triennial plans must be approved by the Maine Public 
Utilities Commission, and will be reanalyzed annually through Docket 2010-116. The first triennial 
plan was approved by the Commission in July 2010, and will expire in June 2013. 
The overall goals and the programs are directed at consumers rather than utilities. Reviews to the 
plan were approved in February 2011, and again in January 2012. 
Applicable Sectors:  
 Utility. 
Targets 
The plan includes a goal of saving more than 3.3 trillion BTUs of energy annually by Fiscal Year 
2013. Efficiency Maine has made the draft fiscal year 2014-2016 triennial plan available. 
Current peak demand targets: 
 100 MW reduction by 2020. 
 
Funding 





Efficiency Maine also publishes an annual report on its activities; Fiscal Year 2011 Efficiency Maine 
Annual Report was published in December 2011. 
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Maryland153 
Legislation 
In April 2008 Maryland enacted legislation setting a state goal of achieving a 15% reduction in per 
capita electricity consumption and 15% reduction in per capita peak demand by 2015, compared to 
2007 levels. 
Utilities are required to consult with the Maryland Energy Administration (MEA) on program design 
and implementation every three years. The first consultation was required to take place by July 1, 
2008. Utilities must also submit plans for achieving the specified energy consumption and peak 
demand reductions to the PSC every three years, with the first plan due by September 1, 2008. 
The PSC is tasked with evaluating the plans based on cost-effectiveness, rate impacts for each 
ratepayer class, job impacts, and environmental impacts. Utilities filed their second set of plans for 
the 2012 - 2014 compliance period during the summer of 2011 and the plans were approved by the 
PSC in December 2011. 
The ongoing regulatory proceedings at the PSC are taking place in Case Nos. 9153 - 9157 (each 
utility has a different case number). 
Applicable Sectors: 
 Utility (Statewide Goal). 
Targets 
The legislation requires the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) to direct the state’s 
electric utilities to implement programs designed to achieve a 5% reduction in per capita electricity 
consumption by 2011 and a 10% reduction by 2015. The remainder of the overall goal of 15% is to 
be accomplished independently through other means. 
Utility targets for per capita peak demand reduction are set at 5% by 2011, 10% by 2013, and 15% 
by 2015, thus utilities are responsible for the full portion of the peak demand reduction target. 
Current peak demand targets: 
 5% reduction in per capita peak demand by 2011, 10% by 2013, and 15% by 2015, 
compared to 2007 
 
Funding 






The Maryland PSC issues annual reports on progress made towards meeting the standards. 
The Empower Maryland 2011 Compliance Report indicates that the utilities' collective per capital 
demand reduction and energy savings achievements met the 2011 targets, but that part of the 
savings is attributable to factors such as moderate weather and the economic downturn rather than 
utility programs. In fact, collective program energy savings generally fell well short of the 2011 goal, 
though the utilities were able to generate peak demand savings equivalent to 105% of the 2011 
goal. 
Progress towards the targets also differed substantially from utility to utility. 
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Missouri154 
Legislation 
In 2009, Missouri enacted the Missouri Energy Efficiency Investment Act, creating energy 
efficiency sales and peak reduction goals to be met through investment in demand side 
management. The targets outlined below were created by the Public Service Commission (PSC) in 
2010, with benchmarks beginning in 2012 
The goal of the program is to achieve all cost-effective demand-side savings. 
Applicable Sectors: 
 Utility, Investor-Owned Utility. 
Targets 
Annual benchmarks beginning in 2012. 
Current peak demand targets: 







2012 1.0% 1.0% 
2013 1.0% 2.0% 
2014 1.0% 3.0% 
2015 1.0% 4.0% 
2016 1.0% 5.0% 
2017 1.0% 6.0% 
2018 1.0% 7.0% 
2019 1.0% 8.0% 
2020 1.0% 9.0% 
2021+ 1.0% -- 
 
Funding 
Individual utilities must file an application with the PSC for approval of their demand-side 
management programs; recovery for any such programs will not be permitted unless the programs 
were approved by the PSC and result in energy or demand savings. The Total Resource Cost Test 
will be considered the preferred cost-effectiveness test. The only exceptions to the cost-
effectiveness requirement is programs for educational purposes or for low-income customers. 
The PSC may development cost recovery mechanisms to encourage investment in demand-side 
programs, including capitalization of investments in and expenditures for demand-side programs, 
rate design modifications, accelerated depreciation on demand-side investments, and allowing 
utility retention of a portion of the net benefits of demand-side programs for its shareholders. 
As required by statute, Docket EW-2011-0372 was opened in May 2011 to study rate design 
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Ohio155 
Legislation 
In May 2008, Ohio enacted broad electric industry restructuring legislation (SB 221) containing 
energy efficiency requirements for investor-owned utilities. In addition to the efficiency standard, 
SB 221 established the Ohio Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard (AEPS), requiring utilities to 
obtain 12.5% of their energy for distribution from renewable resources by 2024, and an additional 
12.5% of electricity from advanced resources by 2025. 
The baseline for sales reductions are calculated based on the average number of total kilowatt-
hours sold during the previous three years. For peak demand reductions, the baseline is calculated 
by the average peak demand during the previous three years. The Public Utilities Commission of 
Ohio (PUCO) may alter the baseline to account for new economic growth in a utility's territory or 
weather changes. 
In order to meet the targets, utilities may implement demand-response or customer-sited programs, 
or transmission and distribution infrastructure improvements. In 2012, the legislature passed a bill 
that allows certain combined heat and power and waste energy recovery systems to qualify for the 
Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard. Systems only qualify if they are installed or retrofitted on or 
after September 9, 2012. Certain waste energy recovery systems installed in 2002-2004 may also 
qualify. A system may qualify for either the Renewable Energy Resource portion of the AEPS or 
the Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard. Savings from combined heat and power or waste energy 
recovery must be calculated by the PUCO. The amount of savings claimed from these two 
resources cannot exceed the annual percentage of the utility's industrial-customer load. 
Targets 
Electric utilities are required to implement energy efficiency and peak demand reduction programs 
that result in a cumulative electricity savings of 22% by the end of 2025, with specific annual 
benchmarks. In addition, utilities must reduce peak demand by 1% in 2009, and 0.75% annually 
through 2018. In 2018, the legislature must make recommendations for future peak demand 
reduction targets. Current peak demand targets: 1% reduction in peak demand in 2009, 0.75% 
reduction in peak demand each year through 2018. 




2009 1% 1% 
2010 0.75% 1.75% 
2011 0.75% 2.50% 
2012 0.75% 3.25% 
2013 0.75% 4.00% 
2014 0.75% 4.75% 
2015 0.75% 5.50% 
2016 0.75% 6.25% 
2017 0.75% 7.00% 




Failure to comply with energy efficiency or peak demand reduction requirements will result in 
PUCO assessing a forfeiture upon the utility, which will be credited to the Advanced Energy Fund. 
The amount of the forfeiture is either of the following: 
 An amount, per day per under-compliance or non-compliance, not greater than $10,000 
per violation 
 An amount equal to the then existing market value of one renewable energy credit per 
megawatt hour of under-compliance or noncompliance. 
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Pennsylvania156 
Legislation 
In October 2008 Pennsylvania adopted Act 129, creating energy efficiency and conservation 
requirements, including requiring obligated utilities to develop plans to provide electricity and peak 
demand savings in line with the targets. Notably, energy efficiency measures may potentially 
include solar and geothermal technologies. In January 2009 the Pennsylvania Public Utilities 
Commission issued an order defining how these requirements, referred to as Phase I 
requirements, were to be implemented. 
Under Phase I of the standard, utilities were required to develop plans for achieving these targets 
and submit them to the PUC for review by July 1, 2009. Among other required details, the plans 
had to be designed to provide minimum of 10% of the requirements from units of Federal, State 
and local government, including municipalities, school, districts, institutions of higher education and 
nonprofit entities. They were also required to include specific measures for households at or below 
150% of the federal poverty income guidelines. In the Phase II Order, the ‘carve-out’ for 
governmental entities and non-profits was maintained, and the PUC also elected to adopt a goal 
that 4.5% of each utility's target be met with savings in the low-income sector. 
All Phase I utility plans had been approved by the PUC by the end of 2009 and the obligated 
utilities are all now offering various energy programs for their customers. In June 2011 the 
PUC issued an order establishing an expedited process by which utilities may make minor changes 
to their energy efficiency and conservation plans outside of the potentially time consuming process 
defined in the original January 2009 Act 129 Implementation Order. The Phase II Order adopted a 
similar approval process and required utilities to file new plans by November 1, 2012, though these 
filings have now been delayed by utility challenges to the Phase II targets. 
By November 30, 2013 and every five years thereafter, the PUC is required to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of the energy consumption reduction program, and consider developing requirements 
for additional incremental consumption reductions. A similar review is required for the peak 
demand reduction requirements. The PUC completed its first review in August 2012, determining 
that the benefits of the programs exceed their costs, and initiating Phase II of the standard. 
Applicable Sectors: 
Applies to state’s investor owned utilities with at least 100,000 customers. With this limitation on 
applicability, the standards apply only to the following utilities: PECO Energy, PPL Electric Utilities, 




Phase I targets were: Electricity savings of 1% by May 2011 and 3% by May 2013, measured 
against projected electricity consumption for the period from June 2009 – May 2010. The utilities 
were also required to develop plans that provide for peak demand savings of 4.5% by May 31, 
2013, measured against actual peak demand from June 2007 – May 2008 
Phase II will run from June 1, 2013 - May 31, 2016 and requires (tentatively) energy savings that 
vary by utility from 1.6% to 2.9% of June 2009 - May 2010 electricity consumption. These targets 
are expected to result in collective savings of 3.3 million megawatt-hours (MWh) over the three-
year period. Any savings in excess of the Phase I 3% target may be applied to the Phase II targets. 
The Phase II order provided a specific process for utilities to challenge the revised targets by 
requesting an evidentiary hearing. With the exception of Duquesne Light Company, it appears that 
all of the utilities have chosen to make such a challenge. 
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Current peak demand targets: 
In the Phase II Order, the PUC chose to not establish additional peak demand reduction targets 
pending further study and evaluation, but permitted the utilities to continue existing residential 




Rate Impact Parameters: 
Costs may not exceed 2% of annual utility revenue as of December 31, 2006 
 
Utilities are permitted to recover all reasonable and prudent costs associated with their program 
offerings through a reconcilable adjustment clause. Related costs associated with decreased 
revenue and retail sales may not be included under this adjustment, but may be reflected in future 
utility rate-making proceedings. The total cost associated with an electric utility’s energy efficiency 
and peak demand reduction plan may not exceed 2% of the utility’s total annual revenue as of 
December 31, 2006. The PUC has found that the cost should be determined as an average annual 
amount rather than as the full cost of the multi-year plan as a whole. 
 
Penalties/Rewards 
Failure to achieve the requisite reductions in electricity consumption and peak demand is 
punishable by fines from $1 million to $20 million. (Failure to file a plan with the PUC is also 
punishable by a fine of $100,000 per day). Costs associated with any such fines are not 








Rhode Island enacted legislation in 2006 requiring the state Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to 
establish standards for system reliability, energy efficiency and conservation procurement, 
including standards for energy supply diversification, distributed generation, demand response, and 
‘prudent and reliable’ energy efficiency and energy conservation measures. These standards and 
guidelines, which were adopted by the PUC in 2008, must be reviewed at least once every three 
years. Each electric and natural gas distribution company must submit to the PUC for review and 
approval every three years -- beginning September 1, 2008, and ending September 1, 2017 -- a 
plan for system reliability, energy efficiency and energy conservation procurement. 
Additional legislation enacted in June 2012 (H.B. 8233) requires utilities to support the installation 
efficient combined heat and power (CHP) systems at commercial, industrial, institutional and 
municipal facilities. Each utility must specify in its annual efficiency program plan how it will do so. 




In July 2011, the PUC approved energy savings targets for National Grid for 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
Specifically, National Grid must design its energy efficiency plans with the goal of reducing energy 
consumption by 1.7% in 2012, 2.1% in 2013 and 2.5% in 2014. These goals are intended to 
achieve electricity savings of 128,570 MWh in 2012, 158,820 MWh in 2013 and 189,068 MWh in 
2014. Capacity savings for summer and winter demand were also established. 
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Current peak demand targets
158
: 
 2011 2012  2013  2014  
Summer Demand 
(kW)  
18,512  23,204  28,664  32,759  




Rhode Island Statute 39-2.1.2 requires each electric distribution company to include a surcharge 
per kilowatt-hour delivered to fund demand-side management programs, which are implemented 
by the electric distribution company. The electricity surcharge took effect January 1, 2008, and will 
remain in place through December 31, 2017. The PUC determines the surcharge levels, which are 











Since 1999, Texas law has required electric utilities to meet energy efficiency goals, requiring 
electric utilities to offset 10% of load growth through end-use energy efficiency (Texas Senate Bill 
7). (Demand growth being the average growth of the five previous weather adjusted peak demands 
for each utility.) 
In 2007, after several years of meeting this goal at low costs, the legislature increased the standard 
to 15% of load growth by December 31, 2008 and 20% of load growth by December 31, 2009 
(Texas House Bill 3693). The legislation also required utilities to submit energy savings goals. The 
Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) approved these rules in March 2008.. 
In 2010, the Public Utilities Commission of Texas (PUCT) approved Substantive Rule 25.181, a 
new Energy Efficiency Rule which increases the goals from 20% of electric demand growth to 25% 
growth in demand in 2012 and 30% in 2013 and beyond. The rule also establishes customer cost 
caps to contain costs, which will inhibit some utilities from investing in cost-effective energy 
efficiency measures. 
In the 2011 legislative session, Texas adopted Senate Bill 1125, which amends the EERS policy by 
requiring utilities to eventually achieve savings of 0.4% of each company’s peak demand. As a 
result, utilities with declining or rapidly growing load growth will have more predictable and 
consistent goals than those that were set based on load growth. The Bill also added focus on 
reducing demand in the winter, which is more likely to result in real energy efficiency savings than 
summer demand response programs, which simply shift load and reduce peak demand. The Bill 
does not remove the cost caps adopted in 2010, but included the bonus under the cost cap. 
Targets 
 30% of electric demand growth in 2013 
 0.4% of each company’s peak demand 
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Funding 
Programs are typically funded through the utilities’ tariff or base rate. An Energy Efficiency Cost 
Recovery Factor (EECRF) rate schedule is included in tariffs and permits utilities to recover the 
costs of providing energy efficiency programs. 
‘The EECRF shall be set at a rate that will give the utility opportunity to earn revenues equal to the 
sum of the utility’s forecasted efficiency costs, net of energy efficiency costs included in base rates, 
the EE bonus amount that it earned for the prior year…and any adjustment for past over- or under-
recovery of energy efficiency revenues’.
160
 
Sum of base rate recovery of energy efficiency costs and the EECRF cannot exceed specified 
amounts: 
 2011 to 2012 2013 onwards 
Residential 
 
Monthly Basis = $1.30/month 
Energy Basis = $0.0010/kWh 
Monthly Basis = $1.60/month 
Energy Basis = $0.0012/kWh 
Non-Residential $0.0005/kWh $0.00075/kWh 
The amendments also make several revisions to the energy efficiency cost recovery factor 
(EECRF) proceedings, including revising the procedural schedule and scope of the EECRFs and 
allowing an annual consumer price index (CPI) adjustment to the cost caps beginning in 2014; 
requiring costs to be directly assigned on a rate class basis and calculating EECRFs to provide for 
energy charges for residential and commercial customers billed for base rates on an energy basis 
and as an energy or demand charge for each commercial rate class billed on a demand basis for 
base rates 
Alternatively, a commission order establishing a utility’s base rate may also include an amount to 
offset energy efficiency program costs. The commission also has the option of approving an energy 
charge or a monthly customer charge for the EECRF. 
Penalties/Rewards 
All investor-owned utilities have a shared benefit incentive in place. When a utility exceeds its 
demand reduction goal within the prescribed cost limit it is awarded a performance bonus. The 
performance bonus is based on the utility’s energy efficiency achievements for programs 
implemented in the previous year (PUCT Substantive Rule §25.181). 
A utility that exceeds its demand reduction goal receives a bonus equal to 1% of the net benefits 
for every 2% that the utility exceeds its goal. The maximum bonus was originally equal to 20% of 
the utility’s program costs. In 2011, it changed to a maximum of 10% of total net benefits. 
Additionally, a utility that meets at least 120% of its demand reduction goal with at least 10% of its 
savings achieved through Hard-to-Reach programs (which benefit customers with an annual 
household income at or below 200% of the federal poverty guidelines) can receive an additional 











                                               
160
 http://www.puc.texas.gov/industry/projects/rules/38578/EUMMOT_EEIP_June_2_2011_EECRF.pdf.  
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Vermont161 
Context 
Vermont has had extensive energy efficiency programs since 1990. Originally, programs were run 
by the state’s utilities under jurisdiction of the Vermont Public Service Board (PSB), but in 1999 the 
PSB transferred operations to Efficiency Vermont, an independent, statewide ‘energy efficiency 
utility’ (EEU) supported by public benefits funding that delivers efficiency programs for the state. 
Vermont is one of two states that established statewide public benefits funding without electric 
utility restructuring. 
Legislation 
Vermont does not have traditional EERS legislation with a set schedule of energy-savings 
percentages for each year. Instead, Vermont law requires EEU budgets to be set at a level that 
would realize ‘all reasonably available, cost-effective energy efficiency.’ 
Targets 
Three-year Quantifiable Performance Indictors (QPIs) are established as part of the D emand 
Resources Plan (‘DRP’) process. The DRP process is used to determine the QPI targets, including 
corresponding incentive amounts attached to each and the financial consequences for under-
performance 
Current peak demand targets: 
 Summer peak savings: 60,800 kW (three-year goal for 2012-2014). Winter peak savings: n/a 
Targets for the previous three years (2009-2011) were: Summer peak: 51,200 kW, Winter peak: 
54,000 kW. 
Funding 
Vermont pioneered the model of a statewide ‘energy efficiency utility’ (EEU) after Vermont enacted 
legislation in 1999 authorizing Vermont Public Service Board (PSB) to collect a volumetric charge 
on all electric utility customers’ bills to support energy efficiency programs. Volumetric charges are 
assessed on a per kWh or per therm basis. Vermont PSB created the EEU, Efficiency Vermont, to 
use these public benefits funds to provide programs and services that save money and conserve 
energy. 
Penalties/Rewards 
Initially, there was no explicit penalty for non-performance, but a portion of the compensation 
Vermont pays the administrator was contingent on meeting stated goals, subject to a monitoring 
and verification process. 
With the introduction of QPIs, performance compensation is to be paid based on the attainment of 
the three-year QPI targets discussed below. Currently QPIs 1-7 have a positive performance award 
associated with them and include 100% target levels, ‘super-stretch’ targets, corresponding 
incentive amounts attached to each (reflecting weighting), scaling calculations, and the financial 
consequences for under-performance. QPIs 8-14 are minimum performance requirements where 
the impact for failure to meet the proposed QPI target is the forfeiture of the opportunity to meet a 
portion of the performance award. 
Results 
In 2008, Efficiency Vermont saved 150 GWh at a cost of 2.9 cents per kilowatt-hour (over the life of 
the measures) according to its annual reports. In 2009, Efficiency Vermont saved 90 GWh at a cost 
of 3.8 cents per kilowatt-hour. 
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US Federal EERS 
Stand-alone EERS proposals include H.R. 2529 (Markey) and S. 548 (Schumer). They call for 
distribution utilities throughout the country to demonstrate 15% electricity savings and 10% natural 
gas savings by 2020.
162
 They have estimated peak demand savings of 117,000 MW.
163
 
The federal EERS implies annual savings targets, with utilities achieving 0.33% electricity and 
0.25% natural gas savings in the first year of implementation, relative to average energy sales in 
the preceding two years (the baseline). The initial savings targets start at modest levels, giving 
utilities in states without an existing EERS the opportunity to develop successful energy efficiency 
programs. Annual targets are higher at the end of the compliance period because savings from 
building codes and appliance standards build steadily in the later years. Additionally, targets have 
been ‘back-loaded’ to make it easier for utilities just starting to implement energy efficiency 
programs. Most utilities will be able to accrue savings in the early years reducing the new savings 
needed in the later years. 
Committee-passed Federal proposals – e.g. H.R. 2454 (Waxman-Markey); S. 1462 (Bingaman) – 
do not include a stand-alone EERS. They do include a Renewable Electricity Standard (RES), with 
EE eligible to meet a portion of the standard.
164
 
 HR 2454 S 1462 
Obligated 
entities 
Electric utilities with annual sales 
(excluding resale) of greater than 
4,000,000 MWh 
Electric utilities with annual sales 
(excluding resale) of greater than 
4,000,000 MWh; excludes HI 
Targets & 
Timetables 
Annual targets from 2012-2039; 6% of 
base amount in 2012 ramping to 20% 
in 2020 and beyond; 1/4 of the target 
can be met with EE; the Governor may 
petition to increase EE component to 
2/5 
Annual targets from 2011-2039; 3% of 
base amount in 2011 ramping to 15% in 
2021 and beyond; 26.67% of the target 





Electricity generated by hydro that does 
not qualify for the RE component, CCS, 
new nuclear 
Electricity generated by hydro, municipal 
solid waste, CCS, new nuclear or 




Customer facilities (including recycled 
energy), distribution system, CHP, fuel 
cells 
Customer facilities (including recycled 
energy), distribution system, CHP 
Eligible 
Mechanisms 
Utility played a ‘significant role’ in 
achieving savings (including through 
3rd parties or purchased savings); 
include savings from programs 
administered by the utility and funded 
by State, Federal, or other sources; 
excludes savings from mandatory 
building and appliance standards 
Utility achieved qualified savings, other 
entity achieved qualified savings and 
sold EE savings to a utility; excludes 





Allows for trading of energy savings 
occurring in the purchasing utility’s 
state and that meets EM&V 
requirements through bilateral contracts 
DOE to establish Federal EE credit 
trading program 
                                               
162
 http://www.aceee.org/research-report/e091.  
163
 http://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/E091.pdf.  
164
 http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/brown_presentation_1-19-2010.pdf.  
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Provides for electricity savings 
achieved through such programs to be 
distributed equitably among utilities with 
PUC direction 
Not explicitly addressed; potentially 
covered by section that allows for non-
utility entities to receive EE credits, 
which could be transferred to utilities 
EM&V FERC to prescribe standards & 
protocols for EM&V methods; and 
standards requiring 3rd party 
verification; States may propose 
alternative methods that are equivalent 
to FERC standards 
DOE to prescribe standards & protocols 
for EM&V methods; and standards 






FERC may delegate to States the 
authority to oversee EM&V and to 
determine annual savings that may 
count towards the compliance 
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D. EXAMPLES OF NETWORK DM165 
 
 
                                               
165
 Examples provided by the Energy Networks Association of Australia. 
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